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BORDERS, MOBILITY, AND MIGRATION

OCCASIONAL PUBLICATION #8
When you come to a fork in the road, take it
**Yogi Bera**

Sal, we gotta go and never stop going till we get there
Where we going, man?
I don’t know but we gotta go
**Jack Kerouac, On the Road**

If we travel long enough, my dear, we will come to some place or another in the end. What place it will be we can’t even guess at the moment but we’re sure to find out when we get there
**Frank Baum, The Road to Oz**

Homeland is one of the magical fantasy words like unicorn and soul and infinity that have now passed into language
**Zadie Smith, White Teeth**
CAPA: The Global Education Network

Mission

CAPA: The Global Education Network is an international education organization (IEO) committed to empowering student learning through personal choice, academic integrity, and engagement in urban environments abroad. For more than 45 years CAPA has worked with institutions of higher education to build programs that meet their goals for learning abroad. We operate education centers in global cities and have developed distinct academic offerings, support frameworks, and oversight structures for our students and visiting faculty.

The CAPA learning experience is characterized by the integration of curriculum, formal and informal experiential education, and study environments conducive to the analysis and exploration of the global cities in which we are located: learning laboratories in which students are empowered to develop their academic, personal, and professional skills.

Publications and Symposia

The symposium and Occasional Paper series are part of CAPA’s efforts to contribute to the theoretical basis of our work so as to enrich the learning, teaching, and research experience for all of us engaged in aspiring to be thoughtful and curious students in a complex world.
Acknowledgments

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The contributions here do not represent any particular view and are not in any sense CAPA’s thesis. Instead, they are offered as expressions of debate, analysis, agreement, and disagreement. They are intended to be a contribution to the field and a stimulus for further discussion and research.
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**Introduction: Borders, Migration, and Mobility in a Globalizing World**

Catherine Colon, Anthony Gristwood, and Michael Woolf  

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Catherine Colon is Vice President of Global Operations at CAPA: The Global Education Network. She is originally from California and began her career with CAPA in 1995. Catherine’s passion for study abroad developed as an undergraduate at Santa Clara University when she spent her third year studying at Durham University in the north of England. After completing her BS in Psychology, she returned to the UK and earned an MA in Sociology and Social Policy at Durham University. In 1999, after a few years working in the US, including at the Museum of Tolerance in West Los Angeles and CAPA’s former California office, Catherine returned to the UK and is based at the CAPA London Center.

Philip John Davies has authored and edited around thirty books and special journal issues and dozens of articles and book chapters, often in partnership with respected colleagues, on such subjects as US politics and film, politics and science fiction, the American city, the US Constitution, political marketing, the US presidency, and on many aspects of US elections. In addition, he has written about the US religious group, the Shakers, and has published several articles on Latvian electoral politics in the early post-Soviet years. His co-edited book on the early civil rights movement, From Sit-ins to SNCC (University Press of Florida, 2013), was nominated for the Organization of American Historians’ Liberty Legacy Foundation Award. Other recent co-edited books include Hollywood and the Great Depression (Edinburgh University Press, 2018), Reconfiguring the Union (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), and Broken Government: Politics in the Obama Era (Institute for the Study of the Americas, 2012). Professor Davies has served as President of the European Association for American Studies, Chair of the American Politics Group of the UK, Chair of the UK Council of Area Studies Associations, and Chair of the British Association for
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Foreword

John J. Christian, CAPA: The Global Education Network

When we began planning for the symposium and this subsequent publication, we were aware of the degree to which mobility was so much a part of our personal lives. At every conference I have ever attended one asks, and is asked, three inevitable questions: “How did you get here?” “When are you leaving?” and “Where are you staying?” These are devices through which we reconnect and express a friendly interest in our colleagues’ movements. We all attend many international conferences and need these ice breakers to begin meaningful conversations with our friends and colleagues around the globe. To do this, we must go beyond borders, and enter a world of public transport, movement, politics, and identities. We confront new complexities through the impact of globalization, some that unite us and, in some cases, disunite us.

Travel across national borders is simultaneously about leaving somewhere we may call home and an opportunity for introspection. An educational journey goes into new geographical space and, if welcomed into the self, impacts our thoughts. That is part of a core rationale for education abroad. New ideas in unfamiliar locations create challenges that are intellectual and emotional, informative and challenging.

What we were less immediately aware of in the early stages of our planning was that borders, mobility, and migration would become critical in the shifting political dynamics between 2016 and 2019. They have emerged as the dominant issues of these times. Perhaps naively, our professional motivations have been rooted in the belief that crossing borders enriches lives. From mobility, we learn that we are all, whatever our differences, humans deserving of freedom and respect. In short, our ideals are driven by internationalist values or by what some might call cosmopolitanism.

In the recent political climate, those ideals are sorely challenged. A liberal consensus, if it ever existed, has fractured. We live in an uneasy, uncomfortable present in which the emergent Right and militant parochialism challenges those things in which we believe, and thought were believed by the majority. We are cosmopolitans but we are cosmopolitans under siege. The rise of xenophobia is increasingly apparent, even in countries we associate with impeccable liberal tendencies: eighteen percent of the
Swedish electorate voted for the far right in June 2018 (Henley, 2018). In short, dominant political orthodoxies across the world increasingly appear to value walls rather than bridges.

Despite its rich multicultural history and in defiance of human rights principles, Hungary has become an extreme example of militant xenophobia. Hungary’s Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán of the Fidesz party, was re-elected Prime Minister for a fourth term in April 2018. He referred to refugees as “Muslim invaders” and migrants as a “poison” that his country does not need.

The “keep them out” policy was signposted by the triumphant construction, in June 2015, of a mammoth 175km-long, four-meter-high razor wire fence on the Hungarian-Serbian border. This impenetrable barrier was later extended to the Hungarian-Croatian frontier (Wallen, 2018).

Rabid prejudices against the outsider are expressed elsewhere in Europe, most notably in Poland and the Czech Republic. Traditional hatreds that we had hoped had disappeared have re-emerged in ways that recall darker constructs: the Europe of rampant nationalisms and embedded prejudice, the barbaric horrors of the twentieth century. We are reminded that Europe is a paradoxical space in which savagery co-exists with high art and literature.

Brexit demonstrates that the UK is turning away from its neighbors and while the Channel Tunnel created a physical connection and opportunities for commerce and community between the UK and continental Europe, some Brexiter might argue this is a threat. The idea of a wall between the USA and Mexico is a steel and concrete demonstration of similar isolationism. The $11 billion high-speed Vibrant Express train that connects Hong Kong with mainland China in twenty minutes for the first time could be seen as a bridge, creating ease of travel, and an opportunity for connection. However, many Hong Kong residents feel that it represents an ominous statement of intent:

The blurring of the line between Hong Kong and mainland China has alarmed residents and critics already uncomfortable with the city’s increasingly close ties with Beijing. Hong Kong, a special administrative region of China, operates under its own legal and judicial system. To many, the sleek new rail link and station are symbols of Beijing’s creeping hold over the city and its slow but seemingly inevitable assimilation into China (Kuo, 2018: n. p.)
If these present a bleak scenario, we also need to recognize that as international educators we have an urgent, pressing, moral responsibility to commit to the ideals embedded in our work.

In short, our job is to demonstrate to our students that a more connected and interdependent world is possible and is the path to a better future for all. As Dr Martin Luther King Jr said, “We must all learn to live together as brothers - or we will all perish together as fools.”¹

At CAPA, we are committed to developing opportunities that are enriching for students and that empower them to go beyond the unexamined assumptions, stereotypes, and distortions that litter this environment. We also know that we cannot do this without looking into ourselves, without the kinds of introspection that we aspire to stimulate in our Occasional Papers. It is not possible to combat thoughtless prejudice thoughtlessly.

Borders, mobility, and migration raise critical questions for all of us. I want to thank the contributors to the symposium and to this volume for their work, and for their thought. We may not have solved questions, but we have created a brave space marked by reason, passion, and intellect. That is an essential prerequisite if we are ultimately to acquire the wisdom we will need to move beyond borders, to transcend hatreds, and to recognize the ineffable beauty of our common humanity.

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¹ Rev Dr Martin Luther King Jr, Commencement Address for Oberlin College, June 14, 1965, Oberlin, Ohio.
Introduction: Borders, Mobility, and Migration in a Globalizing World

Catherine Colon, Anthony Gristwood, Michael Woolf
CAPA: The Global Education Network

Ambiguities and Globalization

The fall of the Berlin Wall thirty years ago was heralded as the harbinger of accelerating globalization, an inexorable process which, it was widely supposed, would inevitably bring us all closer together through economic integration and worldwide interconnectedness. Thus, in 1989, Francis Fukuyama triumphantly announced the “end of history,” and a few years later Thomas Friedman declared *The World is Flat* (Fukuyama, 1989; 1992; Friedman, 2005). Others predicted the end of political boundaries and the nation-state in a “borderless” world of what Zygmunt Bauman called “liquid modernity” in which goods, people, and capital would be much freer to circulate and flow (Ohmae, 1995; Bauman, 2000).

Instead, as Tim Marshall has pointed out, we have been driven to construct even more barriers:

> We are seeing walls being built along borders everywhere ... Thousands of miles of walls and fences have gone up around the world in the twenty-first century. At least sixty-five countries, more than a third of the world’s nation-states, have built barriers along their borders; half of those erected since the Second World War sprang up between 2000 and now (2018: 2)

Our globalizing world is contradictory; simultaneously, borders are transcended by networks and connectivity while others are being constructed and reinforced at a multitude of scales in response to perceived threats, such as financial crises, terrorism, refugees, immigrants, and the increasing divides between rich and poor.

Some of those borders are physical; others are virtual or digital. The historian Timothy Snyder reminds us that this is nowhere more evident than along the geographical fault-lines which divide rich from poor countries: their physical and symbolic reinforcement constitutes a “wall around the West” (Andreas and Snyder, 2000). Globalization brings conditions for more interesting and fulfilling lives, but only for some people. The mobility
and “connectedness” they enjoy may happen at the expense of other marginalized citizens and peripheral places.

The cluster of ideas accumulated around these interconnected themes reflect ambiguities that permeate our lives in these troubled times. These notions are problematic, reformed through histories, contemporary realities, technological change, political will, prejudice, aspiration, and a myriad of other factors that, in combination, have reshaped the world and reconstructed human experience. They also occupy a critical space in education abroad. The diverse essays in this volume reveal a field of discussion that is complex, contested, and closely connected to issues of globalization, the subject of CAPA’s Seventh Occasional Paper.

The Politics of Borders and Borderlands

Making Walls and Building Bridges

The definition, reconfiguration, reinforcement, and removal of borders has been a constant of human history, generally reflecting social, economic, and political dynamics. Borders, and the ambiguous borderlands which they create, therefore, have fluid meanings and purposes. As Annmarie Whalen and Timothy Lynn Elliott argue in this volume, they have become carriers of history, distinctive spaces that have acquired meaning through the practices and experiences connected with them.

Historically, some borders may also have been “sensed” rather than tightly defined. For example, the famous walls of the Roman or Chinese Empires were perhaps viewed more as porous zones than actual definitive lines: “frontier” borderlands. As the relationship between power and space shifted, and as advances in cartography led to more accurate mapping of territory, European borders became progressively more “solid.” The Treaty of Westphalia (1648) is often seen as the moment when an international system of states, with such “solid” containing borders, is defined, at least in Europe (Lange and Miranda Pires, 2015: 294-297). Over subsequent centuries, borders became ever more identifiable as lines of demarcation. Colonialism served to export this system across the world to create new states and divide existing nations. The border itself was a key mechanism through which national identities were progressively invented.
However, as globalization accelerated, borders started to assume other dimensions becoming, in some cases, “bridges” connecting territories or symbols of identity; new border regions emerged as centers of active partnership or cooperation. Borders thus become “Janus-faced” and plural. For example, the EU’s internal “liquid” borders (facilitating the free movement of EU citizens across member states) remain “solid” to those on the outside: a “Fortress Europe.” Borders which are “liquid” to flows of capital remain stubbornly “solid” to migrants (Lange and Miranda Pires, 2015: 297-299). Redefining the “nation” and protecting its borders from “alien” intrusion has become a recurrent priority in an increasingly isolationist and parochial time.

Philip John Davies uses a wide range of sources to examine the ways in which the hotly-contested US midterm elections of 2017 were inflamed by political rhetoric surrounding the funding and implementation of the US-Mexican Border Wall in the face of the so-called “Migrant Caravan.” The idea of a physical wall to keep Mexican immigrants out of the country was a central part of Donald Trump’s manifesto, but the USA is by no means alone in an increasing commitment to the notion that foreign intrusion dilutes and threatens national identities. In September 2015, the Hungarian government built barriers to ensure that its border with Serbia was no longer a permeable route for immigrants; since August 2017, the forced displacement from Myanmar of more than 700,000 Rohingya, a Muslim minority, demonstrates a redefinition of citizenship to exclude certain groups; thousands of migrants have died attempting to cross the Mediterranean, the liquid border into the EU, as Angeliki Dimitriadi’s and Simona Wright’s chapters in this volume starkly attest. Exclusion has emerged as a nationalist priority in many places.

Dimitriadi and Wright analyze the tragic consequences of enforced mobility from diverse but interlocking perspectives. Focusing on Greece, the authors illuminate the political, humanitarian, and philosophical challenges to European “values” that arise from refugees seeking to cross the “liquid” border of the Mediterranean. The dual processes of removing strangers (variously defined) and protecting borders signals a rejection of internationalist ideals. Positive attitudes to immigration have historically signaled development and renewal, while by contrast, in cycles of isolationism, immigration has been classified as invasion and alien intrusion.

Paradoxically, as borders have gained in significance, they have also become increasingly irrelevant. Global challenges to the environment are not
constrained by frontiers. No walls can protect a nation from the potentially catastrophic implications of global warming. Polluted oceans do not obey the dictates of isolationist politicians.

There is another sense in which borders have become eroded. Notions of community are no longer only defined by geography; travel and technologies have created channels through which actual and metaphorical communities develop without regard to geographical space or national boundaries, as Jason Cole argues in his examination of the growing significance of digital “algorithmic” nations and borders. For Kirsty Allison, social media has the potential to allow disparate ideas and ideologies to transcend the efforts made to exclude them by the forces of corporate capitalism, or by governments threatened by discordant voices. As both Allison and Cole note, the metaphorical borders between ourselves and “others” have shifted significantly. “Friends” are no longer only defined by those we know or have met. As well as progressively shrinking the spaces that we now consider unfamiliar, technology has redefined relationships. We are both closer and further apart, connected and disconnected. In short, borders, geographical, imaginative, or virtual, have become simultaneously more and less significant.

The virtual, digital world allows for more sophisticated and subtle forms of barriers to regulate and segregate: witness digital passport terminals or the “fast” and “slow” tracks at border control in airports today. British Brexeters have been convinced that smart surveillance technology holds the solution to the conundrum of the UK-Irish border post-Brexit. If Facebook were a country, it would be the most populous nation on Earth; its worldwide users are now more numerous than the population of China. Yet, it is a “nation” divided. Cole and Allison point out that social media, far from unifying us, has given rise to new warring cyber-tribes and the proliferation of fake news. Indeed, the Chinese comparison is an ironic one, given that the Great Firewall of China (known in China itself as the “Golden Shield”) prevents its population from accessing Facebook (among other sites) to preserve the social and political cohesion of Chinese society and the power of the Communist state—what the Chinese government calls “digital sovereignty” (Marshall, 2018: 27-30).

The International Education Context

Crossing borders is at the heart of our endeavors. These borders may be geographically defined or, like nations, created by political expediency:
“complex human constructs” that are the subject of Timothy Lynn Elliott’s illuminating essay. As Elliott demonstrates, political borders and nations are not static. In our living memories, the map of Europe has been redefined. Countries come and go. Where is Yugoslavia? In An Atlas of Countries that Don’t Exist (2015), Nick Middleton lists fifty countries whose borders are now matters of aspiration or imagination. The fluidity of the global environment is part of the context in which international education functions. Nations are, in short, inventions.

Not all borders are geographical. To varying degrees, race, class, religion, gender, and so on may create barriers that are not always immediately evident. Navigating these hidden structures requires “membership” in clubs and associations in which the rules can only be read by those who belong. The idea of a “glass ceiling” and gender pay gap, or the hidden demarcations of the class system, may prove a barrier to advancement or inclusion. Jews were historically barred from the more exclusive golf clubs; many Ivy League universities in the US operated a quota system limiting enrollment of certain groups. Harvard notoriously imposed strict limitations. In 1935, the Dean of the Medical School, Milton Winternitz, issued the following edict: “Never admit more than five Jews, take only two Italian Catholics, and take no blacks at all” (Burrow, 2008: 107). Gender distinctions also create barriers and borders. At the height of Apartheid in South Africa, the bar at the Newlands Cricket Club in Cape Town was one of the few social facilities open to all races. It did, however, carry one bizarre exception: no women were admitted. These borders are also subject to erosion and reconstruction as regulations alter in the face of changing dynamics.²

Borders may also be metaphorical; in education abroad, diminishing the imagined and material barriers to mobility is a critical element in our efforts to increase diversity. The contribution of ‘Dimeji Togunde and Rokhaya Fall describes a set of strategic initiatives through which Spelman College has created pathways to enhance student education abroad opportunities at a Historically Black institution. That essay, in conjunction with the work of Evelyn Lueker, Aaron Bruce, and David Wick, addresses the imperative to increase inclusion of under-represented groups in education abroad. Both papers also demonstrate that such borders are not static or inevitable. The question of unequal access to educational mobility is manifest not only within the USA. Drawing upon his experience in South Africa, Bradley

² This may be illustrated through another example drawn from the arcane world of cricket. In March 1999, women were allowed access to the Pavilion at Lords, the home of English cricket, after 200 years of dogged resistance by some gentlemen.
Rink focuses on: “systematic inequalities that continue to hinder broader and more equal access to higher education mobility ... within and across the global South.” Borders are not simply a line between nations; they also represent metaphorical barriers that simultaneously create opportunities and unevenly separate populations from those opportunities.

Annmarie Whalen’s analysis of the significance of borders draws attention to the many ways in which borders offer both material for study and a mechanism for enriching learning. The border has multiple meanings which resonate with “the essence of education abroad.”

In education abroad, we deal in distinctions and differences, and construct “abroad” as alien space that we need to teach students to negotiate (in notions of cross- or inter-cultural studies). This rather archaic emphasis, heavily reliant on the somewhat nineteenth-century notion of the primacy of the nation-state, and on the illusion that nations and cultures coincide, obscures the possibility that transnational alignments may have become as significant as national distinctions. In short, Woolf argues, that which unites us is as important as that which divides us.

At the same time, our students are challenged to cross probably the most difficult border of all: that which separates the primacy of self from the realities of others. We are only at the center of our own world and peripheral to others. That is a profound lesson and a difficult experience, not just for our students but for all of us.

The Politics of Mobility

Mobility is central to our work. In the international, cosmopolitan mind, it is a pre-condition for enlightened education. However, we also want students to understand that their voluntary mobility is a privilege. Many in this troubled world are precluded from mobility by poverty or politics. For many more, mobility is involuntary, sometimes with tragic consequences. International educators and our students are a privileged elite. For us, mobility is a process in which we go towards something positive: education, adventure, engagement with new ideas and experiences.

Voluntary mobility is, however, a privilege granted to a relatively small part of the world’s population. The more common experience is, and has been, that of banishment, exile, displacement, expulsion, and deportation. As Michael Woolf’s essay demonstrates, the histories of the Jews and Roma
are indicative of forced mobility. Dimitriadi’s and Wright’s analyses of the Mediterranean migrant “crisis” illuminate many continuities between the experience of forced displacement and exile in the past and present.

Examples of forced mobility have also been subject to varying degrees of historical amnesia. The Cherokee were forced off their lands in 1838 and 1839 as a result of the Indian Removal Act in the US. This enforced exile, “the Trail of Tears,” reflects the manner in which the line between exile and genocide has blurred. By way of further example, between 1904 and 1907, German colonial forces in what is now Namibia pursued a policy of expulsion in which Herero, Nama, and San people were driven from their homes largely to die in the desert. Survivors were imprisoned in concentration camps and subject to “scientific” experimentation which prefigured Nazi atrocities. An estimate of over 130,000 people were exterminated. Between 1967 and 1973, the residents of Diego Garcia, part of the Chagos Islands, were forcibly expelled by the British government to allow the US to establish a military base. Frankie Bontemps, the chair of the Chagos Islanders Welfare Group, said of this collusion of the powerful over the weak: “We have been British citizens for 200 years but are treated as undesirable aliens” (Doward, 2016).

War and persecution have been dominant catalysts for mobility. The Spanish Inquisition drove populations across the world for over 300 years (1478 to 1834). As the power of Spain grew and its territories expanded, displacement of religious minorities intensified: “In their own generation, they [the Spanish] had defeated the Moors, kicked out the Jews, enslaved the Indians, and conquered more territory than Rome had in five centuries” (Kritzler, 2009: 51).

Exile as punishment has both political and Biblical roots. Adam and Eve were forced to leave the Garden of Eden and their errant son, Cain, similarly earned the wrath of God, as Amor Towles notes in the novel A Gentleman in Moscow:

As long as there have been men on earth ... there have been men in exile ... After all, exile was the punishment that God meted out to Adam in the very first chapter of the human comedy; and that he meted out to Cain a few pages later (2016: 164)

Home offers security and identity; the loss of home as traumatic dislocation is embedded in human histories. Expulsion in history and literature is a
profound punishment, in some cases a consequence of defeat (Napoleon’s exiles on Elba and St Helena are obvious examples). In literary contexts, it offers Shakespeare a device through which to explore the intense implications for the “individual in adversity” (Prohodsky, 1965: 13) in *King Lear*, *Romeo and Juliet*, *Coriolanus*, *The Tempest* etc.

The late Rabbi Hugo Gryn described the twentieth century as “a century of refugees” (Gryn, 1996). The word “refugee,” a French term first coined to describe the influx of Protestant Huguenots arriving in London having fled religious persecution in Roman Catholic France, is critical to our understanding of unfortunate realities. It illuminates the contradictions inherent in the notion of mobility: as a gateway to opportunity, pleasure, enrichment, freedom, and liberation, the broadening of landscapes; and also, more frequently, representing a lack of choice, constriction of freedom, less going towards some desirable objective and more about escape from intolerable situations. As Warsan Shire attests in *Teaching My Mother How to Give Birth* (2011): “No one leaves home unless home is the mouth of a shark.” For many, mobility represents tragic displacement, punishment, a political problem, an environmental dilemma, and a cause and consequence of conflict.

**The Many Faces of Migration**

The essays collected here represent a rich diversity of approaches to studies of migration.

*Landscape of Migration*

As this collection demonstrates, notions of mobility resonate with our lives in a multitude of ways. Richard Maguire looks at cruising in the context of queer identity and history evoking notions of loss of community. He concludes that “in the face of the homogenization of gay culture, elegy may be our only consolation.”

Two other essays offer similarly original landscapes in which the impacts of mobility may be perceived. Martha Johnson draws upon the difficult historical experiences of Chinese immigrants in America. They experienced marginalization, intolerance, and racist violence. She moves from that narrative to discuss the manner in which Asian-American creativity, particularly in the work of the playwright David Henry Hwang, subverts the myth of assimilation. His play, *The Dance and the Railroad*, draws upon the complex contours of Asian Americans’ relationship with the “American
Dream.” The work of “identity” playwrights enriches and complicates the notion of an American identity. The “American Dream,” made complex by Johnson and others represented here, is essentially a nineteenth-century construct that conflates the idea of refuge with landscapes of opportunity. The US was for generations of immigrants “a distant magnet” representing escape from inhospitable environments: opportunity, aspiration, dream, a national formative myth.

Caterina Romei also takes a specific historical space (the Uffizi gallery at the end of the eighteenth century) and traces the development of taste from the time of the Grand Tour to the contemporary influx of tourists and students. Her study identifies the fluid nature of aesthetic judgment. William Brustein demonstrates that intolerant prejudice and racist hatred are all too mobile across national boundaries and ideologies. In an essay that challenges assumptions about ideological alignments, he traces the manner in which anti-Semitism has moved between Right and Left political contexts. Kirsty Allison engages with the notion of “the identity spectrum” in tension with technology and creativity. These authors use specific histories to offer significant insights into the broader questions of the impacts of mobilities upon contemporary environments, and upon the ways in which we construct our experiences. Mobility is not just about the movement of people. Ideas, ideologies, and identities are fluid, and are not constrained by borders. For good or ill, religious or secular narratives spread across frontiers despite nationalist or exclusionary intentions.

The Immigrant

In many parts of the world, migration has become a political issue that divides and fragments nations. From one perspective, migration has enriched the lives of residents while for others it represents alien intrusion. This is partly a question of ideology but is also a matter of lived experience and geography. Attitudes to international students reflect these ambiguities. The British Government makes no distinction between international students and immigrants (seeking to reduce radically the total numbers). President Trump has expressed an intention to reduce the number of Chinese students studying in the USA. In contrast, Canada creates conditions in which international students can seamlessly move towards citizenship. Those distinctions reflect, on one level at least, perceived national priorities, economic aspirations, and demographic needs.
The figure of the immigrant has always been ambiguous. They may be welcome as imported labor to meet developmental needs, but they also experience prejudice and isolation. As a consequence, an ideological divide has emerged between those who hate or fear outsiders and those who express empathy with them for economic, political, ethical, or religious reasons.

While immigrants may or may not be welcome, they are frequently portrayed as having lost or compromised identity. Whatever economic or lifestyle benefits have accrued, the process of immigration is rarely presented as untroubled. Almost every popular Irish song, for example, bears a message of painful separation typified in the lachrymose sentimentality of “Danny Boy”:

Oh Danny Boy, the pipes the pipes are calling from glen to glen and down the mountain side the summer’s gone and all the flowers dying it’s you it’s you must go, and I must bide (Frederic Weatherly, 1913)

The other recurrent element in Irish popular song is a yearning for return, as typified by the ballad “Carrickfergus”:

I wish I was in Carrickfergus … but the sea is wide and I cannot cross over nor do I have any wings to fly (Traditional)

Brendan Graham’s song, “Isle of Hope, Isle of Tears,” exemplifies ambiguities in the representation of the immigrant experience:

On the first day of January Eighteen Ninety-two They Opened Ellis Island And they let the people through. And the first to cross the threshold Of the Isle of hope and tears Was Annie Moore from Ireland Who was all of fifteen years. Isle of hope, Isle of tears, Isle of freedom, Isle of fears,
But it’s not the Isle I left behind ...
That Isle of hunger, Isle of pain,
Isle you’ll never see again
But the Isle of home is always on your mind

The immigrant may also become a metaphorical “orphan,” as a character in Inua Ellams’ play The Barber Shop Chronicles laments:

We who live outside our countries left because our leaders, our fathers, failed us somehow, or the system was designed for us to fail. We’re lost to our motherlands … motherless too. Maybe we are all orphans here (2017: 72)

Loss is also, however, balanced against the acquisition of new identities, symbolized in the idea of language in Grace Nichols’ poem “Epilogue” (1983):

I have crossed an ocean
I have lost my tongue
From the roots of the old one
A new one has sprung

Internal Migration: Two Case Studies

Significant migration has not only taken place across national boundaries. The growth of megacities is, in part, a consequence of the movement of rural populations to urban environments in search of improved economic and social conditions. However, other examples drawn from US history offer examples of alternative motivations. In the 1930s, Dust Bowl migration was driven by an environmental catastrophe; in the 1940s, Black migration from the American South was driven by prejudicial conditions.

In Camden, New Jersey, in 1940 the singer and song writer Woody Guthrie recorded Dust Bowl Ballads for Victor Records. Those songs commemorate an environmental disaster which led to the largest migration in American history. About 2.5 million people left the Dust Bowl states, Texas, New Mexico, Colorado, Nebraska, Kansas, and Oklahoma, during the 1930s. From Oklahoma alone 440,000 people migrated to California to escape profound poverty. This was not a rural to urban movement but rather inter-rural migration.
The causes are well documented. Over-cultivation and drought led to the erosion of prairie grasses. High winds blew the soil away, resulting in massive dust storms, “black blizzards,” “dust pneumonia,” and the destruction of farmland. Desperate migrants moved westward. In “Talkin’ Dust Bowl Blues” (1940), Woody Guthrie described a tragic dislocation:

I’ve seen the dust so black that I couldn’t see a thing,
I’ve seen the wind so high that it blowed my fences down,
Buried my tractor six feet underground.
When you get that dust pneumonia, boy, it’s time to go

These migrants did not inevitably find refuge or welcome from their countrymen. In California, they were disdainfully called “Okies” regardless of where they came from. Whatever work was available was mostly low-paid and menial.4

“Jim Crow” racist law and practice discriminating against African Americans was a catalyst for another manifestation of internal migration in the US. There were several waves of Black migration following Emancipation, but the largest took place in the 1940s, involving an estimated 1.5 million moving from the rural South to the Northern cities. The impact of this migration extended well beyond the 1940s; the majority of the Black population became essentially urban. Cities of the North East in particular became racially diverse in ways that altered the patterns of urban life.

The Civil War and the Reconstruction era had not brought equality of opportunity or treatment for Black Americans in the South. “Jim Crow” restored racialist practices and laws enforcing segregation. The North was no promised land, but for many African Americans it represented enhanced opportunities and, at least, some liberation from institutionalized prejudice.

An escape from the segregationist laws and customs within the nation is a distinctive example of internal migration. The pursuit of better employment opportunities reflects recurrent motivations. In short, approaches to mobility illustrate the complex interaction of escape and aspiration narratives that characterize this area of investigation.

3 For basic summaries of the key events, see http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/depression/dustbowl.htm and https://livinghistoryfarm.org/farminginthe30s/water_02.html.
4 John Steinbeck in The Grapes of Wrath (1939) records in prose the suffering of these refugees in ways that resonate with the songs of Guthrie.
Conclusion: Mobilities, Migrations, and the Making of Space

Mobility is critical to the work of international educators. Simply put, mobilities are embedded in the practice and ideologies of the field. This reflects the assumption that learning, research, and the exchange of knowledge are enhanced by studies that transcend national boundaries, literally and metaphorically. Nations are divided by borders that are, for the most part, socially and politically constructed, rather than determined solely by physical geography. Disciplines are artificial and fluid ways of organizing knowledge. In that sense, international and interdisciplinary approaches to learning are aligned and present an opportunity to enrich student learning abroad by illuminating interaction, connection, and conjunction.

Mobilities have also shaped our environments in demonstrable ways. Ireland again offers a particular example; as the songs of Ireland indicate, mobility has defined national identity and a national psyche. As Brendan Behan remarked, the Irish and the Jews are both shaped by enforced mobility: “Other people have a nationality. The Irish and the Jews have a psychosis” (attributed).

Behan’s humor masks a tragic history reflected in the demography of the island of Ireland. The current population is estimated at around 6.6 million of which over 4.85 million reside in the Republic. In the early 1840s, the population was estimated at around 8.4 million. Irish history and the Irish diaspora were shaped by the potato famine or Great Hunger which blighted the country between 1845 and 1851. An estimated one million people died and perhaps as many as two million emigrated to escape starvation and disease. By 1851, the population had fallen to around 6.5 million. There is no other nation in the developed world where the contemporary population is lower than that in the nineteenth century. The question of an Irish identity is a matter of the complex interaction of a traumatic history with inherited memory. The critical shaping dynamics derive from mobility and migration.

Cities have also been constructed by mobility and migration. New York offers an example of an urban environment shaped by waves of migration. Ellis Island, the entry point for immigrants from 1892 to 1954, has attained an iconic status in the national myths of America: “a kind of secular church”

6 Sylviane Gold’s review of Ireland’s Great Hunger Museum vividly demonstrates the horror of this history (Gold, 2013).
according to the novelist and essayist Jerome Charyn (2018). London also exemplifies an urban space made by immigration of diverse people. In 2016, the city elected a Muslim mayor, Sadiq Khan, whose parents migrated from Pakistan in 1968. Waves of immigration have created what the Anglo-Caribbean poet Benjamin Zephaniah designates a “London Breed,” a people distinctively formed by migrations:

We just keep melting into one
Just like the tribes before us did,
I love dis concrete jungle still
With all its sirens and its speed
The people here united will
Create a kind of London breed
(Zephaniah, 2001)

For CAPA, these environments are at the heart of our academic agenda. Programs are rooted in the contested environment of “global cities.” However these may be defined, they share some key characteristics. The global city is not bounded by its geography. It is both part of the nation and apart, and beyond, those borders. The idea of a global city is, in a literal sense, metaphorical. The term is an oxymoron given that it is in the nature of all cities to be located in a specific space and to be enclosed, however approximately, in geographic boundaries. As a center for exploration and discovery, participation and observation, the global city offers a rich field of academic potential precisely because it is (by its nature) multi-layered, multi-dimensional, fluid, complex, and challenging.

To travel through these cities is to encounter juxtaposition and asymmetry, movement and flow. Through that created space flows in (and out) culture, wealth, influence, crime, and people. That said, the global city is more than a metaphor in one very concrete sense: “For centuries, the world economy has shaped the life of cities” (Sassen, 1991: 3). The reverse is, of course, also true. The life of cities has shaped the world economy. Historically, the great city-states of, for example, Venice and Genoa facilitated the flow of talent, goods, trade, and power around the world. In the twenty-first century, the “city-state” is re-emergent: that essentially is one dimension of a global city; it grows beyond its boundaries and is a world in itself. There may be paradoxical consequences. Global cities are “highly concentrated command posts in the organization of the world economy … key locations for finance and specialized service firms” (1991: 3). The global city concentrates wealth
and controls capital. International professionals are drawn to these centers as places of glamor and potential riches. In direct contrast, though for similar reasons, the global city is a magnet for the dispossessed. What Sassen calls “the urban glamour zone and the urban war zone” coexist in the global city where, consequently, the gulf between the wealthy and the dispossessed is dramatically present (Sassen, 1996: 221).

The global city is, in summation, not just a poetic construct; more than the Byzantium of the mind, it demonstrates the conjunction of rich and poor and the primacy of wealth distinctions that are enormous, global, and deeply unjust; the global city is a landscape of the imagination, a cultural magnet, and a place of deep, disturbing discord where wealth and poverty uneasily coexist. Global cities themselves may be harbingers of a globalized, borderless future, “transterritorial spaces” of super-diversity, but within them, internal, “sensed” borders proliferate. Architecture and urban design have become deliberate vehicles for border-making and segregation in urban communities. The mobility of residents in Mumbai, Buenos Aires, or London is limited both symbolically and legally by aspects of current urbanism, such as gated enclaves, privatized public spaces, or the phenomenon of “poor doors” which segregate tenants from owner-occupiers in some new housing developments. Indeed, the cutting edge of neoliberal urbanism, gentrification, has become the main process by which urban regeneration takes place, and involves the inevitable social displacement of existing communities. For Saskia Sassen, such processes are part of the “disaggregation” of borders in a world dominated by neoliberal globalization, in which they fragment and splinter into many different forms and scales (Sassen, 2007).

Richard Maguire’s critical analysis of the shifting boundaries of the city’s queer spaces and their representation in popular culture draws our attention to the ways in which urban spaces are striated by many “hidden” boundaries; here, too, displacement and exclusion are key to current social dynamics. However, cities are not, for the most part, congenial places for militant parochialism. They are made, and shaped, by migrations. Populations in cities are inevitably in motion. On the most basic level, the scale of cities makes the residents mobile. Commuting is a necessary part of daily lives; lifestyles are not static. In microcosm, daily commuting is a kind of metaphor for the ways in which cities have evolved through movement rather than stasis.
As William Shakespeare tells us “There is nothing either good or bad but thinking makes it so” (*Hamlet*). Thus, paradox permeates the contours of the chapters which follow. The complex interplay of borders, boundaries, and various forms of mobility continues to shape the world we inhabit and our everyday lives in profound and contradictory ways. For many, “belonging” has become a mutable, fluid form of identification. For others, accidents of borders and the freedom to cross them may determine whether they live or die. For good or ill, few of us have a fixed sense of belonging. Home has become an idea, perhaps an aspiration, but rarely an unchanging location, rarely the place in which we were born or the place where we shall return to die. The impact of migrations has shaped the places and modes of our lives.
BORDERS AND BORDERLANDS

A nation that cannot control its borders is not a nation
Ronald Reagan

A nation ringed by walls will only imprison itself
Barack Obama

We must protect our borders from the ravages of other countries
Donald Trump

Protecting a border is not a nice thing. It is not a matter of aesthetics; it cannot be done with flowers and teddy bears
Viktor Orbán

Borders have lives of their own. They move, shift, metamorphose, edge, retract, emerge tall or powerful or retreat into the shadows exhausted
Nevzat Soguk

Like all walls [it was] ambiguous, two-faced. What was inside it and what was outside it depended upon which side you were on
Ursula K. Le Guin, The Dispossessed

We have been engaged in drawing lines upon maps where no white man’s foot has ever trod: we have been giving away mountains and rivers and lakes to each other, only hindered by the small impediment that we never knew where the mountains and rivers and lakes were
Lord Salisbury 1890 on the Scramble for Africa

Evolution has made Homo sapiens, like other social mammals, a xenophobic creature. Sapiens instinctively divide humanity into two parts, “we” and “they”
Yuval Noah Harari, Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind
National and local elections are always conducted with borders in mind. The act of voting confirms the connection between the electorate and the constituencies that encompass them as well as having potential impact on the shapes that borders may take in the future. Borders and voters too are responsive to migration and mobility. The US midterm elections of 2018 illustrated these cross references in high relief.

President Trump, elected to a four-year term in 2016, was not on the ballot in the midterms of 2018, but placed himself front and center in the Republican Party’s campaign to a degree probably unique in presidential conduct. While Donald Trump’s rhetoric has been excoriated by critics for containing many inaccuracies and for its hyperbolic style, the general themes of a Trump campaign rally remain remarkably consistent and reflect positions that, at least in some policy areas, he had expressed before launching his pursuit of high office.

The Trump campaign’s slogan “Make America Great Again” may not have been wholly original, but it does encapsulate a sense of place, nationhood, and policy direction that, in the case of the Trump presidency, includes a deep skepticism of multilateralism and of international treaties that threaten, in the administration’s eyes, to limit the USA’s freedom of operation on the world stage. Many enthusiastic Trump supporters share the president’s concerns about places and peoples outside their nation’s borders and perceive the administration’s withdrawal from such entanglements as actions taken in defense of those borders.

There is an extensive list of Trump administration withdrawals from international bodies, including the UN Human Rights Council, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, the Paris Agreement on climate change mitigation, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (Iran Nuclear Deal), the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and even the Universal Postal Union. The president has cast doubt on the value to America of NATO. He has confronted, boldly and independently, China on trade and North Korea on nuclear weapons. His cancellation or re-negotiations of the Trans-Pacific
Partnership, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, and the North American Free Trade Area extends this response to confronting the perceived threat of foreign entanglements in the areas of international trade, customs, and tariffs. Many of these actions have been controversial, but they share a consistent approach to policies that revolve around the concept of determining behaviors that relate to the nation’s sense of its borders.

The significance of America’s southern border to Donald Trump’s politics was evident from the very first day of his formal campaign. In June 2016, he announced his candidacy with a speech that promised to erect “a great, great wall on our southern border,” and to “make Mexico pay for that wall.” He accused Mexico of “sending people that have lots of problems … They’re bringing drugs, they’re bringing crime, they’re rapists …” At the same time, he opined that “Mexico has our jobs” because of trade arrangements poorly negotiated by previous presidential administrations (Neate, 2015).

The Trump campaign deployed powerfully anthemic rally chants, often made up of three short words: “Lock Her Up” and “Her Lies Matter” were aimed at his Democrat opponent Hillary Clinton. “Drain the Swamp” targeted more generally the political class inside the Beltway. “Build the Wall” became the most powerful border-related rallying cry of the Trump campaign, carrying with it the memory of associated rhetoric relating to the southern border and its peoples. Perhaps one should not be surprised that “Finish the Wall” emerged as a derivative mantra during the 2018 midterm campaign rallies.

As the midterm elections approached, President Trump concentrated particularly on refugees and migrants, many fleeing violence in Central America, who were making their way through Mexico towards the US border, and who became labeled “the Caravan.” On October 22, 2018, the President tweeted “… it looks like Mexico’s Police and Military are unable to stop the Caravan heading to the Southern Border of the United States. Criminals and unknown Middle Easterners are mixed in. I have alerted Border Control and Military that this is a National Emerg[enc]y” (Trump, 2018). The president’s intervention was challenged as being unsupported by evidence and misleading: for example, there being no reports of Middle Eastern participation in the Caravan and no legitimate role for the military in immigration operations (Qui, 2018). A week later, with just a week to go before Election Day, the Caravan had reduced considerably in size and was still a substantial distance from any border crossing point. Donald Trump nevertheless escalated
his rhetoric, characterizing the Caravan as “an invasion of our country” by “a lot of bad people” (Shear and Gibbons-Neff, 2018).

The weaponization and manipulation of border issues in election campaigns and political rhetoric is not particular to the 2018 midterms, nor to the USA. In 1983, President Ronald Reagan rallied congressional support for his Central America policies by pointing out that “El Salvador is nearer to Texas than Texas to Massachusetts. Nicaragua is just as close to Miami, San Antonio, San Diego and Tucson as those cities are to Washington ...” (Reagan, 1983). He later returned to the same theme, pointing out that Nicaragua was “only two hours’ flying time from our own borders” (Reagan, 1986). United Kingdom Independence Party leader Nigel Farage encouraged his fellow Britons to vote to leave the European Union by using the image of a line of migrants queueing to enter Slovenia to exemplify the threat to British borders (Lowe, 2016). In 2017, Netherlands politician Geert Wilders launched his election campaign targeting in particular Moroccan immigrants as “scum” and tying this into his ambition to “make the Netherlands for the people of the Netherlands, your own home again ...” (McKie, 2017).

In rallying his electorate in support of Republican midterm candidates, President Trump placed border issues at the center of his message, calling 2018 “the election of the caravan” (Peters, 2018). This message was complemented by other administration actions like the separation of families at the border (Thompson, 2018), the administration’s claim in a recent court case that it has the power to block access to abortions sought by undocumented migrants under the age of eighteen who are in government custody (Pear, 2018), and President Trump’s intimation that he would like to end the US constitutional right to birthright citizenship (MCardle, 2018). The unsubstantiated claim that large numbers of non-citizens are engaged in voter fraud in the USA has further been used to justify widespread attempts in Republican controlled states to limit access to voting, with the effects falling most onerously on poor and minority racial and ethnic groups (Toobin, 2018).

The concentration on the perceived threat from a group of potential migrants, likely-to-fail migrants, and applicants for refugee status hundreds of miles from the border, sought to expand the electorate’s mental map of the border of the USA deep into Mexico. The policy and rhetorical links made to perceived threats from the presence of migrants inside the USA simultaneously brought the border into every community, however deep in
the nation’s heartland. In combination, this strategy was likely to heighten anxiety among those voters for whom concerns about personal and national security were high on their agenda.

In the 2018 elections, some other campaigners followed the presidential lead in highlighting border and immigration issues. Donald Trump Jr commented on the Maine elections for US Senate that “Angus King … wants to repopulate Maine with Syrian and Somalian refugees. Support Senator Brakey who fights for secure borders …” (Trump Jr, 2018). The fact that Phil Bredesen, Democrat candidate for Senate in Tennessee broadcast an advertisement illustrating his own earlier use of the Tennessee National Guard on the southern border did not protect him from attacks by his opponent Marsha Blackburn that he had “lured illegal immigrants to Tennessee” (Sher, 2018).

Chris Collins of New York and Duncan Hunter of California were the first two Members of the US House of Representatives to endorse Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign. Both ran successfully for re-election to the US House of Representatives in 2018 while under federal indictment, for business-related infractions in one case, and breaches of campaign finance law in the other. Both won in campaigns that used concocted border-related attacks on their 2018 opponents: in New York, insinuating that the Democrat had concerning links with Korea, and in California, that the Democrat was hiding unsavory Muslim attachments.

Senator Joe Donnelly was always going to find it difficult to hang on in Indiana, a state that went for Trump by twenty points in 2016, but the Republican victor Mike Braun added the border to the mix by calling the Senator “Mexico Joe” in reference to the use of Mexican labor by Donnelly business enterprises (Arkin, 2018). These and similar tactics were often controversial, but they shared the Trump genius for dominating the news media by skirting, and sometimes crossing, barriers of good taste and exploiting those “red meat” issues that generate especially strong expressions of opinion.

If a borders meme was unusually strong in the narrative of the 2018 midterm elections, those contests were themselves conducted within a unique system of political borders that have their own impact on every aspect of the electoral process. The stage for all US elections is set by the country’s federal structure. There are about half a million elective offices in the USA. As well as the relatively small number of national offices, each state has
its own range of offices, and within each state, the counties, townships, cities, and tens of thousands of special districts are filled with elected officeholders.

The two major political parties offer candidates for offices at all these levels, and often a community will lean consistently to one party or the other in choosing officeholders at all levels. But this is not always true and there are enough voters who disregard party political affiliations, and split their ticket, to help return a varied body of candidates to the different offices even in the same election. This may reflect the voters taking an atomized view: judging the candidates with respect to their relative positions in the federal system. A voter might thereby divide her citizenship into slices; for example, preferring a strong Republican president to stand up for the country in the international sphere, but wanting a Democrat presence in the legislature to make sure that important entitlement programs remain well-funded, wanting a business-minded hand at the state’s tiller, and a community-responsive neighbor leading the town. A nation with so many varieties of government prompts the engaged citizen at every election to consider themselves a multifaceted citizen, voting for each officeholder with a clear-eyed perception of the borders within which that voter-officeholder relationship exists (Davies, 1999).

State borders are protected by the US Constitution and this has an impact on the political competitions that take place every two years. In the interests of the country’s federal heritage, each state has two US Senators. In California, almost forty million people are represented by two US Senators. In Wyoming, fewer than 600,000 people are represented by two US Senators. A political party with strength in the smaller states can win most Senate seats while still falling well short of most of the popular vote. A similar effect is evident in the Electoral College, where, as in 2016, and in 2000, the race to the White House can be won by a candidate who achieves an Electoral College majority despite not achieving a majority popular vote.

The embedding of state borders into the nation’s electoral system was a decision taken carefully by the authors of the US Constitution, and while some modern observers may feel it institutionalizes a democratic deficit in the American polity, there is very little chance that any constitutional amendment to alter the situation would succeed. Everyone active in the US electoral system must look to the borders relevant to their contest. In 2016, it would have taken a swing of fewer than forty thousand votes in just three states to give Hillary Clinton victory in the Electoral College as a reward for
her three million popular vote margin. That is a tiny twenty-eight thousandth of one percent of the total votes cast nationwide. But it only makes any difference if those votes are cast within the appropriate state borders to affect the Electoral College result. Candidates and political parties must adapt their strategies to make the best of their opportunities within the strictures of the system.

Constituencies in the USA other than states have more malleable borders, intended to be adapted at ten-year intervals, after each constitutionally-mandated census. This process was designed with the intent of protecting the principle of each eligible person’s vote having equal weight in the political system. The key players in this decennial process are again the states, since it is at this level that constituency borders both for the US House of Representatives and for state legislative bodies are drawn. And in many states, the stronger of the two parties endeavor to expand and embed their advantage by gerrymandering the constituency boundaries.

The gerrymander is named for Elbridge Gerry, a Massachusetts politician of the very earliest days of US national politics, and James Madison’s vice-president. Its purpose is to manipulate political borders to the long-term advantage of one political party or faction. This is achieved by designing constituencies that are of equal size, thereby at least statistically fulfilling the requirement to give each vote equal weight, but that works to corral your opponents together into constituencies where large numbers of their votes are wasted in racking up huge majorities, while spreading your supporters carefully to gain secure, but more modest majorities in a larger number of constituencies.

Both parties have engaged in this practice, but Republicans have been most successful at state level in recent years. Research by the Brennan Center for Justice identifies Ohio, Michigan, Texas, and North Carolina among the states where things have been made very difficult for Democratic voters to receive their due. In 2018, as in other recent elections, North Carolina Republicans received just about half of the popular vote but won about three-quarters of the state’s seats in the US House of Representatives. The results in Ohio favored Republicans in similar proportions (Royden, Li, and Rudensky, 2018; Astor and Lai, 2018).

President Trump’s invocation in his political rhetoric of the apparent threats to the nation’s borders did not stop a substantial swing of votes and seats nationwide to the Democrats, and Republicans lost the US House of Rep-
resentatives after eight years in control. However, the Grand Old Party’s sustained electoral strategy aimed at gaining and retaining the ability to design the political borders at state and local level operates to limit the damage by undermining the Democrats’ ability to convert the increase in their popular vote support into an equivalent number of House seats. Had gerrymandering not been a factor, the Democrats might feasibly have increased their gain of House seats by around fifty percent.

The unending ticking of the US election clock always prompts the same question on the morning after election day: “what is going to happen next time?” There barely seems time to take a breath before campaigns begin to crystallize, candidates to emerge, and issues to be pondered for their value in the next confrontation. Both political parties can claim some cheer from “the election of the Caravan.” The Democrats won in the House and saw gains at state level, winning back some of the ground lost in 2016. Growth in the strength of the heavily Democrat Latinx7 vote, many of them long-standing residents and earlier migrants but only now coming to the polls, gave hope to the Democrats that more constituencies where these ethnic groups are concentrated might come into play in future election seasons. The Republicans took heart from having increased their control of the US Senate, claiming victories in the key presidential states of Ohio, Indiana, and Florida and having held off threats in Texas and Georgia.

In several states, voters used ballot initiatives to try to limit gerrymandering in future decisions over political borders. Some swing towards the Democrats in state gubernatorial, legislative, and judicial elections provides that party with a better foothold for the battles over constituency borders that will follow the 2020 census. More important state-level elections will be decided in 2019 and 2020 before that border re-design takes place. One might expect that the contests for control of the offices that most influence the redrawing of these internal borders will be fierce.

President Trump, barring some startling reversal, seems well set to be the Republican presidential candidate in 2020. The Democrats, perceiving the potential to restrict Trump to one term, may have a surfeit of hopefuls from whom to whittle their candidate. It is likely that immigration will remain an issue in elections for the foreseeable future and that borders both real and imagined, national and internal will continue to be keenly watched and carefully strategized.

7 The term Latinx describes a person of Latin American origin or descent but, unlike Latino or Latina, is non-binary and gender neutral.
“Permanent Borders” and Other Myths We Live By

Timothy Lynn Elliott, Brigham Young University

For students studying abroad, an international border is often the alluring entrance to the new adventure. It is the turnstile to the newest Harry Potter ride. There are thrills and excitement as the ride’s car speeds into the new world just beyond the passport control booth, or perhaps more accurately, the excitement comes once the slow-moving crowd of tired, recent passengers file past jaded border guards. But what students can miss in crossing a border is how truly remarkable they are. They are man-made contrivances that separate people into sometimes obvious and sometimes not so obvious groups. And as such, they are a good representation of the complex interactions that govern humankind.

Borders between countries represent a number of different things. Perhaps most easily understood is that a national border can be the division between two different cultures. For students wanting to study abroad, this, of course, is one of the most appealing aspects of travel, the thrill of stepping into a new exotic land with the promise of different foods, different customs, and different outlooks. The border marks the point where the drudgery of everyday life ends and the thrill of international travel begins. It is perhaps easiest to feel this way when the border crossing requires a visa, standing in long lines at customs, and facing a stern border guard, but even within the EU, where borders have become more ephemeral, one can still feel excitement when crossing from one country and culture into another.

In this same vein, borders teach that despite globalization, the world is still a very tribal place. In crossing international borders, one soon finds that either through choice or simply from inertia, most people still prefer to live with those with whom they share a common culture. It is the rare traveler indeed who, after a long trip abroad, does not feel a soothing sense of coming home once they cross into their home country.

Borders are more than just a separation of cultures and tribes, though. At times the border is a boundary of ideology. For instance, the Berlin wall did not divide cultures so much as demarcate the realm of certain ideologies. Whether or not culture always trumps ideology is debatable, but at least in the case of Germany, once the force that separated the East from West
weakened, the pull of a common culture quickly destroyed the border built on ideology. Watching the interaction of the North Koreans with the South Koreans at the 2018 Olympics, one cannot help but wonder if such a result is in store for other such ideological borders.

Ideology can also be closely related to national prestige which can, in turn, be another determinant of international borders. One can think of numerous cases where the location of a national border has more to do with pride than to any other objective benefit. Examples include the remote border between China and India in Aksai Chin, or the border between Bolivia and Paraguay in the Chaco. In these cases, the border encompasses territory of little objective value, but even so, changing them would probably require a bloody conflict.

And finally, borders represent security. They mark the point where one can expect their government to protect them from the dangers of the outside world, whether these dangers are diseases carried in by visitors, economic threat posed by those coming to take jobs, or security from the enemy’s armies.

Borders, then, are not simply the boundaries of different cultures. They are, instead, complex human constructs that represent very human desires—the desire to feel at home and to associate with people who share common cultures, the desire for a ruling class to stay in power, the desire for a sense of worth that comes with national pride, or the desire for security in a confusing and dangerous world.

As we have grown accustomed to borders, these complexities are easy to overlook. So, it is perhaps understandable that a typical modern study abroad student would give them little thought. As educators we can try to help them understand these issues, and in doing so we may be able to help them gain a better understanding of the human interactions that underlie all international relations. But we need to keep in mind that these students face two hurdles in understanding the complexities that borders represent. The first is the apparent logic of international borders. From my experience, if university students (or travelers in general) think about borders at all, they often see them as some force of nature. This is most easily conceived when the border coincides with a natural feature like a river, a mountain range, or even an ocean. But while borders might be influenced by geographical features, in the end, there is no element of physical geography that can determine a border—not even an ocean. After all, the United Kingdom
fought for the Falkland Islands as if they were Devon or Anglesey. Rather, borders are human constructs, and as such can teach us a lot about the human condition.

I have recently had a personal understanding of the quirky human nature of borders when, for the first time this last year, I took my children to visit the Four Corners monument. This is the point where the states of New Mexico, Colorado, Utah, and Arizona meet. Before making the visit, I was surprised at the number of people who said, “you know that monument is not in the correct place?” The basis for this argument is that in 1863 the border between the four states was set at the 32nd meridian west from Washington DC (or 109 degrees and three minutes west from Greenwich) and 37th parallel latitude. The border between Colorado and New Mexico was first surveyed in 1868 and the border between New Mexico and Arizona was surveyed in 1875. Where these two surveys met was determined to be the four corners since this point was the best calculation early surveyors could make of where the 32nd meridian and 37th parallel met. Later surveys of the Utah/Colorado and Utah/Arizona border started at this point and it became the site of the four corners. As surveying got more accurate, however, it became clear that the four corners monument was not actually at intersection of the 32nd meridian and 37th parallel but rather about 1,800 feet away from this point and this is the basis of the argument that the monument is in the wrong place.

But that argument overlooks two problems. The first is that in 1925 the location of the border was formally decided by the United States Supreme court to be where the early surveyors said it was. As the National Geodetic Survey said, in response to this controversy,

[the various controversies on the surveys are] absolutely moot when considering any question of the correctness or validity of the Four Corners monument in marking the intersection of the four states. Indeed, the monument marks the exact spot where the four states meet … Issues of legality trump scientific details, and the intended location of the point becomes secondary information (National Geodetic Survey, 2009)

The second problem is that parallels of latitude and meridians of longitude are not geographical features. Rather, they are human inventions designed to help understand the world. As such, placing a border at a specific longitude and latitude is no more objective than a Supreme Court Decision.
The border between the four states is, like all borders, a human construct and humans can change their minds. But it is easy to forget this fact and to instead view national (and state) borders as permanent.

That borders are permanent is, of course, not true. But one can easily understand why a modern student might think that they are. For a college student born in 1997, the map of Europe in the year she was born is almost the same as it is in 2018. The only major change is that the Crimean Peninsula is no longer part of Ukraine and the border of Eastern Ukraine is in flux between Ukraine and a separatist force wanting to be part of Russia. The rest of the map has not changed, though. The borders between Germany, France, Spain, Italy etc. appear solid and unchanging and, perhaps, even unchangeable. Also, since 1999, there has been free and easy travel between Western European countries so this student will have never known a time when one had to stop at the border between Germany and France. From her perspective, these national borders (and the free flow through borders) look pretty solid.

But this is an illusion. Jump back a generation to the mid-1960s when this student’s parents were born and one finds the map of Europe to be significantly different than that of 2018. Germany was divided; Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia were not. The Soviet Union was still a union of socialist republics and there were border posts between the countries in Western Europe. Jumping one more generation to the student’s grandparent’s birth year (say the mid-1930s), one can see even more changes on the European map. Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia were still in one piece, but Germany was larger and divided not by the Wall, but by the corridor. Poland stretched further East, the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia were independent, and Finland was larger.

If one went back one more generation, to the birth of the student’s great grandparents in early 1910s, one finds even more changes. Serbia was its own country, but the rest of the future Yugoslavia was controlled by neighbors. The borders between France, Germany, and Italy were different than they are today, and the countries of Poland and Czechoslovakia did not exist. Or, to look at this another way, since 1914, Lithuania’s borders have changed several times and portions of modern Lithuania have been ruled by Imperial Russia, Imperial Germany, Poland, an independent Lithuania, the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, the USSR again, and finally, in its current form, under an independent Lithuania once again.
Europe is likely to have more resonance to current study abroad students since most study there. But other continents have seen border changes as well. In the case of North America, one has to go back to 1903 to see the last major border change (when Panama was created from Colombia), but there have been other close calls, including what would have been a huge change when Quebec narrowly voted to stay as part of Canada in 1995. For Asia, one only has to go back to 2002 to see the last change (with the independence of East Timor). In Africa, most of the national borders are less than 100 years old. In the current environment, one has to wonder if someday there may be an independent Scotland or Catalonia, or if the separatist movements in these countries will seem as “quaint” thirty years on as the Quebec independence movement sometimes seems today.

It is safe to say that apparent rationality and permanence of borders make them of little interest to today’s study abroad student. What value, if any, does a discussion of borders then have for those involved in international education? One thought is that international borders can be used to teach important elements of what it means to be human. Having spent time abroad, students may better understand that even as globalism erases the differences across the globe, people still cling to the things they know and the places where they are most comfortable. Borders represent this difference in people. Or perhaps having crossed a border into a new land and then returning to their home country, students may better understand the feelings immigrants have in leaving their home countries. And finally, given that differences in culture and ideology, tribalism, national prestige, and demands for security will make international borders a fact of life for the foreseeable future, can we use this fact to help students understand the continued need for tolerance, understanding, and patience, and maybe help the world become a better place in the process?

Borders represent complex human interactions and, as such, are remarkable things. After students have breezed through them to start their new adventures, it might not hurt to remind them how remarkable they are.
Surveying: Borders as Concept and Tool in Education Abroad

Annmarie Whalen

Borders in Education Abroad

Not far from where I live, a famous border runs through a rolling green valley of dairy farms and apple orchards. This border, the “Mason-Dixon line,” was surveyed in the mid-eighteenth century (1763-1767) by Charles Mason and Jeremiah Dixon to establish a trade border primarily between the then-colonies of Maryland and Pennsylvania. From where it begins in eastern Pennsylvania, it stretches 235 miles, running slightly southwest, originally demarcating the southern border of Pennsylvania from the north-east border of Maryland. The Mason-Dixon line is now the border among four US states: Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware, and West Virginia.

Together with delineating the borders of these states, the Mason-Dixon line has been long recognized as the symbolic demarcation of the US Civil War’s slave-owning South, the Confederacy, and the abolitionist North, the Union. It marked the northern-most limit of the slave-owning states before the abolition of slavery. In contemporary US memory, this is likely the best-remembered meaning of the Mason-Dixon line, a vestige of the Civil War as the historical past.

Vestiges of that memory, seemingly stripped of any echoes of the tragedy of war, permeate local culture. Local television meteorologists will report, “Thunderstorms this afternoon will primarily stay south of the Mason-Dixon line.” Local traffic alerts use it as a marker: “There’s a pile-up on Route 81 north at the Mason-Dixon line.” Local businesses further preserve the reference in Mason Dixon Auto Sales, Mason-Dixon Barbeque, Mason-Dixon Family Restaurant, Mason-Dixon Endodontics. These contemporary references evoke multiple contexts. The references are benignly quaint to some, a remnant of days gone by. They are proud symbols of rebellious spirit to those who continue to glorify the Confederate flag. They are horrifying reminders to others, remains of past evils supposedly vanquished by our better natures.

The Mason-Dixon line presents an example of how an actual border can carry many meanings: it began as a straightforward trade demarcation; it became a government-validated boundary between states; it then became
a political marker filled with value-laden meaning; and now is a symbol of the historical past and an identifier of local culture.

Education abroad equally utilizes multiple meanings of “border”: as noun, as verb, as ontological existent, as metaphor. The concept of the border lies at the essence of education abroad: without a distinction between home and away, the act of studying abroad loses meaning. Without a “here,” there is no “there.” Without geopolitical borders, there are no national boundaries, no countries to travel to, to study in; study abroad becomes unviable. Intercultural learning presupposes cultural borders between self and others to be crossed to achieve understanding. Education abroad program structure and curriculum presume a distinct border between before, during, and after student experience.

Beyond the seeming common sense of the importance of the border, we live in a time whose cultural indicators reflect the breaking down of borders. Technology and social media make porous the borders between cultures. The infinite availability of digital information compresses the distinctions of before, during, and after, and remixes the grand adolescent experiment of de- and re-constructing identity. Media reports are filled with historic numbers of refugees pressing at the limits of national borders and identities. The question becomes: how does education abroad adapt to the dissolution of traditional borders to guide students in making meaning of their world? A reasonable response calls for a deeper understanding of how education abroad uses the border as concept and tool.

At its most basic, a border is a line separating one thing from another. A border may be literal, conceptual, or symbolic. This line can be strictly defined, such as a border between countries, or loosely defined, such as the edge of a garden bed. When it is conceptual, a border divides entities to define them, to make meaning.

In common usage, a border is binary: something exists either on one side of a border or the other. Josiah Heyman sees borders not as binary, not as an either/or, but as an area of engagement: “the border, instead of being the outer edge of a bounded, coherent, internally-focused nation-state — instead of that, the border is actually a place where key relationships and key interchanges occur.” Heyman views the border as a center for relationships, a place of exchange and debate: “If you view the border as periphery, it’s this scary outer edge where unknown things can enter. However, if you view it as a center, it’s a place that is dynamic and forward-looking, creative”
(quoted by Wilson, n.d.: n.p.). Heyman is referring here to a specific border between the US and Mexico; however, his understanding holds intriguing implications for education abroad.

Borders are an established topic of academic inquiry, and a distinct discipline. Examples from the academy give an idea of the complexity of the topic, and of the practical, intellectual, and critical discourse that surrounds it. The field of Border Studies is defined by the University of Eastern Finland “as an interdisciplinary field that critically examines border and identity understandings found in political and everyday discourses.” In its own context, the University of Eastern Finland took the dissolution of the USSR as its starting point, and further posits that global economic fluctuations and terrorism-related security concerns have led the research on borders to spread into new disciplines and have created the need to study borders beyond just geopolitical divisions. Hence, in addition to state borders and frontiers, “Border Studies focuses on cultural, symbolic and other types of social boundaries” (University of Eastern Finland, n.d.: n.p.).

In the US, students can major in Border Studies at Earlham College, California State San Marcos, University of Texas El Paso, and at Prescott College in Arizona. Arizona State University has a School of Transborder Studies, an academic division of its College of Liberal Arts and Sciences. These programs seem primarily to take as their point of reference the US border with Mexico, and the social, political, and economic issues that arise.

Outside the US, professionals in this area acknowledge a rebirth of interest in the topic: in the EU today, borders have immediate practical and philosophical implications. What is Brexit if not essentially a border issue? The refugee crisis radiates from the question: on which side of a border do these human beings best belong?

*The Times Higher Education*, following a border studies conference at the University of East London in 2015, noted a recent “renaissance in border studies,” and that “the discipline had reinvented itself in response to changing times” (*Times Higher Education*, 2015: n.p.). Other important new themes noted by the Times included: the local “metropolitan, municipal and planning borders which impact daily life, even though their physical crossing is not a problem”; “the significance of trans-boundary regions”; and “the images and presentations of borders in maps, film, literature, art and graffiti” (*Times Higher Education*, 2015: n.p.). All of these themes were debated at the University of East London conference, which was built
around a major EU-funded research project involving twenty-two partner institutions from seventeen different countries.

Where there is academic attention, a professional association follows: in this instance, the Association of Borderlands Studies (ABS) and an academic journal, both housed at Arizona State University. Although “ABS was formed with an emphasis on the United States-Mexico borderlands,” the area of interest has broadened and “is devoted to the greater understanding of borders … we celebrate multidisciplinary approaches engaging geographers, political scientists, sociologists, economists, anthropologists and other social scientists.” Border studies emerges as a “vocation, a prevailing interest and a major focus of inquiry,” ranging from the theoretical, to the practical application, and to the impact of public policy (Association of Borderlands Studies, n.d.: n.p.).

The concept of borders seems readily intellectualized, made into a metaphor to fit any cause or topic. The International Society for Heresy Studies recently used the concept of borders as the theme of its biennial conference, “Heresy and Borders,” held at the Queen Mary College Centre for Religion and Literature in June 2018. The focus was on how borders between heresy and orthodoxy are created, maintained, and imagined. The Society interprets “heresy” primarily within a religious context, and as the opposite of orthodoxy. In this definition, it includes the “heretical” in politics, art, philosophy, and literature. As a border, heresy seems to present the ultimate binary: on one side of the border is paradise, on the other side of the border lies eternal damnation. But the Heresy Studies group holds that:

Borders are, of course, more than lines drawn across maps and between religions; rather, they are blurry spaces of ambiguity and reversibility where identities are constructed and deconstructed … Concepts of separation, threshold, and border have occupied theologians, philosophers, historians, and artists since ancient times and remain dynamic elements in the work of many theorists and creative artists today. The reexamination of borders can demonstrate not only how we have constructed the heretical other, but also can reveal the fragility and arbitrary nature of our own orthodoxies (Institute of English Studies, n.d.: n.p.)

The International Society for Heresy Studies interpreted the theme of borders in relation to their work through these topics:
• Migrants, nomads, vagrants, and refugees as heretics [outside norm]
• Xenophobia and Islamophobia amidst globalization
• Heresy, hospitality, and the stranger
• Belief and unbelief; sacred and secular
• Borders between the material and the spiritual
• Political theology, heresy, and borders
• The representation of the marginal, peripheral, and that beyond Europe
• Refugees, border-crossing, exile, and migration
• Historicizing the categories of “East” and “West” within the context of heresy and orthodoxy (Institute of English Studies, n.d.: n.p.)

While the conference topics may seem esoteric, the Society promised its direct appeal to its attendees in the keynote, as described by Dr Devorah Baum:

When is a joke not a joke?

Reflecting on the liberalising of borders in Europe that marked the modern period of democratic expansion, an expansion that, during the C20th, would find itself revoked with the most deadly consequences, this talk will also respond to our current moment of globalisation and its attendant cultural hysteria. At a time when laughter is as likely to be heard policing orthodoxies as heralding heresies, I’ll be thinking about these historical trends with reference to the part played in them by humour, noting the role of humour in modern Jewish experiences especially. And to the extent that history today seems to be repeating (again) as farce, I’ll suggest that we are living through a moment of rupture and crisis that can be viewed as a crisis of faith in words—and a crisis of faith in jokes. But to keep things cheerful, my talk will still feature a lot of jokes—mostly funny ones (Institute of English Studies, n.d.: n.p.)
To round out the social science approaches, there is the poetic, aesthetic approach of the Centre for Border Culture and Border Poetics, at the University of the Arctic, in Tromso, Norway. Their topics resonate in the context of education abroad:

- the relationship between borders and construction of identity
- the dynamic nature of the process of bordering
- the dichotomy of the border’s function as a divide or a join
- processes of inclusion and exclusion, of group belonging, affiliation and membership, of selective mobility
- top-down and bottom-up forces in bordering processes
- the scaling of borders on macro and micro levels
- questions of sovereignty and states of exception (University of Tromso, n.d.: n.p.)

The Arctic Poets employ an interesting change in language here: “border” as a noun becomes “bordering” a verb, intended to mean both an action and a process. Their understanding of borders reaches further, it brings together identity and mobility, culture and poetics. With the change of just one word, the discourse broadens from the social and scientific to the literary and aesthetic, from utility to art.

In addition to this complexity of understandings of borders within the academy, examples from outside higher education provide further considerations for the meaning of borders. These non-academic examples tend to be more applied than theoretical in contexts ranging from trade matters, to borders as markers of culture, to immigration issues.

From the middle ages through today, from navigating by astrolabe, compass, and sextant to modern satellites and GPS, trade has commodified borders. The global economy connects borders and trade; our ability to quantify the connection illustrates the degree of its pervasiveness. In 2014, the McKinsey Global Institute reported that:

Flows of goods, services, and finance reached twenty-six trillion US dollars in 2012, or thirty-six percent of global GDP .... Now, one in
three goods crosses national borders, and more than one-third of financial investments are international transactions.

Not surprisingly, the more borders there are, the more cross-border trade there will be:

Countries with a larger number of connections in the global network of flows increase their GDP growth by up to forty percent more than less connected countries do... [They effect] an ever-larger role in determining the fate of nations, companies, and individuals; to be unconnected is to fall behind (McKinsey Global Institute, 2014)

The numbers and factors cited here are extraordinarily large. This calculation includes not just physical goods moving across the world. It also includes services and the transfers of funds. However, we should also consider what is not quantified here, namely, the value of “human capital” and the knowledge economy. Were these to be calculated, quantified, and included, the economic numbers would be staggering.

Moving from the macro scale of global flows to a micro-level examination of culture, a 2012 project published online by City Lab, “The Invisible Borders That Define American Culture,” used data “to understand how a variety of cultural and social properties create borders” (Arbesman, 2012: n.p.). The project views these as organic, reflecting everyday life in the USA. In tracing them, researchers tracked small details as potential yardsticks for larger cultural meaning. The researchers looked particularly at social constructs that connect people, such as language, communications, and even sports teams. The project examined a variety of invisible borders that define colloquial language or slang, such as the use of “soda” versus “pop” for bubbly beverages. The project considered television sports programming subscription and viewing packages to explore the question of when a sports team is local and when it is “out of market.” It also considered mobility (how often and where people move) and communications (cell phone roaming patterns), and even politics (voting maps). The project gathered all of this information, mapped it, and then overlaid the maps to see where these invisible cultural borders might overlap. The researchers noted that:

Historically, communication and mobility were closely tied together; you could only interact directly with people in person. But with the advent of the telephone and the Internet, these two parts of human behavior have become disentangled (Arbesman, 2012: n.p.)
That seems to make sense; however, the results of the research project showed otherwise. The conclusion was that in the US “there is a great deal of overlap between communication and mobility ... Despite all the technology at our disposal, in many ways we are still products of place” (2012: n.p.).

In their conclusions, the investigators of the City Lab project ask, “are there any natural borders? Or does our complex nature make the boundaries that separate us also completely messy?” They find:

A lot of these boundaries are porous and messy, allowing for a rich diversity of cultural flow. But knowing how we interact as part of a complex society, instead of only looking at political borders, can explain a lot more than we might have imagined (Arbesman, 2012: n.p.)

By abstracting borders from patterns of behavior, the City Lab project provides a view from above of cultural norms.

Beyond data-mapping from the bird’s eye view, border issues have real-life repercussions. Examples of the role of borders in the immediate socio-historical moment, and their implications in the contemporary geopolitical climate, alert us to the enormous complexity of borders in our contemporary world. The December 2017 project “Vox Borders” is at the same time a concise and an encyclopedic example of the urgency of border matters. Journalist Johnny Harris, a senior producer for Vox, presents an analysis of the human condition at six world borders through a combination of images, data, and observation. His visual style aims to “[blends] motion graphics with cinematic videography to create content that explains complex issues in relatable ways” and he posits that “If you want to know a country’s deepest fears, look at its border” (Harris, 2017: n.d.: n.p.). Borders, he notes, “symbolize a nation’s anxiety about the world, and as political leaders regulate the lines on the map, there will always be human stories at the mercy of those choices” (2017: n.d.: n.p.). The project consists of six brief documentaries, sourced from over 6000 story suggestions:

1. “One Island, Two Worlds” https://www.vox.com/a/borders/haiti-dominican-republic focuses on borders and nation-making. It explores the border between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, and the deep discrepancy between the quality of life in the two nations making up the island of Hispaniola. Harris writes, “this video documents my journey along
this troubled border, on an island smaller than South Carolina where two countries live worlds apart.”

2. “Russia’s Plan for the World’s Newest Ocean” https://www.vox.com/a/borders/the-arctic takes up border creation for markets and trading, in this case of “the five Arctic nations—the US, Canada, Denmark, Norway, and Russia.” Harris argues that the Arctic presents access to promising new trade routes and untapped fossil fuel resources. He documents Russia as the first country to claim the bottom of the Arctic sea and establish Arctic military resources.


4. “How the US Outsources Border Security” https://www.vox.com/a/borders/mexico-guatemala takes up borders through the lens of security and immigration. It features situations where immigrants from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras are stopped in Mexico before they can travel on to the US. Harris documents how the US pressures Mexico to prevent these migrants from moving closer to the US.

5. “Africa’s Gateway to Europe” https://www.vox.com/a/borders/spain-morocco examines Sub-Saharan African refugees outside the Spanish enclave of Melilla, Morocco. Melilla is a territory of Spain, a literal outpost of Europe surrounded by Africa, yet retaining Spain’s daily life and culture. Outside the heavily-defended border of the town, makeshift, but long-enduring camps of sub-Saharan Africans dominate. The camps are filled with migrants and refugees seeking a better life. Harris documents how the camps’ residents literally sit astride Melilla’s border wall, waiting for a moment to enter. If they are able to enter, they benefit from the European Union’s migrant protection programs.

6. “How Mountains Become Borders” https://www.vox.com/a/borders/nepal-china looks at how natural geography serves as an effective border between cultures and governments in the case of a small community in Nepal and China. Harris analyzes how Nepal has used the terrain of the
Himalayas as a border to protect itself from the Chinese government, and how that is changing.

The immediacy of Harris’s Vox Borders projects compels its readers to consider the urgency of border issues.

**Borders in Education Abroad**

What are the understandings of borders in the education abroad context? Considerations of borders and education abroad, identifying the acknowledged and unacknowledged borders, their meaning, their impact, and their influence, ultimately demonstrate multiple layers of meaning. Like the field of Border Studies, should education abroad reinvent itself in response to the times, to new understandings of cross-border issues, both the practical and the philosophic? What is the price to be paid if it does not? What would be the change?

For example, is the work of education abroad better described as globally educating students and not as “education abroad”? Would this place less emphasis on geopolitical constructs, and better acknowledge contemporary conditions, such as the use and presence of technology which make borders porous, and, in some ways, obsolete? First, education abroad is compelled to operate within literal national and geopolitical borders. Borders are an unavoidable reality. They are mandated, required, legal, bureaucratic, and sometimes maddening. They involve passports, visas, treaties, permissions, Schengen and non-Schengen, EU and non-EU. All of these are border-based distinctions. This understanding is also the most binary of definitions in education abroad: you are either in a country, or you are out of it.

Another reality of borders and education abroad is the context of cross-border trade and economics. As a field, education abroad rarely acknowledges the economic impact of its activity. Most national studies measure the impact of full-degree, not temporary, visiting student activity. However, in the past five years, two countries have published reports of the economic impact of visiting US education abroad students.

In 2013, the Italian “Local Global” together with the Association of American University Programs in Italy (AACUPI) issued a report on the economic impact of US education abroad programs in Italy. The data included only programs associated with AACUPI but not programs outside its membership (which could have added another twenty percent to the totals). The
report analyzed data from the spring and summer terms of academic year 2011-2012 and the fall term of 2012-2013. During this time, about 150 programs brought almost 19,000 students to Italy. The methodology of the study considered the number of students enrolled, the length and cost of the program, and included the amount that the students spend during their stay in Italy, including spending by visiting relatives and friends. The conclusion: “The economic and occupational impact, for Year 2012, has been quantified at 544.4 million euros” (Association of American University Programs in Italy, 2013).

In 2014, Cristina Grasset (EDUEspana) and Monica Perez Bedmar (APUNE) presented their study of the economic impact of US students in Spain, which was then followed by a fuller study in 2015. Refining and following on that study in December 2017, Grasset reports that:

The overall economic impact of international visiting students (not just US, but … Erasmus students and language and culture students) in Spain, attending academic programs of various types during the school year 2014-2015 was 782,963,557 euros. The multiplier effect for this activity turned out to be 2.51: for every euro spent on the delivery of an academic program there were an additional 2.51 euros paid out to other sectors of the Spanish economy (Grasset, 2017).

When breaking out only US Study Abroad numbers, Grasset calculates the overall economic impact in Spain at 345,484,280 euros.

Spain and Italy are the second and third most popular program sites in Europe for US students, accounting for about twenty percent of US students abroad. In Italy and Spain alone, the studies above document roughly 850 million euros of economic impact from US study abroad. This number would easily rise into the billions of euros were the economic impact of US students in other EU countries, much less worldwide, considered.

In well-resourced nations, the influx of temporary US students is a welcome source of income and enhances the exchange of cultural capital. In less-resourced nations, US students and programs are welcomed, but at what cost? “Fair trade study learning,” as proposed by Eric Hartman and others, approaches these questions and issues by looking at ethics and reciprocity. Hartman proposes a framework, a set of principles, standards, and a rubric, for co-creating reciprocal partnerships and balancing questions of learning, outcomes, behavior, and the realities of program impact (Hartman, 2015).
Finally, in terms of applied economics, we are seeing students seeking to apply skills learned through trans-border study to their career paths. This theme of applicability of learning is present from program marketing through to post-program “re-entry.” Educational professionals will recognize this as part of US higher education’s justification of the value of education abroad, and in fact higher education generally, by giving it a practical, directly applied meaning. This may represent for some a further level of the commodification of education abroad. In its essence it is capturing the “human capital” aspect of cross-border trade. Simply, workers who can demonstrate that they know how to span borders are valuable.

Education abroad embraces borders on a program level by understanding borders as the invisible maps of everyday culture, as in the example above from CityLab. The programming of education abroad has always utilized everyday actions and activities to track small details as touchstones for larger cultural understanding. It is the “When in Rome” principle, the value of learning another culture. The tenet of immersion in local culture depends on these understandings: how to order an espresso at a bar in Rome, how to ask for a pint in a pub. It is knowing when to telephone an official in Southern Europe: not between two and five pm, and definitely never, ever on a Sunday. Education abroad depends on the lived knowledge of locals to be able to navigate unseen borders, and to teach students to do the same.

New challenges have arisen in teaching students to map cultural difference and use these invisible borders as a tool for understanding local culture. On their surface, major cities may not look as different from the US as they once did. International trade has brought commercial homogenization to many cultures. Today’s student finds bridges across borders back to their domestic life in the US, to peanut butter, breakfast cereal, and Mexican salsa in their local tienda or Sainsbury. Nutella is no longer exotic. Popular culture from the US is border-resistant, and trendy US clothing stores have popped up in major cities from Auckland to Athens. With the “flattening” of commercial consumer culture, site-specific invisible maps of everyday experience become more important in opening student minds to the world. When information is readily available, the impact of embodied experience, unique to education abroad, gains more significance. Admitting a student’s ease of finding their favorite brand of socks or sneakers in their new city provides an opening for their wonder at the sharpness of yiayia’s\(^8\) elbows in a crowd, or the pleasure of following their nose to the local forno. Allowing

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8 Editors’ Note: Yiayia is a commonly used Greek term for “grandmother.”
that students will contact stateside family and friends, these should be leveraged as opportunities for critical reflection on their experience.

Once unsurmountable borders of time and distance have to a great degree collapsed. The omnipresence of digital culture means that students have now more access to information about their study abroad sites before they depart, and more immediate connections to home when abroad. Social media equally provides a newfound ease in continuing relationships made abroad once a student returns home. All of these have exploded the familiar structures of education abroad learning as “pre, during, post.” The familiarity of another culture, where once an education abroad experience was founded in the unknown, places a new importance on the students’ actual experience of the local. The challenge for education abroad is to accept that at many study abroad sites, bridges to the home culture exist to a degree they had not in the past, and to use these bridges to establish a foothold for exploration, as a resource to move from the familiar to the unfamiliar. At this level, mapping borders moves from concept to tool.

Finally, the intellectual, conceptual understanding of borders enriches the relationship to identity development of students in education abroad. Here is where Heyman’s idea of a border as a place of “multidimensional” activity applies best:

   The border, instead of being the outer edge of a bounded, coherent, internally-focused nation-state, is instead a place of relationships ... [where] interchanges occur. The obvious symbol of this is bilingualism, but there are many others. And so the border is actually a center for many relationships (Wilson, n.d.)

Study abroad students occupy a space on both sides of a border, on different sides of many borders, and in this space define themselves. While seemingly contradictory, the border is a creative, open liminal space. In fact, education abroad does not limit itself to learning, to academic disciplines, but also includes the development of students, and this development takes places within the sphere of experiential learning.
Conclusion: Border Poetics

In conclusion, the three tenets of the Border Poetics group elucidate principles that underlie education abroad and its relation to borders. These tenets point to education abroad as elastic and uniquely positioned, perhaps more so than education on the home campus, to create a taxonomy of meaning in the world.

First, Border Poetics posits that “narrative and symbolic representation is a central element in border formation and experience” (University of Tromso, n.d.: n.p.). In fact, this is true of international educators and of students abroad. We ask each other: what is your story? We ask that students keep journals, and now blogs, vlogs, snaps, and chats. What is your tweet? What did you post on Facebook? What is the narrative? In the field, we have a marketing narrative, an orientation narrative, and a narrative by and for alumni. Narrative-making is the central element and essential process of education abroad. The meaning lies in the narrative told, whether that is practical as in the case of students and their careers, applied to areas of economics and policy, or not applied, measured, or quantified. The narrative may take the form of tragedy, comedy, a picaresque tale, a Menippean satire, or a new form of meaning-making. It could be political, social, any and all of these. In this sense, the symbolic representation of borders as markers of everyday experience is central. The task of education abroad is to make sense of the everyday symbols as markers of cultural difference, as borders.

Next, Border Poetics holds “that textual or medial borders within or around aesthetic works are related to the borders represented in these works” (University of Tromso, n.d.: n.p.). If we look at identity creation as a work in progress, the idea of medial borders is particularly relevant to student identity development. If we couple this idea with Heyman’s interpretation of borders as places of important activity and relationships, we can begin to understand borders as liminal tidal pools for creation of self and world.

The Arctic poets’ third tenet holds “that figurations of borders in cultural expressions matter for social, political, and historical processes of bordering” (University of Tromso, n.d.: n.p.). The relation to education abroad is simply put: in education abroad, borders matter, as they are configured intellectually, culturally, socially, politically, aesthetically.
The Heresy Society holds that “The reexamination of borders can demonstrate not only how we have constructed the heretical other, but also can reveal the fragility and arbitrary nature of our own orthodoxies” (Institute of English Studies, n.d.: n.p.). Do our orthodoxies, the way education abroad conceptualizes and uses borders, hold, or are they fragile and arbitrary? I find them neither fragile, nor arbitrary. They are instead organically derived from this enterprise of opening young minds to the world. Education abroad’s understanding of borders is strong and solidly based on human nature and experience and the innate desire to make meaning in the world.
MOBILITY, SPACE, AND PLACE

What are those blue remembered hills,
What spires, what farms are those?
That is the land of lost content.
I see it shining plain.
The happy highways where I went
And cannot come again

A.E. Housman, A Shropshire Lad

Tour, Journey, Voyage … Ride, Walk,
For move you must!
’Tis now the rage,
The law and fashion of the Age

Samuel Taylor Coleridge, The Delinquent Travellers

Any large-scale human cooperation—whether a modern state, a medieval church, an ancient city or an archaic tribe—is rooted in common myths that exist only in people’s collective imagination

Yuval Noah Harari, Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind
What Brought You Here?

Michael Woolf, CAPA: The Global Education Network

Introduction: The Languages of Mobility

Mobility is simultaneously enrichment and tragedy. Refugee, outcast, nomad, flâneur, cosmopolitan, hobo, pilgrim, missionary, migrant, tourist; these terms signify nuanced distinctions that reflect diverse motivations and consequences. Historically, the greatest catalyst for mobility has been war. It has driven colonial expansion, created countless refugees, made and destroyed nations. In contemporary contexts, mobility, almost certainly, contributes to an existential threat to humanity through environmental deterioration.

For many of us, however, mobility has been demonstrably beneficial: global commerce, professional opportunities, and leisure through tourism. In international education, expansion in the mobility of students has created a burgeoning higher education market. In 2000, across the world, 2.1 million studied outside of their home nation; by 2016 this figure had grown to over five million. This growth rate suggests that around six–seven million students are likely to study abroad by 2020.9

Since the 1950s, transnational mobility has become easier and cheaper. The cost of flying has fallen significantly in real terms. In 1955, for example, a one-way ticket across the Atlantic on Trans World Airlines cost more than £5,000 in 2019 equivalent value. In 1958, the price of a single ticket London to New York on British Overseas Airways Corporation was £173, equivalent to almost £4,000.10 The costs of flying were, for most people, prohibitively high. In contrast, over four billion passengers took flights in 2017.11 Local and international travel is more commonplace, affordable, and efficient than at any time in our history.

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10 Deregulation of air fares in 1978 had a critical impact on the cost of air travel. See, for example, Elliott (2018)
11 Statistics from the International Civil Aviation Organization: see https://www.icao.int/annual-report-2017/
Enhanced mobility has altered reality. Community is no longer defined by proximity; we have “friends” we have never met in places we will never visit. Actual and metaphorical communities unconstrained by geography have emerged. The relative democratization of international travel has narrowed distance. Whatever current political parochialisms prevail, the future is likely to be marked by increasing transnational interactions.

That is not, however, the only available narrative. On June 19, 2018, a report by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) noted that: “We are now witnessing the highest levels of displacement on record. An unprecedented 68.5 million people around the world have been forced from home. Among them are nearly 25.4 million refugees, over half of whom are under the age of 18.”\(^{12}\) Displaced persons roughly correspond to the combined populations of the two most populous states in the USA: California and Texas (circa 68.5 million).\(^{13}\) The growth rate is, according to the same report, startling: “nearly one person is forcibly displaced every two seconds as a result of conflict or persecution.”

Many are precluded from mobility by poverty or politics. For others, mobility represents traumatic loss of home and exile. For a privileged elite (like us), mobility enables a journey towards something positive: education, adventure, pleasure, and enlightenment. The distinction between going toward and retreating from is at the heart of the paradoxes of mobility.

The word “refugee” is critical. It demonstrates that mobility may represent a lack of choice and constriction of freedom. In Christian folklore, mobility is also a form of punishment, perpetual exile imposed for sin and betrayal; expulsion from the Garden of Eden was the first example. There are other forms of religious mobility. The pilgrim searches for enlightenment. The missionary brings a higher faith, commonly Christianity, to the unenlightened,\(^{14}\) often as a corollary of colonialism. Other versions of the wanderer or nomad have been romanticized to contrast with conventions and restraints under which most of us are required to live. In US mythology, for example, the “hobo” is simultaneously an impoverished outcast and a figure liberated from obligations of conformity. The cowboy enjoys a comparative status, as do romanticized gangsters such as Bonnie and Clyde or Pretty Boy

\(^{12}\) See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: https://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html

\(^{13}\) See, for further details, World Population Review: http://worldpopulationreview.com/states/

\(^{14}\) This is, of course, frequently controversial. Brian Sewell’s comment is indicative: “missionaries, always the most dangerous and destructive of invaders” (Sewell, 2013: 46).
Floyd. Other mobile figures are invested with negative characteristics. The “mountebank” is closely related to the snake-oil salesman and the traveling medicine man featured in American Western movies.

The idea of the flâneur, or the female equivalent flâneuse (as in Lauren Elkin’s Flâneuse: Women Walk the City, 2016), is sometimes used to model how students might explore the environments in which they study. However, the term also implies purposeless wandering by an empowered elite: “the man about town.” It connects with the historically ambiguous figure of the cosmopolitan. For Hitler, Stalin, and Henry Ford, the cosmopolitan was synonymous with Jew. Stereotypical prejudices represent the Jews and the Gypsies (Roma) as an affront to national values; they live within countries without having allegiance to them. Nevertheless, the idea of cosmopolitanism also expresses internationalist ideals of a “human family” envisaged in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.

These nuances suggest the need to deconstruct the rhetoric of mobility, to challenge conventional narratives.

On the Foreign

In education abroad, mobility is relatively unproblematic; crossing borders is a positive prelude to enhanced learning opportunities. In what used to be called foreign countries, students can learn about crucial differences. Pedagogies framed around “cross-” or “inter-cultural” studies reveal the embedded assumption that these differences are of primary significance.

Given that emphasis, it is rather odd that the word “foreign” has fallen out of fashion. The root is the Latin foris, meaning outside. Most dictionaries define foreign as a place or experience beyond the familiar. In a geographical sense, this usually means a country other than our own. In phrases such as “foreign policy” or “foreign affairs” the word is used in a relatively unproblematic way, but in education abroad it carries negative implications of alien or strange. Thus, the word “international” has largely replaced “foreign” in the context of students studying in the US. This has not necessarily brought clarity.

The term “international students” obscures specific differences between countries whereas, paradoxically, in education abroad valuable opportunities derive from learning about those specific differences. No foreign students studying in the US are “international,” other than the stateless. They come from specific countries such as France, Germany, China, India,
or elsewhere; no student from anywhere goes to study in a place called “international.”

The “international” student is an administrative category not a description of a real person. They are distinct from domestic students in so far as they may require special services, pay higher fees, represent a political issue and so on. The narratives of international education are contradictory. The value of studying elsewhere derives from specific and distinctive characteristics found in other countries whereas, within the domestic context, “international” obscures those differences. These linguistic complexities are symptomatic of the ambiguous landscapes in which we function.

Narratives that draw on distinctions between us also resonate against internationalist or cosmopolitan ideals as expressed, for example, in St Paul’s Epistle to the Ephesians (2:4 KJV): “Now therefore ye are no more strangers and foreigners, but fellow citizens with saints, and of the household of God.” Some 1,900 years later, and in alignment with that universalist message, Robert Louis Stevenson asserted: “There are no foreign lands. It is the traveller only who is foreign” (Stevenson, 1906: 103). In short, paradoxical narratives coexist in international education: there are those that prioritize the differences between us, while others are rooted in notions of universal humanity.

Naming types of mobility further signifies some complex and nuanced distinctions.

**Deconstructing the Languages of Mobility**

**Punishment**

In early-modern European Christian folklore, mobility was a punishment. Jews and Roma were accursed, forced into perpetual exile because of their complicity in the suffering of Jesus. The myth of the Wandering Jew derives from a Christian legend of the shoemaker Ahasverus who denied Christ rest or comfort:

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Being weary thus, he sought for rest,  
To ease his burthened soule,  
Upon a stone; the which a wretch  
Did churlishly controule;  
And sayd, “Awaye, thou king of Jewes,
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Thou shalt not rest thee here;  
Pass on; thy execution place  
Thou seest nowe draweth neare.”  
At which our Saviour sayd,  
“I sure will rest, but thou shalt walke,  
And have no journey stayed.”  
With that this cursed shoemaker,  
For offering Christ this wrong,  
Left wife and children, house and all,  
And went from thence along  
*Anonymous Ballad* (Percy, 1858: 236-237)

The myth of the Wandering Jew enforces the idea of the Jews as betrayers and killers of God’s son.

Roma are similarly implicated in the crucifixion. According to legend, they made the nails that crucified Christ:

The Virgin Mary meets the nail-smith, a Gipsy, and asks him whether he had seen her son. He replies that he was going to make five nails, instead of four, toward her son’s impending crucifixion. Whereupon she curses him to be homeless forever (Mahr, 1943: 20)

In these Christian mythologies, the rootless Roma and the Wandering Jew suffer the curse of permanent mobility.15

*Persecution*

Connections between Roma and Jews go further than legend. They have been subject to a common history of persecution and expulsion.

Security was temporary. When Roma (“Gitanos”) arrived in Spain around 1425, they enjoyed some protection as “pilgrims” until the imposition of the Spanish Inquisition in 1478. By 1482, both the Roma and the Jews had become subject to vicious and often fatal persecution, threats of eradication by assimilation or death, and ultimate expulsion.

The Romani historian Ian Hancock notes that some 400 years later this pattern was repeated: “in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century,

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15 The idea of permanent wandering as a punishment for sin is found widely in other contexts, notably in Islam and in African mythologies. See Slezkine (2004: 20-24) for detailed examples.
Gitanos culture was represented as an essential part of Spanish popular culture” (Hancock, 2010: 27). However, under Franco: “Gitano identity was stigmatised through a double technique of orientalisation and criminalisation” (Hancock, 2010: 30). Within the same period, the 1930s, the Jews in Germany suffered a similarly deadly transformation: “There was no society in which Jews seemed to have greater integration and acceptance. They were the leaders of culture: famous musician, artists and poets” (Lerner and West, 1996: 122). The fact that Jews were embedded in German society at all levels offered no protection. History and myth combined to ensure the dehumanization of both communities. They were characterized as outcasts, cursed wanderers, alien intruders in the inhospitable worlds through which they passed. Their common destination was Auschwitz.

**Seeking a Promised Land**

And the Lord spake unto Moses, Go unto Pharaoh, and say unto him, Thus saith the Lord, Let my people go, that they may serve me. And if thou refuse to let them go, behold, I will smite all thy borders

*Exodus 8 KJV*

Journeys and mobilities have critical significance in major world religions. The Exodus from Egypt led by Moses combines two deeply influential narratives: an escape from slavery and the search for the Promised Land.

The idea of a promised land was deeply embedded in the founding of America and has been repeatedly part of American political rhetoric before and since independence. The story of Moses permeates anti-slavery campaigns and Civil Rights rhetoric, as in this speech by Martin Luther King:

If … the Almighty said to me which age would you like to live in?... I would watch God’s children in their magnificent trek from the dark dungeons of Egypt through, or rather across the Red Sea, through the wilderness on toward the promised land

During forty years of wandering, the Jews received the word of God through the Ten Commandments. Similar epiphanies during journeys occur repeatedly in most of the world religions. In 1844, Brigham Young led his followers to a version of Zion. Buddha’s wanderings were motivated by a search for

16 Dr Martin Luther King, Jr, *I’ve Been to the Mountaintop*, Speech, April 3, 1968, Mason Temple, Memphis, Tennessee.

17 And were famously defined as “Red Sea pedestrians” in Monty Python's *Life of Brian*. 
enlightenment. Muhammad’s pilgrimages feature critical epiphanies. In 620, Muhammad toured heaven and hell with the angel Gabriel and spoke with earlier prophets, such as Abraham, Moses, and Jesus.

Mobility is more than a route from A to B. Within world religions, it offered pathways towards God. The hermit travels inward into the self to find spiritual meaning. The pilgrim journeys into space in search of the same objective.

*Pilgrimage*

The pilgrimage represents a path towards spiritual enlightenment, as exemplified in the traditional hymn *To Be A Pilgrim*:18

> He who would valiant be ’gainst all disaster,  
> Let him in constancy follow the Master.  
> There’s no discouragement shall make him once relent  
> His first avowed intent to be a pilgrim …  
> I’ll labour night and day to be a pilgrim

The famous Christian pilgrims of Chaucer’s *The Canterbury Tales* are motivated as much by good company, pleasure, and security as they are by spiritual motives. However, pilgrimages continue to have the significance envisaged by Pope Benedict XVI in 2010: “To go on pilgrimage is not simply to visit a place to admire its treasures of nature, art or history … To go on pilgrimage really means to step out of ourselves in order to encounter God” (cited by Elliott, 2017).

Pilgrimages are not only significant in Christianity of course. For Muslims, the Hajj attracts an estimated fifteen million pilgrims each year. For Hindus, Varanasi is the most potent of a number of holy places and is visited by approximately four million annually. Buddhism and Shinto have comparable sites. For Jews, the Wailing Wall, a remnant of the ancient Temple of Jerusalem, attracts approximately eight million annually. Over 300,000 people took some part in the Camino de Santiago in 2017. Somewhere between six to eight million people visit Lourdes annually. The Alliance of Religions and Conservation estimates that 155 million people participate in one pilgrimage or another each year.19

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18 Adapted from John Bunyan’s *The Pilgrim’s Progress* (1678).

19 See, for further details, Alliance of Religion and Conservation, http://www.arcworld.org/.
The Secular Pilgrimage

The pilgrim is a traveler seeking iconic places considered rich in profound possibilities. The idea of a secular pilgrimage is, thus, not an oxymoron. Malcolm Cowley, describing the literary American expatriates of the 1920s, argued that: “a long sojourn in France was almost a pilgrimage to Holy Land” (Cowley [1934], 1951: 102). Generations of Americans have been drawn to the great cities of Europe as repositories of history, sophistication, and high culture. Europe is a kind of secular shrine; a dreamed landscape that resonates with what students seek in education abroad.

The tourist may also be a metaphorical pilgrim. Holiday travel is not always to beaches and bars. It may also be driven by a desire to find things missing in our daily lives, mysteries perceived in worlds elsewhere. The marketing of tourism offers numerous examples:

With over 1.2 million square miles to explore, beautiful India … filled with mesmerising culture and history … Up in the lush lands of the Himalayas visitors can explore their spiritual side …

Similarly, holidays in Florence typically offer some variation of the following:

Experience one of Europe’s most culturally and historically significant cities … a remarkable selection of museums, galleries, and restaurants … Every stroll has the potential for something remarkable, whether it’s peering out of the Vasari Corridor or wandering across the Giardino di Boboli.

In the exotic, the visitor seeks secular enlightenment.

The development of motor transport created other types of secular pilgrimage; the open road is expansive space rich in the possibilities of exploration and discovery. Route 66 has acquired something of a mythic status. The fact that it has to be searched for and now barely exists adds to its iconic status: a lost route through and into the heart of America.

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20 There are any number of American writers who draw upon this idea of Europe including Washington Irving, Henry James, Henry Miller, even arguably James Baldwin and Bernard Malamud. A fuller discussion of the implications for education abroad may be found in my essay “The Baggage they Carry” (Woolf, 2011). Malcolm Bradbury’s Dangerous Pilgrimages (1995) is an erudite and comprehensive examination of the topic.

21 See Southall Travel, https://www.southalltravel.co.uk/holidays.

The “trail” has also acquired a particular significance in America. The Turquoise Trail from Santa Fe to Albuquerque in New Mexico offers, for example, a version of American history: “synonymous with Native American spirituality, Spanish explorers, adventurous mining, and brave pioneers.” A trail may be invested with historical meaning and generate national myths. The Appalachian Trail, for example, is constructed to connect with unspoilt, virgin territory, to embody a myth of innocence, rather than with the industrial blight that deforms parts of the region. The Oregon Trail resonates with a critical event in the development of the USA: the opening of a trading route to the West Coast in the early nineteenth century by Meriwether Lewis and William Clark; a trek that has become a symbol of resilience and courage in the founding of the nation.

Jack Kerouac’s On the Road is a literary pilgrimage, a search for some form of essential America. Any number of road movies combine escapes from one situation with a search for some form of alternative place or values. What Woody Guthrie called “The freedom highway” in This Land Is Your Land represents a vision of liberated America:

As I was walking that ribbon of highway,
I saw above me that endless skyway:
I saw below me that golden valley,
This land was made for you and me
(Guthrie, 1944)

Literal, political, and spiritual meanings coincide in iconic or imagined spaces. They embody the temptation of, and search for, enlightenment.

Nomads, Roma, Jews, Cosmopolitans, and Nationalism

Nomads, Roma, and Jews

Romani and Jewish historical experiences render positive associations with mobility problematic. In Romani history, mobility represents enforced expulsion:

Banishment and transportation have been important factors in the dispersion of the Gypsies. They were banished from Germany in 1497,

23 See the History of the Turquoise Trail: http://www.turquoisetrail.org/history.
Spain in 1499, France in 1504, England in 1531, Denmark in 1536, Moravia in 1538, Scotland in 1541, Poland in 1557, Venetia in 1549, 1558, and 1588, etc (Groome, 1899: xix)

Despite a history of deportation, the single, recurrent characteristic in the inventions of Roma identity is, ironically, that they are nomads. As a negative trope, this has led to the perception of a people who are rootless, without national allegiance, frequently spies, aliens who carry disease, much like the Jews: “the pariahs of Europe” (Sutherland, 2017: 2).

From 1348 onwards, eastern and central Europe suffered recurrent outbreaks of plague, known as the Black Death. “Clearly a demonic malevolence was at the root of this catastrophe. People grew suspicious of the stranger and the most vulnerable stranger was the Jew” (Potok, 1980: 433). The association of the Jew with the arrival, metaphorically and literally, of the plague is recurrent. In Eugene Sue’s *The Wandering Jew* (1884), “a fearful distemper suddenly broke out” (580) on the arrival of the Jew.

The notion of the Jews as a disease or an infection attacking the health of Christian communities persisted for centuries, as evidenced by the rhetoric of Edouard-Adolphe Drumont writing in France in 1886. In the notorious bestseller *La France juive*, he describes Jews as “a sort of perpetual discharge which is impossible to stop … dropping vermin wherever they pass, offering a constant danger for public health” (Drumont, 1886, v.1: 456). Jews, like Roma, bring sudden disaster to Christian communities. “Plague” has both metaphorical and literal significance. The collocation of racial hygiene and plague is further illustrated in Nazi ideologies. Heinrich Himmler created a Racial Hygiene and Demographic Biology Unit responsible for implementing the 1938 decree: *Bekampfung der Zigeunerplage* (“Combatting the Gypsy Plague”).

Jews and Roma were identified as carriers of disease, wanderers whose primary loyalties were not to the nation but to mysterious, alien codes. The path from outsider to displaced person to the Holocaust reflects a transition from myth to history.

To complicate further the ambiguities of mobility, in mythologies generated by the Roma and those invented by outsiders, the “true gypsy” represents the embodiment of romantic freedom; they enact a set of behaviors that resonate with myths of origin distinctive from modern ethical, social, and
political restraints: our primitive selves unburdened by the baggage of complex modernity.

While mobility permeates Romani stereotypes, the reality is that for almost 500 years a significant proportion of Roma in Europe went nowhere:

Much of Europe’s Romani population was held in slavery until the middle of the last [nineteenth] century, and never left the estates at all except perhaps to be driven to be exhibited for sale (Hancock, 1987: 130)

Furthermore, of the current population in Europe, only a very small percentage of Roma live outside of some form of permanent dwelling. Travel to fairs and gatherings may well be an integral part of the lifestyle, but these journeys (any more than our annual vacations) are not evidence of a nomadic lifestyle.

Jews, African Americans, and Irish Americans are often characterized as diasporic peoples. In the context of the Roma, the notion needs qualification. “Diaspora” usually designates dispersal from a homeland. While it is possible to see the Roma as historically part of an Indian diaspora, there is no myth of return, or inherited memory that evokes yearning for a lost homeland. The Roma have no narrative of displacement that compares with Alex Hayley’s Roots or Maya Angelou’s construction of Africa:

Our people had always longed for home. For centuries we had sung about a place not built with hands, where the streets were paved with gold, and were washed with honey and milk... In the yearning, heaven and Africa were inextricably combined (Angelou, 2008: 20)

Nationalism

Separation from a historical homeland, Zion for example, is also critical to Jewish identities. While Africa may be a more contested homeland for Black Americans, those who choose to describe themselves as African American signify a diasporic consciousness and commitment to a dual sense of national identity. Roma are dispersed people but only metaphorically diasporic.

25 There are many difficulties associated with statistical information on the Roma. There are, of course, major national variations; the inclusion of groups within the definition of Roma is variable; Roma, for good reasons, resist inclusion in official census reports. In any case, it is clear that the majority of European Roma are predominantly sedentary. Broadly it is likely that only around five percent of Roma of Europe are in non-permanent housing (see, for example, Matras (1995: 20-24)).
in so far as dispersal has not generated the idea of a lost homeland: no dreamed landscape, no Africa or Zion of the mind.

The historical development of national identities generated allegiance to specific geographical spaces delineated by borders. However, countries rarely cohered around natural geographical or human communities. National borders are most commonly made by man rather than by nature. The nation-state is fiction translated into concrete forms and invested with meaning. The search for national identity is embedded in our collective experience. It is an ongoing process by which we struggle to define our place in global reality.

Cycles of temporary integration and expulsion meant that the Jews had no such place. From the end of the fourteenth century, the experience of the Sephardic Jews in Spain is illustrative. The 500,000 in Spain represented effectively half of the entire Jewish population of Europe. A massacre in 1391 led to the death of 100,000 Jews (twenty percent of the entire population); imposed conversion of another 100,000 followed. The Inquisition forced the Jews of Spain to abandon the lands in which they had gained some sanctuary, protection, and influence. They faced essentially three choices: conversion, slaughter, or escape.

Over the sixteenth century, the mobility of Sephardic Jews was driven by the need to flee the ever-encroaching Inquisition. Jews looked towards the New World. Columbus was transformed into a kind of Moses opening safe havens. In practice, the New World contained only temporary, fragile spaces of relief from persecution.

By the nineteenth century, however, Ashkenazi Jews in Eastern Europe saw America as a distant magnet, a place of safety and opportunity:

America was in everybody’s mouth. Businessmen talked of it over their accounts; the market women made up their quarrels that they might discuss it from stall to stall; people who had relatives in the famous land went around reading their letters for the enlightenment of less fortunate folk ... children played at emigrating ...; all talked of it, but scarcely anyone knew one true fact about this magic land (Antin, 1899: 12)

26 The bifurcation of the Jews into Sephardic and Ashkenazi is of itself evidence of dislocation and dispersal.
The notion of the USA as a haven for the displaced and dispossessed originates in the nineteenth century. It finds iconic expression in Emma Lazarus’ poem that graces the statue of Liberty.

Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore;
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me,
I lift my lamp beside the golden door (Lazarus, 1989, v.1: 203)

The idea of a sanctuary is not necessarily defined by geography. It may also be a landscape of the yearning mind. For the Jews, Jerusalem and Zion are idealized, dreamed landscapes, places out of time and space, not inevitably analogous with the geopolitical reality of Israel. In that sense, all Jews live within a state of exile from the Kingdom of God. Thus, the Passover service ends everywhere, including in Jerusalem, with the exhortation: “Next year in Jerusalem!” This is not the city served by numerous airlines: it is a construct of the mind: a metaphor for spiritual reconnection.

Such mythic spaces are not exclusive to the Jews. Fabled worlds were, for example, commonplace in the age of burgeoning exploration: El Dorado, the Fountain of Youth, the Seven Golden Cities. Like Zion, Jerusalem, Avalon, Atlantis, and Eden, these are lands without borders or territory.

Conclusion: Privilege and Pain

A myriad of factors including technological change, political will, prejudice, aspiration, competing ideologies, and myths shape the ways in which we perceive mobility. Technology has progressively shrunk the spaces that we now consider unfamiliar. Nevertheless, in education abroad, we prioritize distinctions and differences, construct “abroad” as alien space that we need to teach students to negotiate. This emphasis is reliant on a somewhat archaic notion of the primacy of the nation-state, on the illusion that nations and cultures coincide. It requires us to ignore the impact of technological change.

The generation we think of as “digital natives” resides in a “country” not constrained by geographical borders. Boundaries have become increasingly porous while, simultaneously, ideologically-driven policies seek to reconstruct political or legal barriers: to build walls rather than bridges. In short, while we recognize the value of exploring local differences, we need also
to consider that what unites us may be as important as that which divides us. The border is a contested idea: not necessarily or inevitably a definable boundary between here and there, or us and them. The borders between ourselves and the unfamiliar may have altered but there is inevitably a shifting boundary of consciousness which separates the self from the realities of others.

There is no such thing as objective space. The external world cannot solely be defined by sight, photographs, or statistics. The spaces we inhabit, study, and imagine are forged by a synthesis of that which we observe and that which we have dreamed. Mobility pollutes and enriches. It involves confronting spaces that exist in geography and imagination. In those journeys, we confront paradox and engage with ambiguity.
“The Woods of Arcady are Dead”: Elegizing the Cruising Grounds


The opening shot of Ben Edelberg’s short film *Empty Nightclub* is of someone positioned in a tight corridor, but all we can see of them is their rubber-gloved hands. With perhaps what is police-radio crackle in the background, these gloves soon are identified as the forensic gloves a crime scene investigator might wear. These early scenes are images taken from the footage of the police entering Pulse nightclub, a gay venue in Orlando, where forty-nine people were shot dead by Omar Mateen in 2016. The rest of the nightclubs and bathhouses in Edelberg’s seven-minute black and white film are unpeopled. Mirror balls spin and porn films play above the bars, but these homosocial places are empty, mausoleums to an earlier age. The opening words of Yeats’s pastoral elegy “The Song of the Happy Shepherd” (1889) seem appropriate here: “The woods of Arcady are dead/ And over is their antique joy.”

It is not just the fear of violence that has caused the desertion of these playing fields, but also other forces, such as gentrification, dating apps, and the admissability of the homosexual into wider society, where acceptance depends on following the prescribed heteronormative rules. A report by University College in London has discovered that there has been a fifty-eight percent drop in gay venues since 2006, from 125 to fifty-three. It suggests that twenty-one percent of the closures were the result of new housing developments or transport links (Campkin, 2017). Space in the city comes at a premium now, and empty buildings and warehouses have been converted into luxury apartments. This gentrification, where inner city neighborhoods are flooded by the middle class, can be considered neoliberal as public space has been sold off to private investors. The reduction of public spaces has, in turn, limited the number of outdoor venues where men have met men for sex since probably the beginning of urbanization. Parks, such as London’s Russell Square, have been re-landscaped with the removal of bushes and low-hanging trees which once allowed cover for sexual activity. Many parks are now locked at night.
It could be argued that there is no need for these places as gay men have
now been welcomed into the general population, in the West, at least. John
Lyttle writing in The Independent in 1997 is surprised that there is still a
need for cruising grounds:

not only has the bedroom been invented: so has the back room, the
gay pub, the gay classifieds, the gay escort, the gay sauna, the gay
restaurant, the gay shopping mall, the gay phone line and walking
home from work and making beady eye contact with Mr Right Now.
Joining the world, not hiding from it (Lyttle, 1997)

But here Lyttle presumes you have to identify as a gay man in order to want
to have sex with other men, disregarding other ways of having same-sex
desire. The scope of this paper does not allow me to argue for the ongoing
need for cruising grounds, but instead I will explore what these cruising
grounds tell us about same-sex desire and queer communities in the past.
By comparing the cruising grounds to the pastoral, I will contend that these
venues for al fresco sex are worth saving whether in reality or in elegy. I
will conclude by looking at how young artists are remembering the cruising
grounds in their works, highlighting the process of inheritance that features
throughout elegy’s history. These young artists, by rubbing up against the
artists of the past, reanimate these cruising grounds to ensure that they
remain fertile for the future.

Parts of London would now be unrecognizable to Derek Jarman, the artist
and filmmaker who died from HIV/AIDS in 1994. Gentrification has also
changed New York’s Lower East Side, and one of its most famous art-
ists, David Wojnarowicz, would be hard pressed to find the piers where he
cruised in the years before his death in 1992. Both men were elegists too,
but they sought to hold on to their losses while traditional mourning favors
the relinquishing of the loss as a sign of the mourner’s return to society.
In his seminal essay, “Mourning and Melancholia” (1991 [1917]), Freud
sees mourning as the redirection of the libido from a lost love object to a
new object. The mourner may forsake the lost love, but, through mourning
successfully, the mourner avoids melancholia where the lost object is in-
teriorized. The new object of affection is often seen as a consolation for
the original loss. If mourning is forgetting, then Jarman and Wojnarowicz
refuse to mourn. In their elegies for queer spaces, Ben Edelberg and Benny
Nemerofsky Ramsay continue the work of Jarman and Wojnarowicz by com-
plicating the process of mourning to ensure that cruising grounds are not
forgotten and relegated to the past to become relics of other ways of living.
When these liminal spaces are changed, and when the boundaries of these semi-public, semi-private spaces are altered, the men cruising there are forced to change their behavior. Brian C. Kelly and Miguel A. Muñoz-Laboy in their study of an unnamed park in New York witnessed men adopt new cruising strategies when the City, through designs such as cycle trails and signposts, opened up the once forgotten corner of the park to the public. But the greatest change of behavior in recent years is the move to online cruising through apps such as Grindr and Scruff.

Of course, some young gay men have grown up with these dating apps, making the cruising grounds of previous decades appear either antiquated or romantic. The digital age casts sepia tones onto these older rituals, imbuing them with the innocence of simpler times. As these cruising grounds decline, there is a new interest in remembering these urban pastorals or even restoring them. This new urgency is similar to the revival of pastoral poetry in Renaissance England, when modernity and the city made people nostalgic for country living, although it is not just nostalgia that links the cruising ground to the pastoral.

Arcadia, rather than the utopian place it is sometimes figured as, is a space connected to death as Poussin’s paintings “Et in Arcadia ego” attest. The pastoral’s beginnings, both in Theocritus’ Sicily and Virgil’s Greek Arcadia, deal with the death of Daphnis. In Virgil’s fifth eclogue, we see Menalcas and Mopsus singing songs to Daphnis as a way of mourning him. Since the establishment of these traditions—or conventions—poets such as Keats, Shelley, and Milton have returned to the pastoral in order to mourn their own losses. When the elegy was revived in the 1980s in response to the AIDS crisis in the West, many poets, such as Mark Doty, used the pastoral, mostly without irony, in their poems remembering dead friends and lovers. For Derek Jarman, a consummate cruiser as well as a consummate artist, Hampstead Heath was the place where he would go to escape the “ABC of HIV,” a place of respite (Jarman, 1993: 10). Places like London’s Hampstead Heath, where Keats lived, are now best seen as urban pastorals, enclosed by the city. As Frank Kermode declared in 1952, the pastoral is a product of the urban: even Theocritus and Virgil, the creators of the pastoral tradition, are responding to the increasing differences between town and country (Kermode, 1952: 14). The pastoral has always been at risk, too, not just from the city but by those seeking to possess public land, like today’s gentrifiers. Virgil’s ninth eclogue, a lament to the pastoral and its
community as new landowners arrive, is just as important today as public space is privatized into what Bradley L. Garrett and others call *pseudo-public* space (Garrett, 2017).

The search for community was just as important as the search for sex when Jarman went cruising on the Heath. Under Margaret Thatcher’s Government, gay men and lesbians were treated like second-class citizens, most easily seen in the infamous Clause 28, which prohibited the “promotion of homosexuality.” Jarman searched for community at the very edges of society to where gay men and lesbians had been pushed. They had been consigned to darkness, and so they sought company within it. Sometimes the atmosphere on the Heath, if not Bacchanalian, “resembled a garden party, joints were rolled, hip flasks produced. People laughing and shouting … once you are over the invisible border your heart beats fast and the world seems like a better place” (Jarman, 1992: 84). While the shepherds and goatherds of Theocritus and Virgil were not exiles in the same way as Jarman and his contemporaries, both pastorals—ancient and modern—are homosocial environments. Some women haunt the pages of Theocritus and Virgil, but it is the voices of men and their songs of love for each other that fill the pages. For example, there have been many translations of Theocritus’ homoerotic fifth idyll, but none as blunt as Daryl Hine’s rendering where Comatas reminds Lacon of the time “I buggered your bum and you said it hurt” (Hine, 1982: 20). The whole of Virgil’s second eclogue is concerned with Corydon’s love for Alexis, a theme picked up in Christopher Marlowe’s “The Passionate Shepherd to His Love.” While Marlowe hides the gender of the shepherd’s beloved, another Renaissance poet Richard Barnfield is less discreet and explicitly relates the unrequited love of Daphnis for Ganymede in his eclogue “The Affectionate Shepheard Sicke for Love.” Gregory W. Bredbeck attests that “in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries one of [the pastoral’s] primary interests is its participation in fields of sexual deviation” (Bredbeck, 1991: 200), while Bruce Boehrer, in his queering of Milton’s “Lycidas,” suggests that English pastoral has an “erotic contact with the literature of Greece and Rome” (Boehrer, 2002: 223). The libidinous nature of the pastoral clearly reappears in the urban cruising grounds and, through the closure of these spaces, “non-normative” sexual behavior can be more easily controlled.

However, Ben Edelberg’s desolate *Empty Nightclub* is not only mourning communities of men but also communities of all genders based on equality and politics. Though the nightclub may not be the best symbol here as, with its VIP areas and memberships, it can hardly represent egalitarianism. The
cruising grounds, where entrance is free, is a better example, and we can all be shepherds here. Other places where men meet men for sex were once founded on interclass relations. Middle-class and upper-class men would often pay for sex with working-class soldiers and sailors who were eager for money to supplement their meager wages. But in the cruising grounds these class distinctions lose their form in the darkness. As Jarman points out, “In the dark for a brief moment age, class, wealth, all the barriers are down. An illusion you say, I know, but what a sweet one” (Jarman, 1992: 84).

This imagined democracy is the basis of the pastoral itself, and in Some Versions of Pastoral William Empson claims that the genre is a way of unifying society by disregarding social class:

> The essential trick of the old pastoral, which was felt to imply a beautiful relation between rich and poor, was to make simple people express strong feelings (felt as the most universal subject, something fundamentally true about everybody) in learned and fashionable language (Empson, 1935: 12)

We meet a whole cast of characters in the writings of Jarman and Wojnarowicz as they cruise London and New York, desire, and the desire for community, eclipsing any identifiers of status.

It may be as Jarman suggests “an illusion,” but this illusion is not extended to the digital cruising grounds of Scruff and Grindr where frequently profiles would contain the words “no fats, no femmes, no blacks, no Asians.” While this kind of proposition is now banned on these apps, both Grindr and Scruff allow the user to choose a group, or in Grindr’s terminology, a “tribe” that they belong to, such as “clean-cut,” “leather,” or “twink.” There are no surprises in online hook-ups. As Mark Turner has said “Apps tend to be about excluding, blocking and confirming a person’s conscious desires” (2016). The use of these apps enables people to meet who they want: here, age, class, and wealth are all apparent. These choices require judgment, and as Jarman says of the Heath, there is little judgment in the cruising grounds: cruising “was a form of socialism, here was equality” (Jarman, 1993: 27). As David J. Getsy points out, cruising is not just a language of same-sex desire, but also of solidarity:

> While it can involve opposite-sex pairings, cruising has been predominantly used by those interested in same-sex interactions precisely because it is these interactions that have been historically
outlawed, marginalized, repressed, or marked as different. In this respect cruising is properly queer in that it is a resistant negation of normative sociality performed not just by self-identified homosexuals but by individuals from across a range of disallowed sexual and social self-identifications (Getsy, 2008: 17)

The (supposed) equality of the cruising grounds is one of the main reasons that they should be retained in reality, or at least, in elegy. Unlike the apps, cruising grounds welcome difference, and, in an era of gentrification, difference is sometimes hard to come by, with whole areas of inner cities designed with the same “hipster” flair of the creative classes. This process is well known by now, but Sarah Schulman in *The Gentrification of the Mind* (2013), believes that it is not just our neighborhoods that are in danger. Very convincingly, she claims that our minds and behaviors are at risk of being homogenized too. Creativity will suffer if we all think the same way, and all hold the same middle-class values to be true. Difference will be erased, and as in gentrified neighborhoods, homogeneity will rule. In the 1970s and 80s, there was an outlaw quality to the artists in New York, such as Wojnarowicz: “They had illegal sex, took illegal drugs, hustled literally and figuratively for money, lived in poverty, and said *fuck you* to dominant culture, all of which made it possible for them to discover new art ideas” (Schulman, 2013: 101). Although Schulman is discussing how art today is tied to university education and corporations, resulting in work that is bland and homogenous, there is an outlaw quality to the cruiser too, best seen in John Rechy’s series of novels that began with 1963’s *City of Night* and in Wojnarowicz’s own book, *Close to the Knives* (1991). In comparison, gay life now, while safer, lacks the experimentation of these older outlaws.

Recent political successes in the West for gay people, such as the right to marriage, have led to some gay people leading lives almost indistinguishable from heterosexuals as the pressure to conform becomes more intense. This homonormative process—that gay people get married, have children, get a mortgage—overshadows other ways of having same-sex desire. Indeed, in the future, only those lifestyles that mimic heteronormativity may be the ones accepted by wider society. Schulman blames some of this move to conformity on the fact that gay men and women have not yet fully mourned the AIDS epidemic. In rhetoric which clearly exposes a line between gay and straight people, she writes “So traumatized by mass death and the indifference of others, we assimilate into a culture that allowed us to be
destroyed. We access their values and use them to replace our own in a way that undermines our distinction and strength” (Schulman, 2013: 156).

Schulman’s point raises two issues here: the first is that gay—or queer, in that queer resists homonormativity—rituals and values are being erased by gentrification, and the second is that gay men and women need the pastoral of the cruising grounds to continue the process of mourning those who died in the AIDS epidemic, and those who are still being killed by homophobic attacks today, such as the shooting at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando. Without support in the 1980s and 90s, gay people were forced to create their own mourning rituals and their own elegies which complicated traditional elegiac ideas of consolation. With no Arcadian landscape of shepherds and fauns available to Wojnarowicz, he discovered the pastoral in the cheap movie theaters of Times Square and the derelict piers jutting out into the Hudson River. The latter were “as far away from civilization as I could walk” and “they were good for solitude and being able to hear myself think.” He called the piers his “industrial meadows” and even once tried to grow grass in one of the warehouses to create his own urban pastoral (Wojnarowicz, 1990: 54).

Of course, Wojnarowicz and Jarman are primarily remembered for being artists rather than cruisers, though it could be said that they turned cruising into an art; one that is now almost forgotten. An approach they shared in their art was the use of collage, a tradition employed by other queer men such as Joe Orton and Kenneth Halliwell when they “decorated” their digs in Noel Road in London. Jarman’s love of collage extends to his films, writings, and art. It is a form he discovered relatively early in his career; he was fascinated by “surprise collisions” (Jarman, 1992: 22). The method of collage, where materials not usually associated with each other are glued together, sounds rather like cruising itself, and in this era of social media where we surround ourselves with people like us, perhaps we should all be persuaded to take up collage to bring variety into our lives.

This active role of the cruiser sets him apart from the flâneur, another committed wanderer of the city and its delights. They share many attributes in that both are usually figured as male—although there is a good deal of work on the flâneuse (for example, Elkin (2016))—both have time to spare, and both have money in their pockets. However, the role of the flâneur is to spectate, to be invisible in the crowd while the cruiser seeks to be seen, not by everyone, but by those who are also searching for intimacy, either
through glances or, indeed, sexual contact. Linked to consumer capitalism, the *flâneur* often represents the alienation caused by the modern city. He can only watch passively and voyeuristically the “collision” between two or more cruisers. The cruiser’s process of seeking out difference, experimenting, and collaborating with it could resist gentrification’s homogenizing philosophy. In short, art could become new again. To elegize the cruising grounds would seem to suggest that this artistic—or sexual—drive has turned to marble, but not all elegies insist on forsaking the past. Some elegies look forward too.

The cruising grounds are, themselves, layered elegies, remembering other ways of having same-sex desire and memorializing the countless losses from HIV/AIDS and the political solidarity that came with it. Any elegiac response to the imminent demise of real, rather than virtual, cruising grounds is bound to be complex; traditional elegy tries to make sense of death in order that the poet, or the speaker of the poem, is returned, alive, into society. But as Iain Twiddy observes in his book on modern pastoral poetry “where deaths are senseless, elegy is unable to bring events towards sense-making” (Twiddy, 2012: 39). We see this struggle to make sense in Ben Edelberg’s elegy to queer nightlife, *Empty Nightclub*, as the film appears to offer us no consolations. In this experimental film, there is no narrative in its scenes of found footage and footage Edelberg filmed himself. Each shot of a nightclub or a sauna seems part of a crime scene: moreover, the black and white images suggest that they are crime scenes of the past. Posters of future events at the nightclubs seem more like posters of missing people, which is apt as all the interiors here are missing people. With the start of the film showing the police entering Pulse, it would seem that it is fear that has driven the people away from these places. This atmosphere of fear is deliberate, and, in interview, Edelberg has suggested that his film should be viewed as a horror film. Halfway through the film, however, as the music moves from a melancholy swell to a techno beat, a lone hand upraised above the dancefloor opens and shuts in time to the music, but it is clear that this hand is a ghost, a shadow of happier times that never reappears.

As the music builds, the footage becomes more urgent but, at the same time, repeated images make it plain that the elegy is struggling to find a way out, despite an Exit sign that shines ominously in a corridor. With this apparent refusal to find consolation, *Empty Nightclub* belongs to the group of elegies that are not traditional in that they refuse to refigure the lost object of affection as a “permanent figure in a permanent landscape” or,
indeed, in nature’s endless cycle of death and renewal (Twiddy, 2012: 5). Unexpectedly, the film’s conclusion does return us to a pastoral, but here traditional Arcadia is electrified. Neon palm trees pulse in the night sky before the credits appear. This ambiguous symbol implies that the pastoral is now artificial, and even neon nature is like nature, which is “neither beneficent nor cruel,” and will go on without us (2012: 5).

In *Empty Nightclub*, and other short films such as *Magnificent Obsessions* where “unrelated … memories stored on YouTube profiles and cell phone cameras, clips from classic melodramas and sitcoms” are looped together, Ben Edelberg practices the form of collage, and thus makes “surprising collisions” with Jarman, whose 8mm short films are an influence on the younger man. However, Canadian artist, Benny Nemerofsky Ramsay is more direct in representing the “surprising collisions” of cruising in his elegiac installation, *Legacy*, of 2010. On a screen shaped like an enchanted mirror from a fairy story, a young man cruises in a forest. Unlike in Edelberg’s empty rooms, there are men dotted around between the trees: it seems like an authentic cruising ground, but soon we see that the young man is not cruising for sex but for advice. The older men offer this advice by singing him the words of queer elders such as Quentin Crisp and Radical Faerie, Harry Hay. These songs are restagings of the songs that the shepherds sang in the works of Theocritus and Virgil. The process of inheritance that takes place in elegy is very clear here in that wisdom is being passed from the dead poets to the living one. These elders also tell the young man how to live an ethical life and their singing becomes a “spiritual manifesto to queer men” (Nemerofsky, 2010).

The encounters with the past in *Legacy* almost suppose there was once a queer community, like Jarman’s sweet illusion of democracy, which has been lost in recent times, as gay men and lesbians are “gentrified” into society and as their differences are erased. One of the elders paraphrases the words of Quentin Crisp, and his advice is potently still useful: “You should make no effort to try to join society: stay right where you are and wait for society to form itself around you.” The end of the film proposes that a queer community can be restored; in turn, each queer elder raises his head and howls to the skies with, finally, our young hero joining in the cries. In true elegiac form we see the transfer of the artistic voice from the dead to the living.
But despite following this convention of elegy, the consolation is ultimately fictitious, and the restoration of a queer community in the film only reveals an absence in reality, and so the consolation is immediately undercut with loss. Crucially, this community could be established in the future, and so Nemerofsky’s elegy to queer culture is also a call to arms, a petition for a queer community in the future. This might appear to be a task beyond elegy’s remit, but Yeats faced the same battle in his elegies for an Ireland that never existed. His early plays such as *Cathleen ni Houlihan* (1902) and early poems such as “The Stolen Child” (1889) are part of the Irish Revival where Yeats saw Arcadia in the Irish landscape. Calling for a stop to the ongoing Anglicization of Irish culture, a colonizing process that resonates with the homogenizing tendencies of today’s gentrification, Yeats thought that an Irish pastoral was still possible despite the fact, as he claims in “The Song of the Happy Shepherd,” that Arcady’s god is “buried under the sleepy ground.” The speaker sings to remember the dead god:

> And still I dream he treads the lawn,  
> Walking ghostly in the dew,  
> Pierced by my glad singing through,  
> My songs of old earth’s dreamy youth:  
> (Yeats, [1889] 2008)

We could also dream that cruisers still tread the cruising grounds, and that by singing to them we can somehow connect the present to the past. Nemerofsky’s cruisers sing old songs of wisdom, but in another work, *Nightbird* (2013), a different kind of music fills the air. Here, Nemerofsky imagines names of queer male artists who have either died, or have been wrenched from queer society through their celebrity status, as birdsong. A gilded megaphone perched in a tree plays out the names like birds chirruping in a forest. Any consolation to be had from repeating the names of, among others, David Wojnarowicz and Wolfgang Tillmans, is tempered by the single voice of Nemerofsky who seems to be singing to an empty forest. Instead of restoring this queer community, which he admits is “ever elusive,” the sole voice exacerbates loss: the bird sings in isolation.

The Happy Shepherd, too, is a lone figure but Yeats advises that he should pick up a “twisted, echo-harbouring shell,” that it is enough to whisper into the shell his dreams and that even if Arcadia cannot be rebuilt then at least his words will “die a pearly brotherhood.” If the queer community elegized in the cruising grounds themselves is “ever elusive,” the queer men in
Nemerofsky’s *Nightbird* still attain a “pearly brotherhood” through death. And if we then look to these elegies as evidence that queer communities existed in the past, we can “rebuild” them in the future. If we elegize the past, we must strive to inherit the voice of the Happy Shepherd and sing, like the shepherds of Theocritus and Virgil, of utopian democracies. It is better one voice singing to the darkness than none at all. Even if cruising grounds only exist in elegy, they can remind us of other ways of expressing same-sex desire. In the face of the homogenization of gay culture, elegy may be our only consolation.
Introduction

*A man who has not been in Italy, is always conscious of an inferiority, from his not having seen what it is expected a man should see. The grand object of travelling is to see the shores of the Mediterranean*

Samuel Johnson (1776)

The intention of this paper is to analyze the international audience visiting the Uffizi Gallery at the end of the eighteenth century in order to demonstrate the role of the gallery in developing an international artistic taste for the upper classes. This investigation will focus on those artworks considered the highlights of the Neoclassical period that every visitor admired, studied, and copied. Thanks to the documents in the Uffizi Archives (A.S.G.F.), it becomes evident that foreign travelers’ interests, no matter where they came from, focused entirely on a few specific pieces. A stop in Florence meant a visit to the Uffizi collection, a walk through its corridors, and a talk with some of the educated travelers or with the director of the gallery.

In analyzing today’s mass tourism, we have also discovered that most of the visitors to the gallery focus their attention on a few art pieces, however not the same ones as their predecessors—the highlights in 2019 are not the ones of the late eighteenth century. While artistic taste has drastically changed, the social role given to certain art pieces has not: some were and are considered “a must see” in order to belong to a certain social class and to be accepted as its legitimate member.

The Uffizi Gallery and the End of the Medici Dynasty

Francesco I de Medici, second Grand Duke of Tuscany from 1574 to 1587, was responsible for creating the first museum arrangement of the Uffizi Gallery, located on the second floor of the building started by Vasari in 1560 to house the administration offices of the new Tuscan state.
The eastern wing of the corridor contained ancient Roman statues and busts, portraits of illustrious men, as well as frescoes inspired by Nero’s Domus Aurea: the so-called “grotesques.”

Francesco I commissioned the architect Bernardo Buontalenti (1531 - 1608) to create the octagonal room called the Tribuna that was the heart of the collection, containing the treasures of the Medici. The visit to this room became a must for all intellectual, wealthy European travelers since the mid eighteenth century. The room was so famous that Queen Charlotte of England sent the court painter Johann Zoffany to Florence to depict it and its setting.

In 1737, the Grand Duke Giangastone de Medici died without heirs and the assembly of European powers granted the Tuscan Grand Duchy to the Augsburg–Lorraine family. Anna Maria Luisa de Medici, sister of the last Grand Duke and widow of a German Prince, was worried about the destiny of the enormous art collection accumulated throughout the centuries by her family and decided to draw up an agreement with Franz Stephan of Lorraine: thanks to this Patto di Famiglia (Family Pact), the immense collection survived the end of the dynasty on condition that the art pieces should remain “forever” bound to the city of Florence and the Tuscan state “as an ornament to the State, for the benefit of the people and to attract the curiosity of foreigners.” The settlement of the inheritance came into force on the death of the last Medici in February 1743.

On June 24, 1766, Peter Leopold of Lorraine came to Florence to take care of his new reign. Overwhelmed by the Medici collection and by its Baroque confused display, he decided to reorganize the Uffizi Gallery in a more logical way, influenced by Enlightenment ideas, in order to create a new museum setting more commensurate to the Neoclassical taste that was then spreading through European courts from Paris to Vienna and St Petersburg. Subsequently, the Grand Duke opened the gallery to the public in 1769 and commissioned a new entrance to the Museum Mediceum. This was followed by a rational, education-based rearrangement of the collections established in chronological order and dividing paintings per school.

In 1775, a new director of the gallery was appointed: Giuseppe Pelli Benvenni, who was able to transform the museum into a place of education for the students of the Florentine Academy of Fine Arts and of entertainment for elite European travelers. The new director prepared and published the catalogue of the refurbished gallery, sending it as a present to all the Euro-
pean courts, in order to let them know the importance of the Uffizi collection and the new display strategy to instill curiosity and, probably, envy.

Giuseppe Pelli also introduced an obligation for all visitors: a letter of presentation in order to receive permission to enter the gallery to study and/or copy. All these letters are still available in chronological order in the Uffizi Archives. They are divided into two broad categories: letters to study and copy statues and paintings from corridors and other rooms, and letters to copy and study in the Tribuna, which contained the highlights of the collection.

If the director was not convinced by the letter of presentation, he sometimes asked for more information from the Secretary of State or from noble and educated Florentines who vouched for the travelers. Most of the letters are in Italian and foreigners asked acquaintances or friends to translate them. We know from the director’s diary that many of them met the director and the language spoken was certainly French, considered at the time as the international language of the European courts and of educated people.

Among all the requests between 1775 and 1792, only one is written in English and translated into Italian:

*Custode della Reale Galleria*

Palombo’s compliments to Mr Bastianelli, as he has a commission to procure a permission for Mr Tresham, an English painter, to copy the Portraits of Rubens and Van Dyke, existing in the apartment of the Flemish Painters in the Gallery, Palombo entreats of Mr B to direct him to whom he is to apply for that permission, or whether he will be so obliging as to obtain it from proper channel

Saturday noon May 6, 1775 (Card 8, A.S.G.F., Filza VIII, 1775, n.79)

**The Grand Tour and the Anglo-Saxon Community in Florence**

The definition of “Grand Tour” appears for the first time in a book by Richard Lassel in 1670, *Voyage of Italy, or a Complete Journey through Italy*. Lassel’s introduction listed four areas in which travel furnished “an accomplished, consummate Traveller: the intellectual, the social, the ethical and the political.”

The journey derived from the “*peregrinatio academica*” of medieval students moving from Paris to different universities in Padova and Bologna.
During the seventeenth century, the Tour was a very exclusive journey for a few European aristocrats, but thanks to the Industrial Revolution and its technical discoveries accompanied by the end of the Seven Years’ War in 1763, traveling became easier and safer and involved a larger part of European society.

The destination of the travelers were those Italian towns that were involved in the protection, rediscovery, and display of Roman antiquities; in 1734, the Capitolini Museums in Rome were opened, and excavations of Herculaneum and Pompeii were ordered by the King of Naples and, as previously stated, Lorraine started the reorganization of the Uffizi Gallery. The Grand Tour gave birth to Neoclassical tastes and became associated with a standard itinerary, serving as an educational rite of passage into adulthood.

In Florence, there was a considerable Anglo-Italian society led by the British consul Sir Horace Mann, who often remained in contact with travelers, helping them to buy antiquities or paintings. The Tuscan Government was aware of the importance of these foreigners for the economy of the state and the head of the State Council proposed to offer a course in English on the art of making medals, to oblige travelers to stay in Florence for at least four months.

The Uffizi Gallery became an intellectual meeting point, creating contact between the Florentine painters and the wealthy foreigners who seldom left the city without a painted souvenir. John Moore confirms the role of the gallery: “I have generally, since our arrival in Florence, passed two hours every forenoon in the famous gallery. Connoisseurs, and those who wish to be thought such, remain much longer” (quoted by Whitehead, 1983: 289).

Among the visitors to the gallery we can identify three categories: knowledgeable wealthy foreigners who copy for delight, Italian or foreign art students who copy to practice and, finally, painters who copy for business. Indeed, through the analysis of permits to copy, we discover that many Florentine artists asked to copy the same subjects several times, mostly requested by travelers. Many of these were copied in miniatures, a good size for paintings that needed to be packed and transported.

By the end of the eighteenth century, the request for copies was growing and the European market was offering good possibilities of earning. Royal families and aristocrats had to possess a copy of those pieces that every
connoisseur needed to know, and copyists started to acquire their own dignity as artists.

Some artists visited the gallery and made a profit by making copies that they sold either in Florence or back home. For example, Ozias Humphry came to Florence from Rome to copy the Venus of Urbino by Titian under commission of the Duke of Gloucester (A.S.G.F., Filza IX, 1776, n.76). Thomas Patch remained in Florence for about twenty years, producing a large number of Florentine and Tuscan landscapes which he sold to his compatriots. Joseph Macpherson copied for two years in the Uffizi and he produced two hundred and twenty-three miniature copies of self-portraits, mainly for the collection of Lord Cowper (Webster, 1951: card n.59). Gregorio Smirnoff, court painter of the Russian Empress Catherine the Great, was present at the Uffizi in 1790 to copy unlisted paintings from the Tribuna (A.S.G.F., Filza XXIII, 1790).

The Investigation of Artistic Taste

The chronological analysis of visitors’ letters allows us to investigate which artworks were considered masterpieces at the end of the eighteenth century. Many were requests to study and copy in the rooms containing the Medici’s vast collection of self-portraits. Those copies were easily sold to adorn corridors or meeting halls of villas and castles in Italy, as well as abroad. The first gallery guidebook, from 1759, already lists 223 copies on display. Among the most copied were the self-portraits of Rubens, Van Dyck, and Rembrandt, together with those of Anthon Raphael Mengs and Joshua Reynolds, a German and an English painter respectively, both of whom were involved in the contemporary Neoclassical movement. These paintings were copied and sold mainly to British clients. The English aristocracy was indeed very attracted to subjects with a domestic focus or to portraits, as stated by Sir Richard Steel who wrote in The Spectator in 1712, “What the antique statues and bas-reliefs which Italy enjoys are to the history painters, the beautiful and noble faces with which England is confessed to abound, are to the face painters” (quoted by Simon, 1987: 19).

Many permissions to copy were surprisingly related to some small Flemish genre paintings that the Medici had been collecting for centuries (Chiarini, 1989: xiii). The Uffizi Gallery was indeed the only public museum where these paintings were visible. These paintings, which focused on subjects of everyday life were not considered “supreme art,” as stated by Joshua Reynolds in a famous speech made to the students of the Royal Academy:
The painters of the Dutch school have still more locality. With them, a history piece is properly a portrait of themselves; whether they describe the inside or outside of their houses, we have their own people engaged in their own peculiar occupations, working or drinking, playing or fighting. The circumstances that enter into a picture of this kind are so far from giving a general view of human life that they exhibit all the minute particularities of a nation differing in several respects from the rest of mankind. Yet, let them have their share of more humble praise. The painters of this school are excellent in their own way; they are only ridiculous when they attempt general history on their own narrow principles, and debase great events by the meanness of their characters … In works of the lower kind everything appears studied and encumbered; it is all boastful art and open affectation. The ignorant often part from such pictures with wonder in their mouths, and indifference in their hearts … (Reynolds, Seven Discourses on Art, 1771: iv)

Furthermore, in the introduction of the catalogue of the Uffizi, the Director Giuseppe Pelli Bencivenni confirmed this idea when he wrote that Flemish art was “for servile and limited minds … a pastime for women and common people” (Fileti Mazza–Tomasello, 2003: 24).

Despite this derogatory judgment by two intellectuals, Flemish paintings remained a beloved subject for copyists and students alike. Some of the copied subjects were related to poverty, while others possessed sexual allusions showing women in a negative way as bearers of primitive instincts and agents of temptation. For example, one of the most copied paintings deals with the subject of Mary Magdalen seen as a sleeping courtesan barely dressed in contemporary fashion; another piece represents a lady tempting a hunter whose gun is presented in a vertical position, clearly alluding to how a woman can distract a man from his job. Female figures in Renaissance and Baroque art pieces were normally related either to saints or to sinners (Erhardt–Morris, 2012).

Indeed, the concept of genius was assigned solely to the male spirit and even during the eighteenth century, women were seen as incapable of forming higher intellectual thoughts. For this reason, women artists were generally not considered capable of creating “pittura di storia” (historic paintings), and they were normally relegated to the use of watercolors depicting flower compositions and family portraits. This idea was justified by scientists of the time, who claimed to have physical evidence from nature
that the female physique was not “built” in such a way. In addition, this view was sadly not only shared by doctors but also by philosophers of the time (Tadisisch, 1992).

In the documents of the Uffizi archives, there are several female names, women copying “per diletto” (for fun), but also women painters with studios of their own, considering the art of painting as their main income. One of the main peculiarities of all these copyists, male and female, was their request to reproduce a large number of small sized copies related to the most admired pieces: the so-called miniatures. These copies were often located in painters’ workshops where they could be easily sold to foreign clients, an easy “souvenir” to carry home.

The most beloved, admired, and copied painting during the years analyzed here is the Venus of Urbino by Titian, painted in 1534. It was copied about fifty times in the last thirty years of the eighteenth century, creating concerns for its safety and preservation. Indeed, the director proposed to bring an old copy into the gallery in order to avoid the use of the original. Copyists were copying from a copy, because for contemporary souvenirs, the quality of the copy was not very important; it was just necessary to possess a replica of what was considered a “must-have.” The Venus of Urbino is a lascivious painting in which the Venus/model is clearly offering herself naked to public view. Access was very restricted, as the painting was intended for the intimacy of a bedroom prepared for the arrival of Giulia da Varano, who at fourteen years old was to be married to Guidobaldo della Rovere, the Duke of Urbino.

The second most copied subject at this time was Mary Magdalen by Cristofano Allori, a female saint interpreted in different ways, very often wavering between the sacred and the profane. The copyists preferred the lascivious saint semi-clothed and alone in the desert in penitent position, a subject enjoying great popularity in the Catholic world of the Baroque period.

Again, notwithstanding the many requests for copies, the judgment of the intellectuals towards these female subjects was not indulgent. The Uffizi director Giuseppe Pelli wrote that Titian had painted a real woman, certainly less elegant than an idealized Classical statue (Fileti–Mazza, 2003: 13-14). As Raphael stated in one letter to Castiglione: “Seen that beauty among women is rare I use a certain idea born in my imagination” (quoted by Pinelli, 2000: 94).
Most Italian and foreign intellectuals were indeed extremely attracted to the Classical statues located in the Tribuna, among them the famous Medici Venus, a Hellenistic Greek statue dated to the first century BCE. All the connoisseurs agreed that the beauty of the classical past was unsurpassed. Winckelman affirms: “The only way we can achieve greatness and if possible to become inimitable is the imitation of the ancients and what some say of Homer that whoever has learned to understand him learns to admire him. The same can be said of the art of antiquity” (quoted by North, 2012: 7).

Many of the visitors to the gallery were asking to copy classical statues because the Uffizi possessed the largest collection of antique statues outside Rome. Beyond the classical statues, the intellectuals particularly appreciated the Renaissance artist who was considered the closest to the perfection of the Ancients: Raphael. Many enthusiastic words were used to elevate his figure above every other artist of the past, mainly by the Florentine English community. For example, around 1775, Lord Cowper purchased a small Raphael’s Madonna with Baby Jesus (Small Cowper Madonna, Washington National Gallery) and Sir Joshua Reynolds held public lectures to students of the Royal Academy (1769-90), later published as Discourses on the Arts (Reynolds, 2007: 14). It seems therefore quite strange that none of Raphael’s paintings located in the Uffizi were asked to be copied.

The Uffizi Gallery Today

Analysis of late-eighteenth-century artistic tastes in the Uffizi reveals that none of those visitors of the past were struck by the paintings that are considered the highlights of the museum for most tourists visiting the gallery today: Botticelli’s Birth of Venus and Allegory of Spring. Travelers, intellectuals, and critics were not interested in Early Renaissance artworks until the end of the nineteenth century. Indeed, the first monograph on Botticelli was written by Herbert Percy Horne and published in 1908, giving birth to a new interest in the Florentine school of painting before Michelangelo and Raphael (Horne, 1980).

Today the image of the Botticelli’s Birth of Venus is one of the most sold items of merchandizing throughout Florence. The Venus is an attraction for tourists, a “must-see” on the same level of Michelangelo’s David. Her fame is so great that often people have no idea of what else to see in the museum. We can find Botticelli’s Venus on aprons, ties, umbrellas, stationery, in small scale replicas of different colors: souvenirs to possess together with a selfie with her.
The taste of Uffizi visitors has changed through time and an interesting question to investigate is how the relation between visitors and the gallery has also changed. As already stated, the Uffizi Gallery was the first private family collection to be opened to the public, and until the 1970s, it was a temple for high culture as were most of the major European museums, a place for educated elites to be able to understand its treasures. Since then, the role of the Uffizi Gallery in the contemporary world seems to have changed, like the role of many other museums. They have become more and more visible institutions in contemporary societies, but do museums still satisfy their three original duties: to preserve, study, and exhibit, and do they still pursue eighteenth- and nineteenth-century ideas of using museums to “civilize” and educate people?

In the 1970s, the art historian Carlo Ludovico Ragghianti affirmed that the educational purpose of the museum was already lost (Antinucci, 2014), while some years ago the art historian and curator Antonio Paolucci, then Superintendent of the Polo Museale Fiorentino, asserted that transmitting culture means passing knowledge and values through the communication of signs and symbols to new generations (Paolucci, 2007). All the ancient Italian art pieces were originally part of an historic and natural environment: a small altarpiece in a medieval countryside church is able to recreate the atmosphere of that past, as opposed to the same image attached to the empty white wall of a modern museum.

The possession and display of art are not enough: works of art need partially to recuperate the value they lost in their museumification. When an art object is exposed in a museum, it should maintain and communicate an historic message as well as an aesthetic one. Is this passage of information between artworks and visitors working nowadays? I do not think so, especially because of the enormous crowd that has transformed our museums into the ultimate luxury items: now people visit the gallery as a “must.”

The Uffizi Gallery is visited by almost three million people each year, and the museum has become so popular that the waiting time in season can be up to four or five hours. Recently, the price of entrance to the gallery was increased from eight to twenty euros during high season. The Director announced that this was done to discourage “hit and run tourism.” However, the queues in front of the gallery are still the same; no one seems to have been discouraged by the new price. The Director’s idea has not worked. Probably, hiking prices hurts true art fans who may not be rich and may also be discouraged by the difficulty of enjoying the works because of
overcrowding. It has become harder and harder to hold an art lesson in the gallery. Most teachers try to organize their syllabus in order to enter the museum in winter months, even if sometimes this is impossible.

Historic museums are also being forced to generate income and establish their relevance within society or risk closing their doors. They must be on Facebook, Twitter, or Instagram in order to appeal to the public, to support increasing museum expenses that the state cannot completely absorb. The Vatican Museums, for example, attract about six million visitors, almost as many as the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York, which is nearly five times bigger. The crowds are a financial boon. According to the latest calculations, Italian museums generate around eighty million euros (eighty-seven million US dollars) from ticket revenue each year and another twenty million euros from merchandizing and corporate hospitality. However, when more than 25,000 visitors a day pass through them, the crowd also poses a problem. Their exhalation of carbon dioxide and the sweat and the dust they bring in with them endangers the Renaissance frescoes (*The Economist*, 2015).

Many of the visitors do not realize how delicate these items are and how difficult it is to protect them. Every year we have to attend to damage caused by visitors (probably because of their ignorance rather than deliberate bad manners) and so we have the responsibility to try to educate our children from a young age to have respect and appreciation for all works of art.

**Conclusion**

Italy has many sites with endangered art and with today’s visitor numbers it is becoming harder to protect them. In the Scrovegni Chapel in Padua, frescoed by Giotto, a solution was found: no more than twenty-five visitors are allowed in at one time, and they must spend fifteen minutes in an air-conditioned waiting room first. This has been a great solution, but the number of visitors to the Scrovegni is not the same scale as those going to the Uffizi, the Vatican, or the vast archaeologic park of Pompeii.

What are the reasons that make people move from one historic place to another without any sufficient cultural preparation? Visits to museums seem to have become an aspect of social appearance, a status symbol to show off. Does this mean the relevance of some museums has changed and they have become the ultimate luxury brand? What is, therefore, the solution to the problems that are suffocating our historic centers and main museums?
Probably there is not a miracle recipe, but we need to find solutions in order to continue “to educate and entertain,” as the last Medici wrote, unless we decide to follow Umberto Eco’s proposal (or provocation) that some would probably be happy to accept, while others would cry scandal:

It would be so useful to have an Uffiziland on the outskirts of Florence, with perfect reproductions of the items in the real Uffizi Gallery on display, maybe even with their colors touched up a little, the way funeral parlors add makeup to the lips of the deceased. Given that crowds gather in front of Florence’s Palazzo Vecchio to admire a “David” that isn’t the original (but they don’t know this, or don’t care), why shouldn’t they go to Uffiziland? Don’t tell me that my proposal is “class-driven” in the sense that it would represent an attempt to separate the troglodytes from people with refined artistic sensibilities. True, it might, but each person would decide to which category he or she belongs by choice and not by social decree. Similar choices are made by millions of people—including those who consider themselves aesthetes and connoisseurs—when they tune in to trash TV shows (Eco, 2007)
MOBILITY, IDENTITY, AND TECHNOLOGY

If we are always arriving and departing, it is also true that we are eternally anchored. One’s destination is never a place but rather a new way of looking at things

Henry Miller, *Big Sur and the Oranges of Hieronymus Bosch*

We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time

T.S. Eliot, “Little Gidding,” *The Four Quartets*

There is no nationalist answer. As in the case of climate change, so also with technological disruption, the nation state is simply the wrong framework to address the threat.

Yuval Noah Harari, *21 Lessons for the 21st Century*

Information is the oxygen of the modern age. It seeps through the walls topped by barbed wire, it wafts across the electrified borders.

Ronald Reagan

But it makes an immigrant laugh to hear the fears of the nationalist, scared of infection, penetration, miscegenation, when this is small fry, peanuts, compared to what the immigrant fears—dissolution, disappearance

Zadie Smith, *White Teeth*
Anti-Semitism and the Mobility of Prejudice

William I. Brustein, West Virginia University

Introduction: Anti-Semitism from Right to Left

The rise of National Socialism and the Holocaust have led many to assume that the Left has consistently served as the principal supporter of Jews and has accordantly opposed anti-Semitism. That contention is not supported by the evidence.

To understand the Left’s position, it is important to factor in the degree to which Jews are, and have been, perceived as natural allies. Between 1881 and 1945, by virtue of the mass migration of poor Jews from the Russian Empire and Eastern Europe to the West, the affinity of a sizeable proportion of the Jewish population toward the Left was quite strong. However, after 1945, many Jews living in Western Europe and North America experienced considerable social and economic mobility which translated into support for the political agenda of Center and Center Right. This political migration was met with displeasure by the Left and with active courtship by Right politicians like Margaret Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Reagan in the USA. Consequently, a vicious circle emerged where the Left became more critical of issues important to western Jews (e.g., support for Israel) resulting in a political realignment.

David Cesarani argues that the late-nineteenth-century and early-twentieth-century right-wing attack on Jews as constituting a worldwide conspiratorial network vying to shape world affairs has, since the 1990s, been taken up by the Left (2004: 66-67). This is illustrated by the allegation of Jewish overrepresentation within the ranks of the neo-conservative lobby who have purportedly shaped US foreign policy (Cesarani, 2004: 76). Within this new ideological frame, America, the Jews, and Israel are the principal purveyors of evil.

However, we cannot assume that every criticism from the Left of Israel or Zionism is necessarily anti-Semitic. Since 1945, with the public awareness of Nazi crimes, what constitutes anti-Semitism is complicated by the reluctance of those who harbor anti-Jewish beliefs to state them publicly, and

27 See also Nonna Mayer’s “Nouvelle Judéophobie ou vieil antisémitisme?” (2004: 92-93).
the difficulty of differentiating between legitimate criticism of the actions of Israel and those which reflect animosity to Jews as a people. We must be careful not to assign the label of anti-Semitism to every criticism of Israel or to every non-positive comment about Jews. Brian Klug’s distinction between anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism is critical:

To argue that hostility to Israel and hostility to Jews are one and the same thing is to conflate the Jewish state with the Jewish people … Israel is one thing, Jewry another. Accordingly, anti-Zionism is one thing, anti-Semitism another. They are separate. To say they are separate is not to say that they are never connected. But they are independent variables that can be connected in different ways (Klug, 2004: n.p.)

In these terms, the working definition of anti-Semitism issued in 2005 by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is flawed. In 2005, OSCE agreed the following: “Anti-Semitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred towards Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of anti-Semitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities” (Whine, 2006: n.p.).

The conference report provided several examples of contemporary anti-Semitism including:

a) calling for, aiding, or justifying the killing or harming of Jews in the name of a radical ideology or an extremist view of religion;

b) making mendacious, dehumanizing, demonizing, or stereotypical allegation about Jews as such or the power of Jews as collective, such as, especially but not exclusively, the myth about a world Jewish conspiracy or of Jews controlling the media, economy, government or other societal institutions;

c) accusing Jews as a people of being responsible for real or imagined wrong doing committed by a single Jewish person or group, or even for acts committed by non-Jews;

d) denying the fact, scope, mechanisms (e.g., gas chambers) or intentionality of the genocide of the Jewish people at the hands of

The OSCE working definition is consistent with the operational definition established by the European Monitoring Centre (EUMC) on Racism and Xenophobia.
Nationalist Socialist Germany and its supporters and accomplices during World War II (the Holocaust);

e) accusing the Jews as a people, or Israel as a state, of inventing or exaggerating the Holocaust;

f) accusing Jewish citizens of being more loyal to Israel, or to the alleged priorities of Jews worldwide, than to the interests of their own nations;

g) denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor;

h) applying double standards by requiring of the State of Israel a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation;

i) using the symbols and images associated with classic anti-Semitism (e.g., claims of Jews killing Jesus or blood libel) to characterize Israel or Israelis;

j) drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis; and

k) holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the State of Israel (quoted by Whine, 2006)

While the OSCE’s statement on anti-Semitism has been widely embraced, it is over-reaching. In contrast to the OSCE’s statement on anti-Semitism, I draw on my previous research where anti-Semitism is defined as “hostility (as expressed in sentiments, attitudes, or actions) to Jews as a collectivity rooted in the general population” (Brustein, 2003: 5). Therefore, I would question the inclusion of points “g” and “j.” By way of illustration, some take the position that Zionism is antithetical to full integration into the societies in which Jews have lived for generations.

Many Jewish leaders before the Holocaust also criticized Zionism on these grounds. Left-wing anti-Zionism in Western Europe today is partly based on the same rejection of the idea of Jewish national identity, and this does

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29 The US Department of State’s “Defining Anti-Semitism” fact sheet published by the Office to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism (June 8, 2010) mirrors the 2005 OSCE definition while elaborating anti-Semitism relative to Israel by including examples under the heading of “Demonize Israel,” “Double Standard for Israel,” and “Delegitimize Israel.” The US Department of State’s statement does note that “criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded as anti-Semitic.”
not necessarily impinge on the defense by the same left-wing figures of the rights of individual Jews, or Jewish communities. Moreover, while those critics of Israeli policies who compare Israeli policy to that of the Nazis may well be guilty of unacceptable ignorance of Nazi genocide, such criticism, by itself, does not constitute anti-Semitism. As Brian Klug observes, inflamed passions produce inflated rhetoric. Unfortunately, those inflamed passions lead to the employment of analogies to Nazi crimes (Klug, 2004).

**Anti-Semitism in the Soviet East Bloc**

Veiled attacks on Jewish citizens residing within the East Bloc often fell under the guise of attacks on Zionists who were alleged to constitute “rootless cosmopolitans” and “Jewish nationalists” who allegedly conspired with the western imperialist enemy. The depictions of “rootless cosmopolitans” and “Jewish nationalists” might appear mutually contradictory. However, Timothy Snyder asserts that

within a Stalinist logic they could function together. Jews were ‘cosmopolitans’ in that their attachment to Soviet Culture and the Russian language was supposedly insecure. They could not be counted upon to defend the Soviet Union or the Russian nation ... they might prefer Israel, the Jewish national state, to the Soviet Union, their homeland (2010: 348-49)

Underlying these attacks were the notions that certain Jews comprised a closed conspiracy seeking world control and subscribed to a dual loyalty. Proponents of this new wave of anti-Semitism drew upon left-wing anti-Jewish rumors of the 1920s, 30s, and 40s highlighting the role of the “so-called Jewish communist fifth columns” in selling out to and conspiring with enemies of the Soviet Union, while simultaneously seeking to dominate and transform Russian culture (Lendvai, 1971: 6-7; Laqueur, 2006: 174-77; Wistrich, 1992: 112-13).

However, at the time of the birth of the state of Israel, the East Bloc, particularly following the lead of Stalinist Russia, eagerly embraced the independence struggle and survival of the fledgling state of Israel. The position taken by Stalin vis à vis the new state of Israel seemed consistent with the Marxist position that socialists should support nationalist movements opposed to western imperialist powers. In the case of Israel’s struggle against Great Britain, the Soviet Bloc’s self-interests and those of worldwide Jewry were well-aligned. Moreover, in 1947 and 1948, the horrors
of Auschwitz and the other Nazi concentration camps were so new that Soviet support seemed non-controversial. Soviet foreign minister Gromyko’s speech before the UN in 1947 in support of the Jewish state reflects the Soviet position at the time (Cohen and Wall, 1985: 90; Frankel, 1984). But as Israel increasingly appeared to align itself with the Western powers during the Cold War, there was a gradual shift in the Soviet position to one of increasing opposition and suspicions towards citizens of the Jewish faith within the East Bloc.

Lendvai cites the influential article by Ilya Ehrenburg in Pravda (September 21, 1948) as marking the turnabout. Ehrenburg’s anti-Zionist essay (carrying the stamp of an official endorsement) appeared to have derived from the Soviet Union’s disapproval of Eastern Bloc Jews’ public enthusiasm for Israel’s success (Lendvai, 1971: 19).

The anti-Jewish purges within the Soviet Bloc during the last few years of the Stalinist period marked a high point in Soviet anti-Semitism. No example personifies this tendency more than the infamous Slansky trial of 1952 in Czechoslovakia. The interrogators referred to the defendants as “Jewish swine,” “enemies of the people,” and “cosmopolitans” engaged in activities to undermine the state and communism. One prosecutor spoke of the Jewish predisposition to treason, disloyalty to socialism, and imperialist Zionism (Snyder, 2010: 364-65; Heitlinger, 2012: 21; Oschlies, 1979: 159).

The anti-Semitic character of the Slansky trial is clearly captured on the November 24, 1952 front page of the Czech communist party paper, the Rudé Právo:

Zionists are the representatives of a reactionary-bourgeois and chauvinistic Jewish movement which, since its inception, has doggedly opposed the cause of progress and of the people. Under the cloak of Jewish national interest, they pursue only their class interest and dirty money-making trickery. Their policies are designed to exploit the entire working class. In the interests of these selfish and extortionist objectives, they organize themselves into international Zionist movements and serve the American imperialists as their most reliable running dogs (Oschlies, 1979: 158-59)

In brief, for most of the post-World War II Stalinist period, governmental anti-Zionism clearly implied Judeophobias (Frankel, 1984: 440-41).
Particularly in the aftermath of the 1967 Six Day War, anti-Semitism gathered significant steam most notably in Poland, post-Stalinist Russia, and Czechoslovakia. In March 1968, the Polish government characterized student anti-government protests as “Zionist” inspired. During the spring of 1968, the Gomulka regime went further, alleging that Jews were simultaneously Zionists and “cosmopolitans.”

Added to the traditional leftist anti-Semitic themes emanating from Eastern Bloc pundits, after 1967 an effort to equate Zionism with Nazism included the incredible charge of a shared Jewish and Nazi responsibility for the Holocaust. The Soviet Union’s journal Evseev unabashedly suggested that the “Zionists should put up a memorial to Hitler. After all, it was the raving Führer in his Mein Kampf who asserted the basic dogma of Zionism—the existence of a ‘worldwide Jewish people’ and of ‘the Jewish race’” (Snyder, 2010: 373-74; Frankel, 1984: 465).

Wistrich notes that the October 4, 1967 edition of the Komisomolskaya Pravda alleged that “the adherents of Zionism in the USA number from twenty to twenty-five million people” and that Zionists control eighty percent of local and international news agencies, constitute seventy percent of US lawyers, sixty percent of US physicists, and forty-three percent of American industrialists (Wistrich, 1979: 288-90).

The historical anti-Semitic leftist attacks on the anti-progressive nature of the Jewish religion, Jews constituting “a nation apart,” and Jewish hatred for non-Jews held sway within the Soviet Union for much of the 1970s and 1980s, frequently under the guise of anti-Zionism. The US-Israel alliance that began to emerge in the 1970s did little to drown out the chorus of anti-Zionist/anti-Jewish rhetoric in the Eastern Bloc.

**Anti-Semitism in the West**

Many observers note the rise of “new left-wing anti-Semitism” in the late 1990s and first decade of the twenty-first century. The Second Intifada and the anti-globalization movement were catalysts for a spike in left-wing anti-Zionism sometimes indistinguishable from anti-Semitism (Urban, 2005). From 1945 to the present, historical left-wing anti-Semitic themes have once again reasserted themselves with increasing magnitude and intensity.

Throughout the late 1940s and 1950s, voices within the powerful French Communist Party echoed the Soviet Bloc’s criticism of Jews as cosmopolitans and bourgeois. Perhaps best known was Pierre Hervé. In La Libération
Trahie, Hervé highlighted the dangers of Jewish bourgeois cosmopolitanism within the leading ranks of the French Socialist Party and in a denigrating manner referred to the French Socialist Party as the party of the Jewish intelligentsia (Cohen and Wall, 1985: 88-89). There were likely other factors influencing the reemergence of French Left anti-Semitism particularly during the 1950s and 60s including the considerable migration of North African Jews to France. These Jews represented a higher socio-economic standing than the earlier waves of East European Jewish immigrants and tended to be more conservative in their politics.

Traditional leftist anti-Semitic tropes appear in a number of Swedish leftist pronouncements as exemplified in the September 21, 1982 edition of the Left-leaning Västgöta Demokraten:

If one believes the old source texts, Israel was God’s chosen people. It is therefore perhaps not a difficult choice for such a people, using all the means at its disposal, especially military options, to strive to extend its chosen property and territory … we need to differentiate between Christianity and Judaism—the Jews follow the law of Moses, a specially composed story, particularly well-suited to military and warlike adventures (cited in Schoenfeld, 2004: 93)

Left-leaning Dutch academics like W.H. Nagel and P.A.H. de Boer conflated anti-Zionism with anti-Semitism in the aftermath of the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Nagel, a Dutch professor of criminology, quipped that the Israeli Zionists conducted themselves like fascists and, most notably, that the Jewish attachment to the teachings of the Old Testament rather than the teachings of Christ has led the State of Israel to conduct itself in a fascist manner and in one that denotes a superiority to others (Poliakov, 1977: 108).

Anti-Semitic utterances are in no way the exclusive property of Swedish Social Democrats. The well-known contemporary French philosopher, Alain Finkielkraut, has stated that the “loathing of Israel today is so thick you could cut it with a knife.” Post-WWII Social Democrats have at times blurred the boundary between legitimate criticism of Israeli policies and anti-Semitism. The former Austrian Social Democratic and Jewish Chancellor, Bruno Kreisky, in his condemnation of Begin’s policies, pointed to “the stupidity of the Jews in general” (Wistrich, 2007: 15). In Italy in 2002, Giancarlo Desiderati, a spokesman for the trade union Flaica-Cub, called for a boycott
of Jewish enterprises proclaiming that goods purchased from Jewish-owned shops were blood-tainted (Furedi, 2009: 3).

One of the most blatant left-wing attacks on Israel emerges in the writing of the late-Portuguese Nobel Laureate, Jose Saramago. Saramago, a libertarian communist, in El País (April 21, 2001) employed the anti-Semitic theme of Jewish particularism or exclusivism. To understand Israel’s treatment of Palestinians in Saramago’s view, one only needs to see that the Jews rationalize and justify their aberrant behavior towards non-Jews by virtue of what they endured during the Holocaust. According to Saramago, Israelis end up committing crimes against others as horrific as those committed at Auschwitz. Saramago adds that the Jews “endlessly scratch their own wound to keep it bleeding, to make it incurable, and they show it to the world as if it were a banner” (cited in Schoenfeld, 2004: 99-100).

Contemporary left-wing opposition to the existence of the state of Israel has strong roots in early-nineteenth-century European liberalism and socialism. The advocates of secularist thinking in the years following the French Revolution envisioned that European Jews could avoid stigmatization and marginalization by abandoning their historical attachment to their close-knit communities and to the aspiration of constituting a free nation among many nations. Many segments of today’s left have inherited this antipathy toward a Jewish collectivity, represented today by the Jewish state of Israel, and, notably, to the perceived dual loyalty of Jews living outside of Israel.

Blatantly anti-Semitic utterances have come from within the British Labour Party. One of the most egregious cases is that of Tom Dalyell. While Tony Blair was serving as Prime Minister, Dalyell denounced him as a puppet of the Jewish “cabal” led by British Jewish or Jewish-sympathizers like Jack Straw, Peter Mandelson, and Lord Levy and that world Jewry dictated both American and global policy (Iganski and Kosmin, 2003: 140; Harrison, 2006: 141). Another example of British anti-Semitism comes from the New Statesman, the highly-regarded leftist British weekly magazine. The New Statesman’s January 14, 2002 edition entitled “A Kosher Conspiracy?” had as its cover illustration a gold-colored Star of David piercing a small, prostrate British Union Jack (Hodgson, 2002).

Any discussion of contemporary European anti-Semites would unquestionably include such notorious proponents as the neo-Nazi Horst Mahler and the rabid French anti-Semite Roger Garaudy. Both Mahler and Garaudy have alleged that the Holocaust is a myth and that the Jews employ the
lie of Auschwitz to legitimate their claims for recompensation and for the existence of the State of Israel. Much like late-nineteenth-century right-wing anti-Semites, Mahler and Garaudy cut their teeth as committed members of the political Left. In the case of Mahler, he was one of the co-founders of the Baader-Meinhof ultra-Left movement of the 1970s while Garaudy served as a member of the Politburo of the French Communist Party (Laqueur, 2006: 130).

Opposition to Israel and America are as much a tenet of the contemporary European Left as are pro-choice, abolition of capital punishment, equality in marital arrangements, economic and social justice, official recognition of gay and lesbian couples, and support for Third World claims against the rich First World (Markovits, 2005: 6-8). Yet I insist that leftist opposition to Israel does not by itself constitute anti-Semitism.

Newspaper Reportage of the Second Intifada, March-April 2002: Is the Leftist Press in France, Great Britain, and Germany Anti-Semitic?

There are several factors behind the recurrence of left-wing anti-Semitism since 1945 including the perception that Jews have placed the interests of Israel above those of their own nation and that upward social mobility has led to the progressive shift in Jewish electoral support from the left to the right; this has been further cemented by the New Left’s embrace of anti-globalism and the Palestinian struggle against Israel: political viewpoints at variance with the positions held by many Jews.

Has the re-emergence of left-wing anti-Semitism found a voice in the contemporary leftist press? The Second Intifada of March-April 2002 received substantial coverage in the French, British, and German press that illuminates this question.

France

*Humanité*, the principal organ of the French Communist Party, *Lutte Ouvrière*, a more radical left newspaper, and *Libération*, a progressive leftist newspaper featured considerable coverage of the Second Intifada. Overall, this was critical of Prime Minister Sharon’s policies, the persistence of violence on both sides, and was not notably anti-Semitic. Articles frequently promoted peace in the Middle East, an endorsement of the Peace Now movement in Israel, a two-state policy, a sympathy for the plight of the
Palestinians, and highlighted the presence of internal Israeli opposition to Sharon’s policies in the West Bank.\(^3\)

*Lutte Ouvrière*’s coverage is similar to that found in *Humanité*. The newspaper calls for the Israeli people to stand up and oppose Sharon while at the same time condemns attacks on Jews. Moreover, the newspaper is critical of Palestinian suicide attacks on Israeli citizens but strongly anti-Zionist in that it advocates the establishment of a communistic society in Israel in which Palestinians and Israelis co-exist peacefully.

In *Libération*, the intellectual progressive newspaper of the French Left, the tone of the articles, by and large, is more neutral, compared to other French leftist journals. The articles give considerable attention to the occurring dialogue between the Israeli government and the Palestinian leaders. The coverage points to the USA’s endorsement of Sharon, yet the US Government is not presented as an accomplice. Editorials and articles in *Libération* report the events in both the Middle East and in France in an objective fashion.

Three representative right-wing newspapers were analyzed to compare the reportage to that of the left-wing papers. *Le Point*, *Les 4 Vèrités*, and the widely-circulated *Le Figaro* were, overall, slightly more pro-Israeli yet critical of Sharon’s policies, and quite pre-occupied with coverage of the anti-Israeli demonstrations within France. The one exception appears to be *Les 4 Vèrités* whose reportage during the period of this examination targeted French and western Jews.

*Le Point*, a moderate Right weekly news magazine, dwelled largely on Saudi and US efforts to achieve a cease fire and peace solution, as well as criticizing Prime Minister Sharon’s heavy hand in dealing with the Palestinians. April reportage highlighted the unfortunate violent turn of the Israeli-Palestinian clashes while commenting that the fight was uneven due to the vast superiority of Israeli arms. The news magazine gave special attention to the subject of French anti-Semitism. The April 5, 2002 edition argued that anti-Semitic events in Lyon and Marseilles were perpetrated by disenfranchised Muslim youth who are being indoctrinated by some Imams and Islamist extremists. *Le Point* goes on to claim no apparent involvement by either the French radical Right or French Left in these events (Rankl, 2002).

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\(^3\) Online editions can be accessed at http://www.humanité.fr/2002.
Les 4 Vérités, a more conservative and Christian right-wing newspaper, concentrated largely on anti-Israeli demonstrations occurring in France and the role of French Jews. Pierre Lassieur’s “Relations judéo-musulmanes” (March 22) claimed that the spate of anti-Semitic acts in France is the work of Muslims rather than adherents of the French Right. He also suggests that French Jewish politicians, most often leftist, should abandon their accommodating and encouraging attitude towards the Muslims. It is clear that Les 4 Vérités subscribes to a form of right-wing anti-Semitism prevalent before World War II when the Right frequently castigated Jews for their purported leftist political leanings.

Le Figaro, France’s most widely-circulated and highly respected Center-Right newspaper, regularly reported the international debate surrounding the situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the causes of the conflict, the tactics employed by the leadership of the Israelis and Palestinians, and the formation of allegiances within France to one side or another in the conflict. Le Figaro also published several interviews and opinion pieces concerning the resurgence of anti-Semitism in Europe under the guise of anti-Zionism. The newspaper presented balanced views from those who argued forcefully that opposition to Israel does not constitute anti-Semitism and from those who equated opposition to Israel as a form of anti-Semitism.

The United Kingdom

Of the three leftist papers, the New Statesman, The Independent, and the Morning Star, the Morning Star is considered the most left-wing. The editorial staff of the New Statesman did not hold a unified view; illustrative of this is “Middle East: No goodies or baddies” (March 18, 2002):

It is hard to resist taking sides in the Middle East ... the war between Jews and Palestinians is [close] to home, not just geographically but politically and culturally. On to this conflict we can project our own prejudices and fear. Some see in the Jewish state a force for modernity: dynamic, liberal, democratic, and paradoxically multicultural ... Israel is ... a welfare state with a parliamentary system ... But on the left at least, the more common view of Israel now is of a colonial oppressor which exploits and represses the Palestinians (New Statesman, 2002: 4-5)
A second article appearing in the same issue of the *New Statesman* took a very different stance. John Kampfner paints a generally negative view of Israel’s evolution from a progressive to a reactionary society:

> Few places in Jerusalem … still preserve the liberalism and idealism that Israel was supposed to be … At the present, however, these values are corroded because of the way in which “security and identity the twin axes of the Israeli psyche” have been pursued. Israel’s problem … started with the policies of improving the demographic balance by welcoming anyone who proclaimed oneself a Jew. The policy brought scores of individuals from the former Soviet Union … who once in Israel, delimited themselves in enclaves and displayed a Soviet racism against the Arabs. The demographic shift in the composition of the population, and the decrease in the number of older Jewish communities, explain what caused the growing support for the Israeli right and extreme right and its rise to power (Kampfner, 2002)

Though Kampfner’s article is unquestionably critical of Israel’s fall from grace, it does not question the existence of Israel nor does it attack worldwide Jewry for its support of the state of Israel and, therefore, cannot be considered anti-Semitic.

*The Independent* contained numerous reports and updates from the conflict zone focusing on the siege of Jenin, the humanitarian crisis, and the executions of Palestinian collaborators. A few articles dealt with the rise of anti-Semitism in Europe but, overall, we could not detect any signs of explicit or implicit anti-Semitism in the reportage.

*The Morning Star* depicted the Palestinians’ resistance both as a heroic struggle against overwhelming capitalist forces and as a struggle for self-determination against imperialistic powers. However, the *Morning Star* is careful to emphasize that its opposition to Israel pertains exclusively to the Israeli leadership and military and to Israel’s violation of the UN decisions and international law and is in no way aimed at Jews.

As with France, we compared the reportage of the political Left and Right in Great Britain. Right-wing perspectives were represented through an analysis of the *Daily Star*, *The Spectator*, and the widely-circulated *Daily Telegraph*. The latter has traditionally represented the views of the British Conservative Party while the *Daily Star* has typically presented more populist Right-wing views. *The Spectator* has upheld a more Right-of-Center
position. The *Daily Star*’s coverage was limited to news flashes and did not dwell on causes, meanings, and consequences of the Second Intifada. The newspaper instead condemned Palestinian suicide attacks within Israel and characterized the perpetrators as maniacs. On the other hand, the *Daily Star* commented that the Israelis are unlikely to succeed at ending the terrorist attacks by pursuing their current policy of trying to destroy the Palestinians. The newspaper went further in its criticism of Israeli policies by claiming that Israelis may have committed war crimes against the Palestinians. Nevertheless, I could not detect an anti-Semitic tone in the March-April 2002 editions of the *Daily Star*.

*The Spectator* devoted considerable coverage to the Second Intifada. Among the topics addressed were whether Israel should bear the full burden for the fact that a Palestinian state does not exist or might some of the responsibility lay with the actions and decisions of the Palestinians and Arab nations. Additionally, articles dealt with the topic of recurring anti-Semitism and the New Left. The article by Paul Johnson, “To hate America is to hate humanity” (April 6, 2002) speaks clearly to this point:

… the collapse of the Soviet Union and other communist regimes left the Western Left missing a hero. Hence, the Left chose Arab nationalism and Islamic fundamentalist as a new cause … this new allegiance resonates with anti-Americanism that is traditional among leftists … Moreover, America is deemed to protect and cherish a hidden and powerful presence, the Jews. The conspiracy theory, at the heart of anti-Semitism, is also dear to the Left (Johnson, 2002: 23)


**Germany**

*Junge Welt* is the more left-wing of the two socialist daily newspapers. *Neues Deutschland* served as the official communist party organ of the German Democratic Republic. *Junge Welt*’s position on the Second Intifada leaned decisively in favor of the Palestinian cause. Israel is frequently characterized as a colonialisit and racist state serving as a proxy for the USA in the Middle East while Prime Minister Ariel Sharon is portrayed as a terrorist and a liar. The Israeli peace movement, on the other hand, receives substantial favorable coverage in several editions.
There are many articles in the *Junge Welt* describing the Israeli military siege of Ramallah. These articles paint a picture of Israeli war crimes including the use of Israeli helicopters and tanks firing rockets and grenades at health clinics, a daycare center, and residences (Heiser, 2002; Schäfter, 2002).

All told, while numerous entries in *Junge Welt* linking Zionism and racism and insinuating parallels between the Israeli military activities in the occupied territories, plus the Nazi annihilation campaign against European Jewry, misrepresent the facts, we cannot justify characterizing them as anti-Semitic, according to our definition of anti-Semitism.

The left-wing *Neues Deutschland*, like *Junge Welt*, supported Palestinian resistance. However, unlike the reportage in the *Junge Welt*, the articles in *Neues Deutschland* steer clear of defining Zionism as racism and comparing Israeli military policies to Nazi Germany’s.

The right-wing of the German political spectrum is represented by two newspapers. *Die Welt* is an established widely-circulated conservative daily while the *Junge Freiheit* is a less-widely circulated weekly and considered to represent the German “New Right.” In general, the coverage of the Second Intifada in both newspapers differed from the left-wing papers in that they adopted a more pro-Israeli bias, though it should be noted that, at times, the *Junge Freiheit* expressed harsh criticism of Israeli military policies.

With few exceptions, *Die Zeit*’s reportage presents a more favorable portrait of the Israeli side and thus clearly differentiates itself from the left-wing’s pro-Palestinian reportage. There is no indication of anti-Semitism in *Die Zeit*’s coverage. In contrast to *Die Zeit*, *Junge Freiheit* contains significantly more disapproval of Israeli policies. However, this should not be interpreted as pro-Palestinian; *Junge Freiheit* is uniformly opposed to Palestinian terrorist attacks on Israeli civilians.

All told, if one employs the OSCE’s broad definition of anti-Semitism and its complete list of anti-Semitic examples, the reportage in the left-wing *Junge Welt* falls within the category of anti-Semitism. However, as I have stated previously, opposition to Zionism and comparing Israeli military actions to Nazi policies during the Holocaust (however misguided) do not by themselves constitute anti-Semitism. Many of the entries in *Junge Welt* come quite close to crossing the border into anti-Semitism. I do not believe that line has been crossed.
Conclusion

This analysis of anti-Semitism demonstrates:

a) The importance of recognizing that there is a border between critiques of Israel and anti-Semitism and that

b) Ideologies of anti-Semitism are also mobile. The assumption that anti-Semitism is necessarily a characteristic of right-wing thought is demonstrably not the case. Since the end of World War II, both Left and Right have embraced traditional anti-Semitic stereotypes. The Soviet Bloc moved from a pro-Israel position to virulent anti-Semitism. By the late 1980s, the Right tended to look more favorably on Israel than the Left, which at times, conflated opposition to Israel with anti-Semitism. As I and Louisa Roberts argued in our 2015 study of left-wing anti-Semitism:

opposition to Israeli policy vis a vis the Palestinians has become a major left-wing cause, giving rise to the risk that anti-Israel discourse might blur into anti-Semitic rhetoric. At times, age-old anti-Semitic tropes have been activated as part of a larger anti-Israel discourse: for instance, in allegations that Jewish support for Israel reflects an excessive exclusivism and insufficient loyalty to universalistic values; and in accusations that a purported Israeli military brutality toward Palestinians can be traced to Old Testament teachings (Brustein and Roberts, 2015)
Interrogating Assimilation: The Role of Theater in National or Cultural Identities

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What does it mean to perform a national, cultural, or racial identity? How are individual, cultural, or national identities changed by the bodies that cross physical, geopolitical, or social boundaries and borders?

The concept of identity is, it seems, a particularly American fascination. In his book *Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity* (2004), Samuel P. Huntington discusses the history and preoccupation of identity in the creation and reinforcement of a unifying American culture. He makes a distinction between “individual” and “group” identities but suggests the power of individuals in informing and shaping constructed group identities. The acknowledgement of the constructed nature of identities, particularly those of a cultural or national group, is useful in understanding the power of performance as a tool to create, disrupt, or reinforce identity associations and stereotypes.

America’s history is one of migration and immigration, but our notions of shared identity tend to rely on an assumption of assimilation as a positive process, and the movement of bodies through migration as a privilege and benefit to those who experience such forms of mobility. There is, however, a basic denial of the underlying racial assumptions on which the myth of assimilation relies. How, then, do we tell the stories of those for whom this process has not been consensual, or whose inclusion is denied by barriers and borders both visible and invisible?

The major works in the American dramatic canon reflect the role of theater in representing a vast array of American cultural, or perhaps subcultural, experiences. American playwrights stage versions of the same quintessentially American stories from the perspectives of different identity groups. Eugene O’Neill’s Irish immigrants, Tennessee Williams’ Southern belles, and August Wilson’s African Americans all represent a version of the American family. In the case of these works, and numerous other American plays, an echo of the shared “American Dream” and experience characterizes the text, the “kitchen sink drama” staged as an act of assimilation.
The emergent commercial and mainstream success of an increased number of works by a group I term as “identity” playwrights has demonstrated the ability of playwrights from marginalized groups to develop plays that integrate aspects of a shared American identity into their work. These include those playwrights who are strongly and consistently associated with a particular aspect of their identity, such as race, gender, or sexuality, and who also often incorporate exploration of these identities into their work. In simplest terms, they are the playwrights whose works are rarely discussed without their associated identity being referenced, such as “African-American playwright,” “gay playwright,” and so on.  

Part of the genius of a work such as the musical Hamilton (2015) is its association with the story of the American project, even as it subverts the underlying associated racial assumptions. The same can be said of Neil Simon, Terrence McNally, or August Wilson, who wrote (or write) realistic, naturalistic dramas and comedies from the perspective of underrepresented American cultural groups, re-appropriating the genre to place their stories in the context of shared American experience.

Theater has had a unique historical role in challenging and exploring the performance of American identity; the body, by definition, becomes a site to perform, contest, subvert, and reinforce meaning. The performance of race and identity in American theater, particularly in the twentieth century, has been complicated and controversial, arguably serving an important role in broader conversations about gender, race, and sexuality in American society (Case, 1997; Demastes and Smith Fischer, 2007; Uno and San Pablo Burns, 2005).

While it is true that many of the early successes of identity playwrights have come through derivations of realistic, family-based dramas thematically focused on the pursuit of the “American Dream,” I would argue that this does not necessarily constitute a failure or compromise. Instead, I would argue that the reframing of narratives that resonate within the assumptions of American identity have proven an important tool in challenging notions about marginalized identities.

The landscape in American drama reflects the conflicts and complexities of the very notion of an agreed-upon modern American identity. In an era of racialized violence and tension, the exploration and evolution of intentional

31 For further detail on the representation of identity in American drama, see, for example, Demastes and Smith Fischer (2007), and Uno and San Pablo Burns (2005).
identity performance offers an opportunity for intervention, but how to best reconcile identity and performance in American culture remains unresolved.

As I considered this paper, I knew I wanted to discuss a specific play by David Henry Hwang. Hwang, who is best known for his Tony award-winning play *M. Butterfly* (1988), has approached much of his writing from the perspective of actively seeking to integrate Asian American history, experiences, and stories into the American identity conversation. His 1981 play, *The Dance and the Railroad*, portrays the friendship between two “coolies” or indentured workers on the transcontinental railroad, as well as a workers’ strike during the construction of the railroad.

First, a note about Asian America. The term Asian American is, itself, contested and complex. The immigration trajectories span over two centuries and there is little shared history or experience within a group that includes people of Cambodian, Chinese, Filipino, Japanese, Indian, Korean, Laotian, Pakistani, Thai, Vietnamese, and those of other Asian-country descent. Indeed, particularly since the 1970s, the national and ethnic groups which constitute this identity category have histories of conflict with each other. In reality, Asian Americans were required to develop a shared culture in order to be a recognizable community in America.

Early advocates of Asian American culture made a distinction between “Asian American” and “Americanized Asians” (Takaki, 1998: 474). The reputation of Asian immigrants as hard-working and obedient members of the community and state had, it was felt, resulted in inaccurate perceptions of weakness, and an acceptance of discrimination. Ronald Reagan often referred to the “hard work ethic” and “shared values” of Asian immigrants and their descendants, resulting in the label “model minority” (1998: 474). To angry Asian American activists, however, subservience touted as a model and virtue was unacceptable and the desire to have a voice in their identity was paramount. There was a sense that a unified history might legitimize autonomy and political status. It is generally agreed that what is shared among Asian Americans is a set of imposed stereotypes and discrimination based on racial and cultural assumptions, as well as physical attributes, that prevent “passing” in the dominant Caucasian culture. It is important

32 “Coolie” was a derogative slang term for an unskilled laborer hired by a company, mainly applied to those from India or Southern China.

33 For further information about the history, development, and definitions of Asian American identity, see Lee (1997); Takaki (1998); and Li (1998).

34 For a comprehensive study of Asian American cultures and immigration, see Lee (2015).
to note that the common thread is migration, whether by choice or by necessity, and the body itself.

I will also admit my own ignorance as to the specifics of Asian American history previous to taking on this study. I have come to understand that much of it is highly counter to the “American Dream” narrative in which many of us have been raised to believe. Systemic and institutionalized discrimination began with the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 which denied US citizenship to thousands of Chinese laborers who had been encouraged or forced to come to the US to build the railroads or immigrated during the Gold Rush. Legislation based on race was not new in US law. The Naturalization Law of 1790 had already specified that citizenship should be reserved for “whites.” However, the 1882 Act singled out individuals of Chinese origin and established, for the first time, the practice of discrimination in public policy based solely on race and culture (Takaki, 1998: 14).

In 1924, the National Origins Act prohibited Japanese immigration, while simultaneously permitting and supporting immigration and community building for Irish, Italian, Polish, and other European immigrant communities. This same law made provisions for, and in fact encouraged, European immigrants to bring wives “home.” Thus, the same law that encouraged the establishment of families and communities by European immigrants denied the same right and practice to Asian immigrants. The law barred entry into the US for women from China, Japan, Korea, and India. Asian wives of US citizens were ineligible for citizenship and inadmissible to the country, while, based on the 1790 Naturalization Law, Asian immigrants were denied basic rights such as voting and land or property ownership. Shockingly, this law remained in effect until 1952.35

The most tragic manifestation of institutionalized discrimination against Asian Americans is undoubtedly Executive Order 9066, the law that denied Japanese Americans their most basic rights during World War II. The resulting persecution included the internment of approximately 120,000 Japanese Americans, two-thirds of whom were American citizens by birth.36

The Immigration Act of 1965 changed immigration patterns from Asia significantly, and permanently, by increasing quotas and allowing family members

35 For more reading on Asian American immigration and exclusionary laws and policies, see Lee (2015) and Takaki (1998).

36 A variety of sources summarize these figures. See, for example, Documents from the National Archives: Internment of Japanese Americans (1989: 9-10), Kendall/Hunt Publishing, Dubuque, IA.
in on a non-quota basis. The result has been a dramatic growth in the Asian American population, from just under 900,000 in 1960 to approximately 17,321,000 according to the 2012 US Census. This represents a rise from 0.5 percent of the US population to five percent in a span of fifty years. Collectively, Asian Americans are the fastest growing ethnic minority group in the USA.

Yet as Takaki notes, “very little is known about Asian Americans and their history. In fact, stereotypes and myths of Asians as aliens and foreigners are pervasive in American society” (1998: 6). The recounting of statistics, laws, and discriminatory policies does not tell the whole story, but in this case the impact of the legal history is useful in considering the emerging Asian American literary canon and narratives. For Sau-ling Cynthia Wong, Asian Americans are “permanent houseguests in the house of America” (Wong, 1993: 6). The work of Hwang, and other Asian American writers, can be seen as an attempt to tell an under-represented American immigration story.

The profound impact these restrictive and extreme policies for citizenship have had on the Asian American community cannot be overstated, not least because they helped create pervasive stereotypes. The exclusion of women, and the inability to reunite with wives, can be argued to have contributed to still pervasive perceptions that Asian males were asexual or homosexual. The inability to own land or property resulted in the need for immigrants to live in insular “Chinatowns,” perhaps unintentionally suggesting a preference for isolation from the broader community and a resistance to assimilation.

Asian Americans remained culturally marginalized well into the twentieth century, and, by a combination of choice and exclusion, were not included in the equal rights agenda of the 1950s and 1960s (Li, 1998: 5-8). In fact, the seeds of the Asian American theater movement were planted in reaction to the continued prevalence and acceptance of “yellow face” casting on Broadway and in films well into the 1970s, far beyond a timeline in which “black face” became unacceptable (Lee, 2015: 31).

In her foreword to the collection of Hwang’s works, *F.O.B. and Other Plays*, Maxine Hong Kingston observes that “telling true stories to one another is very important for those whose histories and literature have been left out

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of textbooks” (Hwang, 1990: vii). Hwang’s play *The Dance and the Railroad* epitomizes his sustained enthusiasm for staging the untold Chinese American story. The play portrays the development of a friendship between Lone and Ma, two “coolies” working on the Transcontinental Railroad in 1867. They are striking to improve working conditions, hours, and pay. Lone was a performer in the Beijing Opera, and the opera is used as a metaphor for culture, storytelling, and immigration.

The story focuses on the relationship between the two young men rather than the strike itself, though the strike, and the incredible hardships and challenges faced by the Chinese laborers, act as a prevalent undercurrent. Both characters have been sold to the railroads by their families. Hwang has stated in interviews that he wanted to write a historical play at that time in his life and chose the setting he did because the experience of the Chinese building the American Transcontinental railroad was something that people vaguely knew about but there wasn’t much literature on it and ... [he] had never seen it explored in any depth in a film or play (Hwang, 1990: vii). The railroad unites the States geographically, at the price of those who were regarded as socially and culturally marginal even as they constructed it. His play, by contrast, puts those who labored on it at the center of attention, placing them in the tradition of the pervasive American narrative of romanticized Westward expansion.

He placed the story during the strike because, in his words, he “found the strike story intriguing, because it contradicted our image of Chinese workers as obedient and servile.”38 In *The Dance and the Railroad*, they are active in defining their own identities and roles. Hwang argues in his introduction to *F.O.B.* that “the strike is important because it reminds us that in historical fact these were assertive men who stood up for their rights in the face of great adversity” (Hwang, 1990: xii).

By 1865, over 12,000 Chinese men were employed by the Central Pacific Railroad and collectively represented ninety percent of the work force. The Chinese workers were recruited for no other reason than their acceptance of lower pay and worse working conditions than white workers. They were initially hired from around California. Once that population was exhausted,
the Central Pacific Railroad arranged to recruit workers from impoverished areas of China, primarily from Guangdong (Canton) Province.39

The railroad companies’ own historical accounts and documents of the construction project provide details praising the Chinese laborers’ skills and tenacity, even as they reveal their shocking exploitation. Workers were sent down narrow shafts for hours at a time with hammers, drills, and explosives to build tunnels through mountain passages. They cleared trees and laid tracks, and were forced to work through the harsh winter of 1866, living in tunnels under snowdrifts reported to be over sixty feet high. Many died, and in the spring, corpses were found still gripping shovels and picks (Takaki, 1998: 85-86). It is estimated that approximately 1,200 workers died from a combination of accidents, snow slides, landslides, and a smallpox outbreak over the course of the railroad’s construction. But there are no official numbers, as names, information, and death records were not kept for any of the laborers as their names were “too hard.”

The American companies transporting workers did not understand Chinese naming protocols, so any surviving lists of workers are inaccurate. As most laborers were illiterate, no written accounts of their experience exist. What little is known about these men and their lives has been preserved through oral history. In the late spring of 1867, approximately 500 workers did, indeed, go on strike. They demanded better wages, a reduction in their workday from eleven hours to ten, and a decrease in the dangerous tunnel digging shifts to no more than eight hours. The strike was peaceful, but the railroad companies cut off supplies. After eight days the workforce, near starvation, ended the strike.40

Hwang integrates an account of the harsh working conditions and facts of the strike into the conversations between Lone and Ma to reduce the didactic nature of the information. Later in their improvised dance, Lone and Ma tell the story of a coolie’s journey to, and experience in, America. They introduce the “water-crossing” dance with Lone’s impersonation of a “white devil” stating: “The one-hundred-twenty-five-dollars passage money is to be paid to the said head of said Hong, who will make arrangement with the coolies that their wages shall be deducted until the debt is absorbed”

39 For further details on Chinese railroad workers in America, see Hong Kingston (1989) and Stanford University’s “Chinese Railroad Workers in North America Project,” http://web.stanford.edu/group/chineserailroad/cgi-bin/wordpress/about-our-project/.
(Hwang, 1990: 81). They go on to recount the ocean passage in verse, with Lone playing the role of a dying laborer, and Ma that of a survivor. The narrative of the journey concludes with 180 of the group of 303 failing to reach the shores of America. Ma mimes throwing Lone’s body overboard. Their dance is beautiful and tragic, celebrating the sacrifices of thousands of unknown Chinese individuals.

Hwang, however, departs from the known facts in one crucial regard. In his version, the workers settle the strike but make some gains. According to most historical accounts, the actual strike was not successful. Correspondence from railroad managers makes it clear that the strikers’ demands were not met. So why does Hwang take such artistic license? When I asked Hwang about this re-interpretation of history, he responded: I felt then that the outcome of the strike was ambiguous. Even today, with more research available, I feel that some case can be made. We now know that the owners starved out the strikers (which the play references), but conditions then did improve somewhat. So the extant sources may reflect the railroad barons’ attempt to spin the outcome so as not to encourage other strikes. Hwang’s point about the reliability of the accounts provided by those guilty of the exploitation the workers were protesting is valid. However, that does not necessarily absolve him of responsibility and has further implications. If the project of staging Chinese American history is to tell the untold stories of the immigrants and their struggles, then what responsibility does Hwang have to represent accurately the events he chooses to stage? Is the point of staging counter-narratives to inspire pride or to expose an ugly truth of oppression and exploitation hidden beneath the existing dominant cultural narrative?

The Dance and the Railroad relates to Hwang’s cultural identity, particularly as it was written at the time when the playwright was most engaged with Chinese American cultural history. His desire to stage this particular story serves a variety of purposes. As mentioned earlier, it humanizes the experience of thousands of unknown and unrecognized Chinese immigrants and acknowledges their contribution to American history, while simultaneously offering an alternative, masculinized, Chinese version of the pioneer hero. Hwang is writing the Chinese role model he was denied in his youth. The Dance and the Railroad stages an untold American story and was also written and produced at a seminal time for Asian American history, culture, and arts.

41 Hwang, email message to the author, September 13, 2015.
As I was writing this paper, I saw a harrowing and impactful production of Paula Vogel’s 2015 play *Indecent* at the Guthrie Theater in Minneapolis. I was moved and inspired by the play. I was also struck by some of the elements that made it, similarly, a departure from the American assimilation story. Vogel’s play also tells an untold true story. *Indecent* portrays the journey and 1923 Broadway debut of a highly successful and popular play written in Yiddish by a Polish Jew in 1906. Because it portrays a lesbian love story, the translated production was shut down and the actors and crew tried and found guilty of indecency. Many returned to Europe and performed in Yiddish, ultimately dying in the Holocaust. The play interrogates the role of theater in cultural identity, but also takes issue with the process by which marginalized groups are allowed (or not) to enter mainstream American art. Linguistic discrimination and accent bias are revealed, as is the unique pressure to “represent” the group when a single work or artist is allowed into the mainstream.

It also occurred to me that both of these plays are powerful because they tell very American stories, and yet, in effect, resist the tropes of the assimilation story. I will conclude by pointing out that this is, in my opinion, the essential role of theater, the role of the body onstage, in not just reinforcing, but also in challenging a simplistic cultural meta-narrative, and in humanizing the untold stories of those who are outside or refuse the assimilation project. In the darkened dramatic space, the physical inclusion of the migrant body becomes undeniable and real. We are forced to see, acknowledge, and hopefully empathize with the Other, and to reconcile their inclusion in the American project.


In America, now, this country devoted to the death of the paradox—which may, therefore, be put to death by one—[the African-American’s] lot is as ambiguous as a tableau by Kafka

James Baldwin, Everybody’s Protest Novel (1949)

A spectrum is a fairground prostitution of colors, haunting our attention to choose a favorite cyan, magenta, or gold.

But is there free will, and how is our agency exploited in an increasingly surreal online spectrum, policed by a prism of corporate-distribution-territories exploiting national identities and shades of our identity-fueled data?

As we shift from analogue to digital, siphoning away the colors of history for dots, zeroes, hashtags and labeling, a cultural decimation is occurring. Yet social media enables people to feel closer and more connected inter-territory than ever before. As we progress into the Anthropocene, with “smartphones,” new populist maps of globalism emerge from our online behaviors. The data we share strangles us, as we sieve through our lives, publishing updates with a nihilist sense of preservation, a mad diaryism creates new mythologies based on how we want/need to be perceived.

This behavior of forced aspiration sits within a system of increasing hegemony, and therefore, when corporations take control of the language and behavior of people, new ideas of “passive” and “active” audiences need to be addressed. It is possible to Like without thinking, as we are coerced to behave, vote, and make consumer choices within a system of forcible displacement of language. We exist in an environment where the playful patois of irony and ambiguity are avoided in the effort for clarity. When language is driven through the virility of scroll-friendly memes, tropes, ads, and apps, how do we become conscientious objectors of a system that enforces behavior?

Much as there is a sexiness in the chase for Multi-super HD Mega four-billion-pixel counts, with video formats even taking quasi-political names of Progressive and Non-Lossy, the very existence of ever-more modern tech
makes the “old age” appear archaic. “Outdated formats,” from black and white photos to Video 2000 to last week’s app disintegrate as a “throwback” against the current where a fetishization of “nowness” is part of the mode of engagement. Relics are feared as much as lifespan, and obsolescence itself. Under the glaring worship of youthtopia, and consumer lust, wisdom deteriorates. In the mirage of Snapchat filters and apps to make it look as if we’ve been in the superstar avatar clinic all our lives, where we can remove lines, sculpt and preen, an ever more arthritic dissolution of truth occurs. We transmit messages and Status Signals amid the roar of conspicuous consumption, holding coffee cups grabbed for serenity amid our super-functioning symbols of success, hoping mild flirtations with those we are attracted to will ring like bird sounds of Likes, and infinite emoji mutual respect.

However, in reality we are mired in the trenches of technocrats warring for dominance—where Facebook introduces video players to compete with YouTubers, and Twitter offers us defense to cat-call against ethical bankruptcy with the reward of ReTweets which effect change as much as holding a placard in the face of Parliament. It is proven that most of what we share is about how we want to be perceived (Haile, 2016). Moreover, in a medium where super-ego shouts loudest, it takes a certain kind of armor to carry on with repetitive stabs of glitzy language and come-to-bed-with-me imagery. Do we continue to feed the beast, or sign out?

The attractiveness of outward communication taunts like a gap-year full of opportunities, away from pressures of the everyday, but it is the advertisers who benefit from our input of time and energy, and stakeholders in Jeff Bezos (Amazon), Alexander Nix (Cambridge Analytica), Elon Musk (Tesla/Space X/Hyperloop), Mark Zuckerberg (Facebook), Robert Mercer (Renaissance Technologies), as well as Steve Bannon-types, who back the conglomerate persistence of global inequality demonstrated by the IMF, World Bank, and UN. Are we in a digital death trap? We are certainly in a maze of war, where landmines such as those left by Cambridge Analytica or AggregateIQ should indicate we are not safe from being victim to their subtle messaging techniques to absorb our agency into their way of thinking. Pushing for influence to affect our opinions, buying choices, and personal ideologies using armies of false news-creators, these bot-loving corporates use psyop-style triggers to pervert international democracy and lifestyle, guiding votes and opinion to audiences who don’t see themselves as mass, but as individuals, caged by reductive collateral, where sixty percent of
the Internet (Reed, 2019) is fed from automated layering of puerile banter coming from the dominant information providers to affect our behavior: we become the medium, and it becomes us.

The early explorers of communication models, Shannon and Weaver (1963), would term this destructive linguistic frisson, **NOISE** (or drop outs in service). That was back in 1949, before we became the media (an *ouroboros* of publishing, hijacking language, bashing out metadata, encoding, decoding). The noise itself enters the feedback loop, and a mass homogenization moves across individuals.

Stuart Hall and Paul Du Gay's **FEEDBACK LOOP model** was used to suggest twentieth-century environments are created by the factors of: Representation, Identity, Production, Consumption, and Regulation, all influencing one another (Hall, 2013). Now, corporations no longer require traditional “impartial” media to send messages to their users because they can now reach them without intermediaries of newspapers and television. So now Hall and Du Gay’s same factors apply, but we hold brands and ideologies closer to our bodies and minds than ever before, as followers and via sponsored posts, and targeted ads.

**PANOPTICISM** (Michel Foucault (1985) being my main man here to explain behavioral effects of CCTV society, where a Big Brother dominance means we can live in prison cells without bars).

It is difficult to sue the Internet. Power does not need to be seen for it to dominate. Consider the open-plan office panopticon—where we are voyeurs of others’ labor, yet controlled by it; social media is no different, and grows with infinite energy and industry. Operating with agility and sophistication in a freeform anarcho/neoliberalism suspended by our demographics: our habits, likes, dislikes, and behavior sold back to us in endless feedback loops hitting ever more exploited identity gaps, fears, and insecurities. In our delineation between “real” and “virtual,” threatening reductive symbols of cartoon walls, bad hair, and explosive name calling superimpose our timelines, and worlds, filtering into our digital space, but pollute our “real” lives.

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42 In a recent interview, Ben Goertzel, the founder and CEO of SingularityNET, a blockchain-based AI marketplace, posits the concept of the Bekenstein bound, the upper limit of entropy or information which may be contained within a given finite region of space: the idea of maximum potentials yet unreached. Upon exceeding the Bekenstein bound, a storage medium would collapse into a black hole (Goertzel, 2018).
The medium is always the message, and as we come closer to trusting our technologies as wearables, we enter an inferno of ever decreasing simulacra of bland aspirations to carceral capitalism (Wang, 2018) in an Alt-America hell (Neiwert, 2018). In this future that James Bridle calls “the new dark age” (Bridle, 2018), singularity and Space X become options associated to the index of money and “luxury,” but even if we go and live on the moon, or Planet Primark, logging off from the influence of our surrounds is not as easy. The whoring lights of apps have become so distracting with their “liking,” “rating,” and “commenting,” that this becomes the index of success, and the medicine for echo chambers filled with commercially-fueled bot bumpf and false tags. Whether Return on Investment (ROI), Newtonian, Dark Matter, environmental, karmic, or general systems theories, most economic, scientific, industrial, cultural, marketing, spiritual, and ethical systems models agree, simply, that you put in what you get out.

We are feeding our AI systems, Singularity-approaching, mind-uploading, nanotech, femtotech, life extension, genetic engineering and energy inventions with the content we have in the system, our data, their data, and much as these innovations are impressive, as are the connections and calculations which create a heaven of fractals above us (or below), technology becomes the parent to our child selves.

This Foucauldian-Orwellian nightmare operates under the suffocating supranet of profit, where “individuals” are targeted: “Become a disruptor, or a pirate, express your true self!” but how is such freedom possible as the quasi-Marxist, Open Source, rad, hippie, punk, hacker, Assange/Snowden rebels of the medium become a decreasing minority, destroyed by the terrifying language of overlords zombifying herds with their data-wrangled dominance, controlled by invisible stakeholders, where board members avoid responsibility in a management matrix of greed? The traditional Estates of Power adapt. Where religion was once the primary power, with nobility, press, and the bourgeois following, Profit is the Lord as our consciousness hits the Anthropocene, and our religion becomes data.

Before telling you why I am into creating a model to understand this change, let us think about the word-of-mouth vibes of the Ripple Effect (where

43 Neiwert blames jingoistic abuse of Right-leaning tropes for bizarre realities of rising ill-truths (Neiwert, 2018).
messages move from individual> friends> families> communities> psychogeographies). Our nearest and dearest are now on our timelines, in our faces, on our phones. **WE ARE WHO WE FOLLOW.**

“Real” friends and family are replaced by Red Queens dominating our timeline, inferring behavior via memes and tropes, and online ad spends wipe out other media. There is profit in cultural signs, and profit in appropriation. Reality is online and offline. Hashtagged intersectionality soon becomes “sameness” when a targeted message reaches a nearest fave park bench, destined to become everybody else’s favorite. Amid this reductive nuance of tone where no one knows whether Leave means stay or go, accompanied by screeches of Define Woman at feminist bookshops, brands search for “interesting looking weirdos” to push their products in areas from which these neo-desirables have long been pushed out.

Marketing means getting your idea to the market. It is done using these concepts:

a. **“Brand personalities” + “brand legacy”—**the creative tools to develop “likeability.” What would Starbucks do? What would Beyoncé do? These help the Audience/consumers/friends/family/“brand fan” to make a decision between one brand and another, for example. If we can choose one ketchup/bag/coffee/homeless hostel/refugee camp, our lives will be easier. The bigger the brand personality, the better.

b. **“Brand fans”** we accrue (to consume our products, ideologies, to retweet, share, Like, encourage, and spread messages across territories of atomized mass media).

c. All the while remembering to **differentiate, reinforce, inform, and persuade**—the DRIP model (Fill, 1995).

d. Using the trinity of **image + identity = reputation.** Reputation, the cumulative effect of what people think of you. To have power, a brand/ruler/dominant ideology needs to control image and identity.


45 The term originates from Lewis Carroll’s *Alice Through the Looking-Glass*: “Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place.” It is used as a metaphor to explain adaption to stay on top and avoid extinction.

46 Online ad spends continue to increase (see, for example, *eMarketer* (2018)).
And this is reliant upon the golden marketing triptych: **segment**, **target**, and **position** (STP)\(^{47}\) the audience, with price, perception, and “needstates” using divide and conquer techniques to delineate products from the competition in order to perpetuate financial wealth, control, and the racket of neoliberal privatization through demographic engineering.

This brings us to **Audience**: the list below offers very generalized divisions which could be expanded on infinitely, as per targeted advertising which is based upon keywords and the metadata we share with the system (*i.e.* Kirsty Allison checked in at Wholefoods with Jeremy Corbyn, and googled: “the concepts of left and right are false structures” and “what has Jacob Rees-Mogg done today,” later receiving YouTube suggestions of “Jacob Rees-Mogg being a loveable buffoon,” and ads for hemp clothing, and suggestions to join the Labour Party):

- **Workers** (generally people who exchange their time for money to fulfil profit for stakeholders) are fundamentally restricted in sharing their truth and opinion via social media. Like corporations, their outbursts will veer to the Right, IF they can risk their interdependency on the tax system in their dream slalom of slavery to the index of money, accruing pseudo-castles, leasehold carriages, all the way through to the promised lands of pensions. *How will this status update affect my career? Am I sharing to demonstrate belonging to some kind of construct?* This means most consumers/likers/participants are unable to disrupt the hegemony and are more likely to be controlled by it. There are shades of emotions which can be expressed here, much at will of demonstrating “individuality” and tribalism, rather than their communications carrying any pressure on the source. Research into the conversations of social media demonstrates dominance from those who have time/money to invest in “conversations,” largely corporations. Conclusion: debt delinquency now facilitates the medium. I would also add that constructs of working class and the bourgeoisie are outmoded, and it is far closer to the Them and Us, and the rhetoric of Occupy, and the one percent than much of the media commentary reflects.

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\(^{47}\) The concept of audience segmentation is largely attributed to Edward Chamberlin in the 1930s; targeting your messages, and positioning your product, to Philip Kotler in the 60s.
This leaves:

- a minority of “independent” voices, often writers such as Akala, Irvine Welsh, John Niven, Peter Joseph, intellectuals, occasional politicians, musicians, artists
- or co-opted “public figures” such as the Kardashians, who frequently live in hyperbolic states of superego aspiration, to fulfil some crazed PR-manifestations of Lifestyle via implicit cooperation with the FANGS (Facebook, Amazon, Netflix, Google—and companies such as Spotify) and corporates who worship the god of profit.

These segments have enough time/money, shelter, warmth, clothing, security, and occasional self-esteem to conduct themselves with little to lose. The motivation of their messaging is frequently to sell something/themselves/raise awareness, rather than engage with those around them, but there is often cultivation of “brand fans/brand crew” in the process. The SME vibes of production mean it is difficult to de-negotiate “brand personality” methods of common marketing from what they are frequently challenging. There is a general need to attach themselves to “trending” topics to increase reach. Trending topics also exist as a reflection of this entire paper. Parallels could be drawn between this sector of the audience and the liberal values of Republicanism where Amendment issues such as the right to bear arms play into the national construct of America/identity, where origins of the word Yankee come from the Dutch meaning of junkies/pirates, fetishizing independence (Mason, 2009). (Many of these groups, and subgroups, could be seen as having symptoms of pseudologia fantastica.)

- The Audience is also constituted by the FANGs who monitor and operate as corporate supergroups with partners such as Unilever, Proctor and Gamble, Pepsi Co, Kering, LVMH. But this group is largely in the business of business. They all have something to sell, alongside governments, regulators, politicians, voices who were beneficiaries from the pre-digital days of marketing. This group has the largest resource for content creation.

The Audience is itself homogenized by the medium, so battles itself for dominance in various modes of attention seeking. The Audience finds itself

48 Editors’ Note: pseudologia fantastica, or “pseudologia lying,” is more popularly known as pathological lying.
attacked/targeted and defined via a series of demographic and cultural signifiers. These define the “brand personalities” too.

GLOBAL LABELS of individualism: who we are: friend/lover/fam/fan, sex, sexuality, appearance, age, hobbies, passions, work etc. and: GEO-LOCATIONAL EXPERIENCES: cultural upbringing—a childhood in Kansas being non-identical to one in Johannesburg, for example. These are the truly personal elements that create our psyche.

(N.B.: I separate these demographical identifiers because of the territorial reign of corporate colonies, where distribution into markets is governed by monolithic organizational blocs such as North America, EMEA, OPEC, the BRICs etc.). Thus, globalized identities are at odds with corporations.

When Global Labels and Geo-Locational Experience join, the behavioral representations of actions present themselves on an “identity spectrum,” e.g. racism/sexism/ageism is an everyday experience dependent on where one is geographically. Or: BlackLivesMatter defines a group by its skin color, thus furthering the concept of difference but also demonstrating institutional racism. One person’s offence is another’s glory, do we avoid labeling altogether, or take pleasure in belonging to “minorities”? (Even the labeling of “minorities” is pejorative, when each person is as valid as the next, same as underground culture only being called that because it doesn’t fit with dominant ideologies.) Much as cultural identifiers help us negotiate, they can be used to express sameness where it does not exist: “Communities” are at risk of being created and abused by secretive, immoral digital propaganda used to control them with visual and written language.

LABELED OR LABELING: IDENTITY POLITICS

Much as it is great to name-call, and single out behavior for being unacceptable, and call someone what you truly think they are, I explored labeling in a film about digital existentialism that played in the Tate.49 The outcome was against it, despite having previously believed identifying to larger groups had guided me, it led to conditioning and inbound behavior. To be defined as something is not the same as to identify as it. My awareness of the direction to codify expression expanded further, being commissioned to write a polemical poem in praise of poetry, over hip-hop, as a battle perfor-

49 Building on a year of fashion blogging, making a statement about identity and the interplay of vanity, pre-selfie/today I’m wearing culture, in an attempt to make something more permanent than a social timeline in 2011.
mance for the Byline Media festival. It was not something with which I was comfortable, and it reminded me of how my fear of being labeled racist at school, as a white minority, negotiated my experience. But it was also that my education of poetry belongs in many lyrics, not only of the Last Poets, Gil Scott-Heron, Michael “Dub” Smith, or as a fan of hip-hop artists such as Madison Washington50 with whom I’m honored to have recently recorded. So, I went in saying genre can reduce narratives, with the example of Grime becoming a cultural echo-chamber, where the group mentality gets exemplified in the media by stabbings and gangsta life, only to feed back into itself and expand. It was when reading the piece in Berlin that I offended someone from a racialized geo-location negotiating his initial (subjective) reading of my upbringing in West London. He later fully apologized, reading the piece, and more of my work.

Another prescient example of multi-meaning for wider labels comes from a discussion I had on the BBC World Service talking about my I F***ed Harvey Weinstein essay and T-shirt, critiquing #MeToo for being labeled as feminism because it automatically perceives women as victims, despite the seismic shift the movement has had on culture.

PUBLIC STATEMENTS, PERFORMANCE. PRIVACY. PALESTINE. Spoken word versus the digital.

So, when on Friday, October 26, 2018, I performed a piece of spoken word at a BDS (Boycott Divest Sanction Israel)-allied fundraiser for Gaza Children’s Cinema aside Thurston Moore, the guitarist best known for his work with Sonic Youth, I knew, as a critic, editor, and artist of letters, I had to find the right words. You know what’s coming?

My 1,000-word piece, Blood Star, explored the recent history of Israel and Palestine. I paid tribute to Leila Khaled, the well-known Palestinian hijacker of 1969 and 1970, who followed in the footsteps of the Khursheed sisters. I used symbolism, descriptives: “throw rocks to the black sun ... cactus muskets … pomegranate bombs” and hoped to allow listeners to smell the oud, hear the defense of stones versus bombs, and sense the disparity of warring factions flowing through the subtext of my piece, in the same way my novel, Psychomachia (to be published by Wrecking Ball Press, Fall 2019) is a metaphor for the 90s patriarch. Blood Star won respect from an array of peers, activists I respected, and those with whom I was honored

to share a bill. I livestreamed my performance on my personal network/“real” community, which was gratefully met with rapture and compliments. This was a new thing for me, livestreaming performances from “private” publicly ticketed events where a stage is a stage, as classrooms become places of recorded conduct. Even with non-public restrictions, Facebook is viewed as being the same as any secretive “burns after three seconds” or “private” network because anything can be screenshot for life, to be held in a social court-like judgment.

Here it comes: Two nights later I received a demand on Messenger to remove all traces of my words from the Internet. There was one line that was brought into question: “burn your bails of money in your Auschwitz nexus,” written to suggest the arms money of Israel outweighed that of Palestine. That’s not hate speech, anti-Semitic, or racist; that’s factual. I used Auschwitz to indicate the implicit construction of the state of Israel out of the unforgivable atrocities of the Holocaust and pogroms.

However, with the request coming from one of the organizers, I reacted quickly, removing traces from the digital sphere, bowing to the patriarch, and what I initially judged as his expertise in the subject. This is what I regret. I was confused, and my reaction was dominated by the same lobbies who were fueling his fears of being labeled. In the case of Palestine, anti-Semitism and the Zionism issue dominate the landgrab of labels used to explain the madness of murder. There are some awfully bad, totally unacademic examples of the Palestinian movements being pulled apart on these grounds in appalling pseudo-factual reports which later become “truth.”51 I was told not to comment on MY platform when I had a former colleague ask about my use of the Star of David. It is on the Israeli flag and was used alongside Arabic symbols to prove exactly the point of signs being used in the war of language and propaganda. However, not wishing to play into negativity towards Palestine’s plight, on publishing the poem with New River Press,52 I have changed the word of offence: Auschwitz to HORRORSHOW, as my intention was never to antagonize a maligned situation. There are few single truths with cookie-cutter answers, and vice versa, so these labels must exist on spectra where we’re all responsible. What is

51 See, for example, Collier (2017) and Steerpike (2018) on the sensitivity of anti-Semitism as a politicized tool.

fixed? Self? (Whelan, 2018). Growth is as flexible as mental wellness being affected by its surrounds.

Spoken word exists to challenge and change dialogue but this request to restrict my language limits my future behaviors. The movement was being policed by its oppressors, allies labeled enemies under the cosh of dominant rule. To be proclaimed as racist for mentioning something sensitive, or a troll for leaving a comment on a board? Do I call it censorship or sensitivity? The use and abuse of trigger words is the vogue of modern times. Therefore, this becomes a discussion about intelligent fascism.

DIVISION. DISPLACEMENT and GLOBALIZED matrix management. Language is flexible. Are ETHICS and DATA?

This decentralized uniformity where our sense of “self” is curated from an environment, guided by educators, and ethical narratives of stories, through religion, literature, media, memes, tropes, and heavily marketed “brand personalities” means we are navigated through our urban, and digital lives without freewill or autonomy. The Internet unites, and creates “real” communities, but participation becomes as commodified and actively passive as the ripple of Thatcher and Reagan’s destruction of society for the individual, when the medium can be dismissed with a sense of Otherness that suggests it does not exist in the “real” world. We don’t need to go out to see something, yet can be “actively” involved by placing a “thumbs up.” And this goes both ways.

The culture of the consumer/individual results in sanctimonious labels and no-go areas. I am noticing Millennials challenging labeling currently with quasi-un-PC memes, but they are removed from platforms quickly because they play on the duality of offence, which in itself, plays further into the denigration of the labels. At time of writing, Azealia Banks’ racist comments get her global attention, and lead her to sell-out shows—and the UK is seeing cries for platforms to ban an increasing number of topics.
Although this sounds like an Instagram inspo-quote, we need to judge without judgment, and take responsibility for what we follow, read, say, share, and speak. It is possible to be better than False Needs and false news.

What I have learned is there are few evil bogey men (or twenty-six if you believe the 2019 Oxfam report), but cultures of ill-funded indigenous research and localized education policies propagate national issues policed by international quangos operating in the mirage of debt. Debt is a delinquency, and its mycelium strangles ideas outside of it. If we are to continue with corporations owning our behaviors and lives, corporate social responsibility (CSR) is at the root of supporting communities where government fails. If genuine authenticity to CSR was reflected in briefs to PR and advertising, everything could change, but currently India and Mauritius are the only two countries with mandated CSR contributions running at a pitiful two percent—but this is still higher than my calculations of CSR contributions from the wealthiest global corporations. For governments, dropping short-term goals of personal cronyism for a Maslow-based joined-up approach needs an assessment program where CSR does more than make Instagrammable content.

We have an opportunity to exploit the impartiality of data to replace self-interested government that labels itself around old ideas of “Left” or “Right,” “Democratic” or “Republican,” for a blockchain division of minerals, food, water, and allow automation and Universal Basic Income to encourage more artisanal, high esteem lives, beneath an ethical, jury service-style global parliament (operating away from the influence and maelstrom of politicians, a toothless UN, weapons-trading, and organizations such as the WTO or the IMF). Suggestions are being made for our online data to be used as a social fund in a similar manner to CSR (McCann, Schifferes, et al., 2018). Technology and equality are essential for reconstructing a fair future: it is not working in its current state, and it does not take a doctorate to see global rhetoric becoming more extreme daily, influenced by leaders’ behavior, filtering through groups to comments, to votes and consumer habits and attitudes. Sadly, it seems impossible to get ideas of implementing technology for positive radical new processes past a “welfare” state with a

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“computer says no” attitude. Our estates of power behave as if technology is a rabid dog, out of human control. But technology hasn’t threatened to kill us, yet, but it is beginning to maul and slaver, threatening to bite us like a malnourished pet of Pavlov if we continue to program it with war, and allow profiteering communication networks to push us phones, powered by archaic energy systems killing the environment (Bonneuil and Fressoz, 2017), perpetuating the black market, wars, and reserves creating the mirage of scarcity (Butler, 1935). Broken Britain sits beneath structured globalization which pleases the eighty-three percent of shareholders who own one percent of global wealth, rarely benefiting the communities in which they operate (Joseph, 2018). In the miasma of proxy austerity (Watkins, Wulaningsih et al., 2017) and theater wars (Kagan, Schmitt et al., 2000), arms sales mean nationalism soon becomes fascism. Labels become toxic quickly.

So, the question now: is it possible we really are participants rather than pawns programming our system? Strategy is essential. It was assumed we could carry on laughing at Alexa, throwing her ambiguity on Friday nights, but what happens if we take Alexa off-grid? The global brain requires education: we still program it. So, this leads me to ask whether I want to be “active” and exercise my freedom in the social courtroom. Instinctively, I know the free market is more Darwinian than free, as I also dawn at the realization that my own national identity is intertwined with swearing allegiance, as a seven-year-old Brownie, to a passive-authoritarian über-granny who owns more of Earth’s landmass than anyone else on the planet.

Freedom and the offer of equality through expression on social media is as false as the validation via populism that the social media index encourages, where “likeability” grows exponentially, mirroring capitalism, with a Kardashian-glam-façade, mimicked by backend black market opportunities to buy fans and Likes. But it is also one of my marketplaces and a shop-front. As an audience/consumer/system, we own the right to interrogate, as we can with art, or any thoughts we allow into our Circus of Labels. However,

54 See, for example, the 2018 report made by UN Special Rapporteur Professor Philip Alston on extreme poverty and human rights in the UK. For Alston, “risk-based verification” processes of “higher risk,” involve GDPR “data protection” practices which prevent people from revealing the processes of a welfare system run without compassion, as the current debacle over the implementation of Universal Credit demonstrates (Alston, 2018).


56 I recently received a request from a well-known fashion brand casting for online content requiring a minimum of 2.5K followers.
to operate in a system where the only index which prevents starvation is financial stocks is outmoded. Cash is not the index of success, any more than identity is universal, although ethics may be. The triple bottom line of People Planet and Profit needs more attention but much as we’ve destroyed the ecosystem of the planet, a toxic communication loop is strangling us. So amid temperatures, displacement, and poverty reaching all-time highs, distractions are played out in mass media from territorial leaders and psycho-pop-star-politicians spouting or repeating double-speak from pantheons of privilege as they grasp to hold onto power, using dirty tricks\textsuperscript{57} on social media with “dumbed down” messaging (\textit{the phrase originating in 1930s Hollywood, when cowboys needed scripts to speak to the illiterate and lowest educated in various “congregations”}).

As a creator, I see an increasing trend of the product merging with the documentation of the process, and the process becoming a lifestyle.

In our ever-more sophisticated ballet with affordable, sexy creativity, online egos become the individual. This blur in the framework of emotionally-charged connotations (e.g. anger and expertise on Twitter, love and lifestyle on Insta) means we’re in an exclusively weird situation. The data with which we are programming our future is a perversion of inauthenticity. Communicating to friends soon becomes broadcasting to wider networks where we know little beyond their “brand personalities.” We are no longer in a space where equality is the goal. The publication of something is always a replication of an original, and with so many factors, the Noise from all the updates is deafening. I require more sentience in my spectrum than to choose to accept the whole algorithm-inducing Thing.

Take your labels, and favorite colors, and Likes with you—having spent nearly twenty years on Facebook and social media, fighting from within, I no longer wish to participate in a system I cannot change. I’m returning to the pastoral where real rainbows, and print, exist.

\textit{(Kirsty Allison was last seen, a second ago. Lol. HMU: kirstyallison.com cold-lips.co.uk)}

\textsuperscript{57} For example, Cambridge Analytica’s marketing data has been implicated in influencing democratic votes in the USA, Ghana, Nigeria, and the UK Brexit Referendum.
2018 was the year the impact of social media on politics and world events made headlines. From the Facebook and Cambridge Analytica scandals surrounding Brexit, the Russian manipulation of social media in the election of Donald Trump, WhatsApp driven lynchings in India to the Myanmar governments use of social media in the Rohingya genocide, the narrative around social media has taken a dark turn. But the reporting on these issues underestimates the potential of social media, and the algorithmic engagement mechanisms they employ, to change fundamentally the modern arrangement of identity and power.

The re-arrangement of the media landscape is a consequence of the advertising driven business models of the largest social media platforms, Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, WhatsApp, and YouTube (FITWAY). Each of them depends on capturing attention to present additional advertisements, maximizing metrics of time on platform and content consumed. The massive scale of these platforms necessitates they use machine learning algorithms to find and present content to keep the user on the platform. As the algorithm learns what types of content drive the most time on the platform, they create a personalized feed of content designed to stimulate the user. These filter bubbles drive the creation of new, atomized narrative identities, creating micro-nations within the state that have their own reconstructed past and imagined future. The borders between nations are becoming algorithmic, determined by affinity and belief structures, rather than geography or shared nation-state narrative.

The emergence of algorithmic nations within and across existing state boundaries presents new challenges for inter-national education. Crossing state boundaries no longer guarantees exposing students to a new nation. If the algorithmic border moves with the student, their mediated perception of the world does not change. Simply moving to another country may not be truly “inter-national” if it takes place within the same algorithmically enforced national narrative. Instead, educators and students will need to develop new paths of digital migration. To pass through these borders,
students will need not only passports and visas, but new digital identities providing them with the ability to pass through the algorithmic borders which now separate us.

Shared narratives form the basis of nations, groups of people forming an imagined limited and sovereign political community. “Humans are pattern-seeking storytelling animals ... We cannot endure an absence of meaning.” (Garreau, 2018). This storytelling ability, according to Yuval Noah Harari (Harari, 2016), creates humanity’s evolutionary advantage. We can create mass cooperation networks, in which thousands and millions of complete strangers work together towards common goals ... We cooperate effectively with strangers because we believe in things like gods, nations, money, and human rights. Yet none of these things exists outside the stories that people invent and tell one another. Without a shared narrative about history, purpose, and shared imagined future, cooperation on the scale of the nation-state is impossible.

Benedict Anderson (2006) discusses the impact of the printing press and the rise of print capitalism as one of the key enablers of the emergence of the modern nation-state. Print enabled the mass spread of narratives regarding the purpose and role of people within the state. Aided by the emergence of capitalism, the spread of print enabled the creation of shared language, narratives of history, cultural signifiers, and purpose, creating the nation-state as we understand it today.

Print, and the later mass media of television and radio broadcast, gave those who were able to establish the narrative the means to shape and guide it. These created national narratives, frequently co-terminus with state boundaries, become the first technologically-driven filter bubbles. Diversity and deviance from the main narrative was tolerated within a prescribed range which varied between nation-states. State intervention was not always necessary, as the editorial process, published gatekeeping, and public scrutiny naturally tamped down on the range of commercially viable expression (Anderson, 2006).

The ascendency of social media, however, disrupts the business model of print capitalism and weakens the tools of nation-state narrative. Recent events have highlighted a step change in fracturing of national narratives brought about by the self-reinforcing affinity algorithms of the FITWAY platforms. As these platforms gain traction, they amplify the social fracturing
caused by the economic crisis, urbanization, income inequality, and physical migration.

Algorithmic filter bubbles are the outcome of simple rules and business model logic of the FITWAY platforms. As advertising platforms, their primary metric is engagement, or how often and how long a person uses the platform. These algorithms, now driven primarily by machine learning, experiment by presenting a variety of content, almost always created by other users, and determining which pieces result in more clicks and time.

On the surface, this seems like a potential positive. Users see content they like, for free, while the platforms sell advertising. However, what ends up driving content is emotionally stimulating, rather than fact based. People are also more likely to share content with high emotional value (hence the rise of cat videos). The social proof of shared content, the idea my friends and family think this is true and important creates “a sense of personally resonant seriousness” (Rothenberg, 2018). The FITWAY platforms create audiences of one, while pretending to connect us. The algorithms customize each feed for each individual (O’Neil, 2016), hiding our sources of information and narratives from our neighbors. There is no longer a pervasive national narrative. Instead there are thousands or millions of narratives, creating sets of micro-nations within and across the borders of the state. We no longer know what messages our neighbors receive.

In the 2016 US presidential election, messages became so targeted, individuals staying at a hotel near the Republican national convention were targeted by a specific campaign no one else saw (O’Neil, 2016). Microtargeting, self-reinforcing algorithms design to promote “engagement” combined with an indescribably large avalanche of content without traditional fact-checking or editorial control replaces the national narrative with a new set of interlocking, overlapping identities:

This growing stream of information is increasingly augmented by tools such as bot armies, targeted news and designed facts, and social media structures that don’t just network people into like-minded bubbles, but create an environment where everyone has an enhanced opportunity to seek out, select, and align facts and information to support the community narrative that they find most appealing—and a reduced need or incentive to integrate, or even be aware of, other ways of organizing knowledge and information into coherent narratives.
In short, individual commitment to larger state and social identities is weakening. The state-based Westphalian system of international law and institutions, although still dominant in many ways, is failing, and it is being replaced by a complex pastiche of private, public, non- and quasi-governmental, and ad hoc institutions, power centers, and interests (Allenby, 2017).

Nations within these new digital borders create their own reconstructed history and imagined futures, their own language and cultural signifiers. For example, white nationalism has found a home online, sharing a history of perceived grievance and imagined future of ethnic and cultural cleansing. This emerging nation crosses state borders across the US, Europe, and Russia. Another international nation of technology enabled entrepreneurs shares a narrative history of capitalism and self-enrichment and an imagined future of financial and geographic liberation.

When students study abroad, they may cross physical borders, but the algorithmic national border crosses with them. Tied to their home social networks in ways previously unimaginable, the algorithms of the FITWAY platforms travel with them. They may have a new IP address, but the mediated filter remains the same. So how do they escape the socio-technical recursion (Davies, 2018) and have a truly “inter-national” experience?

Theo E. J. Wilson in his TED Talk “A black man goes undercover in the alt-right” gives us a place to start. In it, he discusses how he created a new online persona to understand the alt-right white supremacist nation. When he adopts his new persona, and consumes its media artifacts, his feed fills stories of perceived white victimization and racist propaganda. By reinforcing the algorithms associated with or embedded in these items, they accept him into the new nation and begin the process of enculturation and assimilation. If he had revealed himself as a black man, he would have been immediately deported back to the black nation from which he emigrated. Had his physical identity been discovered and publicized, his physical well-being would have been threatened. But by adopting the language and speech patterns, and consuming the cultural artifacts, Wilson’s new persona is accepted by the algorithmic and human gatekeepers of the new nation.

Without deliberately crossing the algorithmic border, Wilson would never have seen or been exposed to the cultural artifacts of the alt-right nation. By putting aside his feelings of anger and revulsion at the messages, he
crosses the border into another nation. He emigrates and discovers an unexpected compassion for the natives on the other side.

For students studying in another country, crossing the digital border requires similar deliberate effort. Without deliberately understanding and challenging the recursive computational border and becoming a digital as well as a physical traveler, study abroad risks simply becoming Instagram grist for the perpetual content mill. Without breaking free of the algorithmic border, time abroad may end up reinforcing the digital border while crossing the physical one.
MOBILITY AND INTERNATIONALIZATION

And if a stranger sojourn with thee in your land, ye shall not vex him. But the stranger that dwelleth with you shall be as one unto you as one born among you, and thou shalt love him as thyself; for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt

Leviticus 19; 33-34 KJV

Travel is fatal to prejudice, bigotry, and narrow-mindedness, and many of our people need it sorely on these accounts. Broad, wholesome, charitable views of men and things cannot be acquired by vegetating in one little corner of the earth all one’s lifetime

Mark Twain, The Innocents Abroad

I am by heritage a Jew, by citizenship a Swiss, and by makeup a human being, and only a human being, without any special attachment to any state or national entity whatsoever

Albert Einstein, 1918
Mobility, Moorings, Frictions, and Fixities: Relational Geographies and International Higher Education

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Mobility and International Education

Mobility as conceptualized in higher education encompasses the movement of students, institutions, and programs (Guruz, 2011: 169). It also includes the movement and circulation of bodies of academic knowledge in the form of teaching, research, and other content from scholarly books and academic journals (Rink, 2017). Along with the movement of ideas and knowledge, mobility is situated at the heart of internationalization efforts at home and abroad (Madge, Raghuram, and Noxolo, 2015). A mobilities approach, as Johanna Waters (2017) argues, “necessitates thinking relationally and contextually about educational processes and the interplay of structure/fixity and agency/flows” (Waters, 2017: 280). Among the earliest mobile subjects, scholars and their mobilities have for centuries formed an essential element in the production and dissemination of knowledge and knowledge networks. Mobility is a requirement for crossing borders, and thus for the internationalization of higher education. In a globalized world, the imperative to experience academic mobility as noted in the Lincoln Commission’s report (2005) is necessitated by globalization’s purported flattening of the earth, the dismantling of borders, and the resulting need to operate within “… a supranational system of economic and political governance, which makes the world more uniform, integrated, and interdependent” (Biles and Lindley, 2009: 150). However, successful internationalization of higher education in a globalized world does not, as Woolf (2002) argues, make higher education a more equitable endeavor.

While the concept of student and staff mobility is not a new one, the term as used today grew in prominence with efforts in the European Union to create borderless opportunities in higher education with the Bologna Process (Scott, 2006). While mobility schemes such as ERASMUS have increased flows across borders within and toward Europe, the trend toward international mobility also exposes long-standing inequalities in staff and student mobility, especially as experienced in the global South. Through the application of theory from the “mobility turn” in the social sciences, this paper will attempt to highlight the nature of such inequalities and how
they may persist at a time when internationalization is seen as a critical component of higher education in the global north (Biles and Lindley, 2009) while, at the same time, it meets with structural challenges and skepticism in the south (Cross, Mhlanga, and Ojo, 2011). Furthermore, this paper contributes to debates on inequality in higher education mobility though the application of a new lexicon of mobility as inspired by the “new mobilities paradigm.” Applying a social science approach to higher education mobilities allows an alternative perspective on, and problematization of, mobility using the concepts of moorings, frictions, and fixities to reinterpret the landscape of higher education mobility and to destabilize notions of fluidity and borderless movement in the globalized higher education sector.

Beyond its use in higher education, mobility in the social sciences is a transdisciplinary concept that can be used to understand the movement and circulation of people, non-human animals, objects, capital, and information both locally and across the world (Sheller and Urry, 2006; Hannam, Sheller, and Urry, 2006). As an integral component of internationalization, academic mobility is no longer peripheral to higher education but is seen as an essential component of undergraduate education (Biles and Lindley, 2009: 148). In this paper, I use Jane Knight’s (2004) definition of internationalization on the institutional level with a focus on activities “… such as study abroad, curriculum and academic programs, institutional linkages and networks, development projects, and branch campuses” (2004: 20). Central to Knight’s definition is mobility; of people (students and staff), objects, capital, and information. As such, taking a mobilities perspective on internationalization, using the “new mobilities paradigm” may help to understand the inequalities that persist in a world of higher education.

Mobilities Through a New Paradigm

The study of mobilities encompasses the extraordinary movements and circulations of students in pursuit of education, and the movement of tourists and refugees, but may also include the more localized processes of daily transportation, movement through public space, and the travel of material things within everyday life (Hannam et al., 2006). Once seen as the exception rather than the norm, mobility may be both mundane, as in a daily commute, or extraordinary as in the mass movements of refugees or a once-in-a-lifetime religious pilgrimage. Geographers and other scholars in the social sciences have recently begun to re-assess and engage anew with the critical role that mobility plays in everyday life (Cresswell and Merriman, 2011), and the distinction between “movement” as a displacement of
location (Cresswell, 2006: 2) and mobility which is the embodied experience of socially produced motion that is mediated by power, subjectivity, and temporality, among others.

A revival and re-appraisal of sedentarist views of social life has been heralded as the “new mobilities” paradigm by sociologists Mimi Sheller and John Urry (2006). The “mobilities turn” (Sheller and Urry, 2006) in the social sciences has allowed scholars from diverse disciplines to interrogate the critical role of movement in both mundane and extraordinary contexts, and across a range of mobility practices, spaces, and subjects (Cresswell and Merriman, 2011). Looking back at ten years of mobilities research under this new paradigm, Faulconbridge and Hui (2016) argue that the mobility turn in the social sciences had already happened by 2006, and that the most salient contribution by Sheller and Urry (2006) and Hannam et al. (2006) was to open

a space to question “normal” assumptions and categories, challenge segmentations and boundaries within communities of knowledge, and explore creative and experimental approaches to studying the social world (Faulconbridge and Hui, 2016: 4)

A new paradigm has allowed mobility scholars to challenge notions of sedentarism and liquid modernity in the social world. Sedentarist views of the social world understand boundaries, rootedness, and territory as fixed and stable (Sheller and Urry, 2006). Such a destabilization of world views may be appropriate in an era of greater technological, economic, and cultural connectedness. At the same time, however, the new paradigm according to Sheller and Urry also applies the brakes to notions of “liquid modernity” as posited by Bauman (2000). In that case, a new approach to mobility reveals that we are not all equally mobile, and that we move at different speeds, with different levels of comfort and privilege (Sheller, 2015; Cresswell, 2011). In fact, despite greater opportunity and technical capability for mobility, some do not move at all. The uneven terrain of mobility is framed through a Foucauldian perspective by Sheller (2015). As she defines it:

Uneven mobility … refers first to a sovereign terrain for movement in which there are spatial designs, physical infrastructures, and symbolic impediments creating divergent pathways, differential access, and control architectures for partial connectivity and bypassing; second, it refers to the means or modes of movement that have a greater or lesser degree of ease, comfort, flexibility, speed, and safety, and
thus signals the disciplining of mobile subjects through affective experiences of moving with more or less friction, noise, danger, fear, or turbulence (Sheller, 2015: 2)

Applying the mobilities turn to higher education allows critical engagement with the assumptions that higher education mobility challenges rather than reproduces inequality. Mobility scholars assert that mobility is not a neutral concept, nor is it one that is equally distributed. As Cresswell (2011) argues, mobility itself is contested. The contested nature of mobility arises due to its differential distribution. As Cresswell (2011) notes, “… [m]obility is a resource that is differentially accessed. One person’s speed is another person’s slowness. Some move in such a way that others get fixed in place” (2011: 162).

International Higher Education Through a New Paradigm

The unevenness of international higher education becomes clear when seen through a mobilities framework where some academic bodies—and bodies of knowledge—move, whereas others remain immobile. Addressing this balancing act involves constant development of the program components, staff competencies, and evaluation tools. It also involves, as Biles and Lindley (2009) note, a commitment

… to an integrated model of equitable overseas engagement, involving direct institutional investment (of time and money) and reciprocity among faculty, students, and local participants in designing and carrying out collaborative activities (2009: 153)

Reciprocity in this case suggests an equal exchange. Through an integrated model involving investment of time and other resources in cooperation with local program stakeholders, some degree of access might be shared with local host institutions and students. However, such a model runs counter to the corporatized, top-down management style that characterizes the consumer-driven education abroad landscape today (Bolen, 2001). In spite of the effort to integrate guests and hosts, access to mobility for students from wealthy countries of the global North to move and circulate through poorer host countries in the global South is already unequal. Attempts at reciprocity may overlook the structural impediments that are part of the everyday lives of students in host countries.

Just as Bauman’s free-flowing “liquid modernity” (2000) is critiqued under the new mobilities paradigm (Sheller and Urry, 2006), an understanding
of mobility in higher education requires assessment of not only the movements and flows, but also the barriers and stasis that limit participation to broader publics. Rather than freedom and flow being the hallmarks of mobility, it is rather gatekeeping and exclusion that define mobility at multiple scales (Sheller, 2016). The “more independent and borderless world of today” as characterized by Knight (2016: 36) may suggest liquid modernity and free mobility, but the reality for many students and scholars is just the opposite. Engaging with an alternative language of mobility allows international educators to better understand how subjectivity, such as gender, or situation, such as urban versus rural setting, may impact one’s ability to experience movement in higher education.

Access to international higher education mobility, like access to mobility more broadly, is governed by a “politics” of mobility that Cresswell (2011) argues is evident in “social relations that involve the production and distribution of power” (Cresswell, 2011: 162). It is through such politics that mobility emerges as a resource unevenly distributed and experienced. Further unpacking the concept of “the political” in mobility, Cresswell discusses the political dimensions of mobility in six different parts: motive force, the reason that a person or thing moves; velocity, the speed of the moving human or thing and its relationship to hierarchies, order, and ranking; rhythm, which addresses repeated periods of movement and rest; route, how movement is channeled; experience, how movement feels; and friction, how movement is slowed. Using elements of Cresswell’s concept, I will illustrate below the unevenness of international education mobility as experienced in the context of South Africa where I teach.

Firstly, when it comes to motive force, incoming and outgoing flows of students in the South African context could not differ more. Whereas students from institutions in the USA coming to South Africa seek semester and shorter-term study abroad program opportunities to partially satisfy degree requirements and to experience new cultures and adventure, many South African students going in the opposite direction take part in short-term mobility programs outside of their degree program because of the difficulty of credit transfer, or they pursue a full degree. The velocity of incoming US students to South Africa is often prioritized by host institutions as a profit-making operation, as noted by Cross, Mhlanga, and Ojo (2011). They state that the benefits of international student flows may be focused on income generation from the global North because:
These students, it is argued, come from relatively wealthy families or have international foundations as their sponsors. They cover their student tuition with American dollars and find studying in South Africa one of the cheapest options in the world (Cross et al., 2011: 82)

The flows of internationalization are thus not equally distributed, and the potential for income generation enables a faster flow from north to south. Unequal mobility is also evident through the politics of “experience.” In this sense, the mobile subjects from the global North, partly out of concerns over safety, are provided with accommodation and personalized door-to-door transport services that are luxurious by local student standards. As a former student reflected, “the power and freedom [that I have as an American student] also determines my comfort and accessibility to transport ...”

Lastly, mobility in higher education is fraught with frictions that are enacted unevenly. While his example comes from the Netherlands, Daniël van Aken (2001) nonetheless illustrates frictions on student mobility enacted through border regimes as a form of deterritorialization of state control, in effect, moving the political border from national territory to sites far away in the form of visa processing agents, consulates, and embassies overseas. It is not only state-enacted frictions that reduce the flow of student mobility, it is also frictions in the form of financial requirements, processing times, and the lack of clear information (van Aken, 2001: 293) that restrict the circulation and flow of academic bodies. Returning to the South African example, such frictions and fixity may be understood through the history of isolation in the international arena as a result of Apartheid’s disconnection from the rest of the African continent. In the present, however, challenges to broader participation in higher education remain in the form of visa regulations, regimes, and costs that exert friction on access to mobility opportunities for many South African (and other African) students and university academics and staff. A concrete example of this can be seen in my reflections on an international, inter-institutional humanities winter school that was recently held in South Africa on my own campus. The winter school drew delegates from around the world to debate the purpose of the university in Africa. As I reflected during the event:

The fact that most of the overseas delegates came from countries as far away as the USA is evidence of both the enormous scale of corporeal mobility in the academic project, but also of the unevenness in its distribution since delegates from the USA (with US passports) do not require visas for entry into South Africa (Rink, 2017: 144)
Such would not be the case for South Africans traveling in the opposite direction. As Eric Neumayer notes, “Poorer countries have an incentive to exempt passport holders from high-income countries from visa restrictions in the hope of bolstering foreign investment and knowledge spillovers into their country” (Neumayer, 2006: 76). The assemblage of the students and their travel documents produce a complex situation. Some experience easy transit, others such as refugees and asylum seekers are channeled along alternative paths of mobility with their own unique structures of processing and re-ordering.

These examples of friction applied unevenly in higher education constitute what Doreen Massey calls “power geometries.” Such structures demonstrate how “different social groups, and different individuals, are placed in very distinct ways in relation to ... flows and interconnections” (1991: 25). It is power geometries such as these that impact on higher education mobility within and across universities in Africa as elsewhere. In the context of inequality, some academic bodies remain fixed in place while others flow freely. Immobile infrastructure and institutions are a requirement for mobility, as highlighted by Hannam et al. (2006). These structures are known as “moorings,” a term borrowed from shipping to reflect the need for a place where the ship is tied and made stationary. The movement of scholars and students alike would not be possible without spatial, infrastructural, and institutional moorings that enable mobility and highlight the relational geographies where their interactions occur.

Relational geographies encompass “webs of relations—that is, the assemblages of people, artefacts, other forms of materiality as well as the ideas, affects and other phenomena that inhabit and animate materiality—in which they are situated” (Ettema and Schwanen, 2012: 175). As all mobility is relational, we would do well to understand international education in relation to its associated immobile infrastructures: its moorings. Moorings for international education include a variety, density, and proximity of higher education institutions; availability of and access to communications infrastructure; proximity to embassies and consulates; and access to transport infrastructure. Without moorings, there cannot be movement. Therefore, a degree of fixity in the form of infrastructure and institutions is required in order for internationalization to take place. Acknowledging the frictions and fixities in international education mobilities allows a more critical view of the notion of “exchange” and reciprocity in higher education. Seen through a mobilities perspective, the concept of “exchange” in higher education as
a transaction of equal value is disrupted. While the rhetoric of globalization might suggest a world of opportunity through unencumbered flows across the planet, the reality for many in the global South is the opposite. Seen in this way, international education mobility that seeks to transcend borders may simply continue to reinforce patterns of exclusion and inequality.

Conclusion: A Reappraisal of Mobilities in Higher Education

As demonstrated in the discussion above, mobilities in international higher education are relational, political, and uneven. My conclusions echo those of Woolf (2002), who notes that:

The greater the mobility created for the relatively wealthy nations of the developed world, the greater the gulf grows between those nations and the poorer countries. The expansion of student mobility inevitably increases the gap between the “haves” and the “have nots” in the global community (2002: 14)

The processes that articulate international higher education are both relational and contextual (Waters, 2017). Movements and circulations are mediated by degrees of structure, fixity, agency, and flows. Seen from the perspective of the “new mobilities paradigm” (Sheller and Urry, 2006), this paper has attempted to provide an alternative view of mobilities in higher education firstly by arguing that mobility is political and is a resource whose access and distribution are unequal. In spite of the flat-world rhetoric of globalization, the free movement of people, not to mention objects, capital or information, is still an elusive dream for many. An investigation of higher education mobilities through a social science approach highlights the political and unequal dimensions of mobility. Second, institutional and infrastructural moorings play a key role in the movement of students and staff. The role of infrastructural and institutional moorings is central to the “new mobilities” paradigm (Hannam et al., 2006). In the same way that a ship needs the stationary spatial fixes of ropes, jetties, and anchors, so too does the potential mobile subject need fixed infrastructures and institutions to make their movement possible. These moorings are neither available nor accessible to all, and thus the potential to be mobile remains unequal.
Finally, I have also attempted to demonstrate that often hidden structures within higher education mobility mediate flows through the application of friction on the very elements that international educators are trying to mobilize. Systematic inequalities continue to hinder broader and more equal access to higher education mobility particularly within and across the global South. While the persistent inequalities in higher education mobility are not new, nor have I intended to offer a solution to them, I have rather lent an alternative language borrowed from the social sciences in which mobility may be understood and the issues can be examined in the hope that the benefits of internationalization may accrue to a wider audience.
The Future of Inequality in Mobility

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Introduction

Mobility as we know it in education abroad must change to reflect the demographic reality of students in US Higher Education. We examine the unprecedented population shift in the USA and what it means for how we imagine and deliver international education programming. We believe that the systems which define our international education arena have not created equitable access or inclusive learning opportunities domestically or abroad; instead, they have created walls that keep students out and barriers on programs that marginalize and minoritize students. In this paper, we demonstrate how and why we must re-imagine our work so that all students can thrive in a global arena. We seek to prove why the success of the new American mobility relies on the readiness of practitioners to change what they do and how they do it. This includes embracing diverse student knowledge, experience, and identities as assets that will enhance learning for all, throughout the education abroad process, rather than as challenges we need to help them overcome. Join us to reframe the purpose of education abroad for marginalized and minoritized students, to discover their strengths and needs, and to begin building programs for inclusive excellence in the teaching, content, and support structures so that mobility in this new demographic reality is educationally powerful and humanizing for everyone who participates.

Section One: Re-Framing the Purpose of EA for the New Demographic Reality

The New Demographic Population Shift

In order to meet the needs of today’s college students, we must reimagine student mobility in education abroad. US colleges and universities are beginning to reflect the dynamic and changing demographic reality in the USA. For example, the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) projects that enrollment in American post-secondary institutions will climb fifteen
percent from 2014 to 2025, with larger proportional increases among minority students than white students (NCES, 2017). This diversification related to racial and ethnic identity must be considered in relationship to increasing numbers of gay, lesbian, and bisexual students; transgender students; older students; students from lower socioeconomic backgrounds; students of different faith backgrounds; immigrants; and students who identify in multiple of these, and/or many additional ways (Patton, Renn, Guido, and Quaye, 2016). Taken together, these data suggest that the demographic makeup of students today is dramatically different from just ten years ago and projections suggest that this diversification trend will continue (NCES, 2017; InCharge Education Foundation (ICEF), 2015).

The long-term financial implications of global connectivity continue to be the catalyst for innovation, research, corporate partnerships, peace building, and the collaborative expression of humanity. Yet the buying power of minoritized communities in the United States is still being ignored in the global discussion. The consumer power of minority ethnic groups in the USA is forecast to reach over $4.1 trillion in 2019 and, if it were a separate country, this new demographic majority would be the third largest economy in the world, after the USA and China (Huffington Post, 2017). The University of Georgia’s latest Multicultural Economy Report estimates the nation’s total buying power reached $13.9 trillion in 2016 and predicts it will hit $16.6 trillion by 2021, with minority groups clearly making the fastest gains (Humphreys, 2018).

Mobility, in the form of education abroad, has not kept pace with the changing demographic trends (Engel, 2017; Institute of International Education, 2018; NCES, 2017). The rate of increase of minoritized student groups participating in study abroad is not rising at the same rate as their enrollment in higher education institutions; we are simply not keeping up. Furthermore, the self-reported data from the Institute of International Education’s (IIE) annual Open Doors reports provide insight on extremely limited aspects of student identity, specifically race and ethnicity, gender, and disability status. Open Doors gives no data on non-US citizens, non-binary gender identities, faith background, home language, family experience with higher education, socio-economic status, age, or other student realities that influence what they bring to their educational endeavors and how well they are served by the existing education system. Despite the notable gaps in our data on who studies abroad and how well they represent all US students in post-secondary education, it is clear to us that the persistent gap in participation
is due to a wall that we have created. Decades of access-oriented efforts have not allowed the field of international educators to make meaningful progress on participation rates.

This mobility gap is of particular concern given the educational potential of education abroad. Increasingly scholars are demonstrating that education abroad can contribute significantly to professional, personal, cognitive, intrapersonal, and interpersonal growth (Deardorff and Jones, 2012; Hamir and Gozik, 2018; Anderson, Hindbjorgen, et. al., 2017; Kuh, 2008; NSSE, 2007; Vande Berg, Paige, and Lou, 2012). These benefits may be of great interest and value to the students who are not currently participating. Emerging research suggests, however, that we are consistently failing at conveying these powerful intercultural benefits through our promotional imagery (Caton and Santos, 2009; Gathogo and Horton, 2018). The purpose of education abroad must convey these benefits to the new demographic population in order to connect their identities to a larger global community.

Designing, Teaching, and Supporting for Minoritized Student Needs

Intercultural competency is the most frequently stated goal of education abroad. As it is currently structured, that may not be the ideal construct for the new demographic reality. When describing assessment, research, and program design, intercultural competency is often the main concern (Vande Berg, Paige, and Lou, 2012). As we diversify access, our students will bring life histories, strengths, and community connections for which we have not optimized our programs. The wealth of capital that these students bring does not fit with current units of measurement and standard baselines of assessing student success (Yosso, 2005). For example, many of the current assessment tools, which evaluate student experiences abroad and intercultural competency, serve students who live in primarily homogenous communities, not the new demographic reality. We will no longer be able to rely on the social constructs of success that have cast these students into the deficit-based shadows of our national education system. A new asset-based pedagogy will be required to create international opportunities in which minoritized students may make their own meaning and their own success.

In order to serve the new American mobility, we must use pedagogy and theory which responds to students’ strengths and allows them to leverage what they bring to their experience. This approach responds to students’ assets, such as those defined by Yosso (2005) within the Community
Cultural Wealth model, which describes six forms of capital: navigational, aspirational, linguistic, familial, resistant, and social which are specifically nurtured in communities of color. These forms of capital all contribute meaningfully to student success in study abroad programs and position students to be successful abroad by building on the strengths that they already possess instead of forcing them to let go of who they are in order to succeed (Waldrep 2017; Moll, Amanti, Neff, and Gonzalez, 2005; Yosso, 2005). Building a stronger, more supportive community, both domestically and abroad, is one key component of program change which will allow students to leverage their diverse strengths (Humphrey, 2018; Walderp, 2017). An asset-based pedagogy requires that we create a new wave of international education programs which validate, honor, and challenge diverse and intersecting student identities.

This asset-based approach is the foundation of inclusion by design and can be used to inform Universal Design Learning (UDL) approaches in programming. UDL (Gordon, Meyer, and Rose, 2016) aims to redress inflexible, one-size-fits-all approaches to teaching and learning by compelling educators to begin design efforts by considering the varying skills and abilities of all students (Gordon, Meyer, and Rose, 2016).

However, in order to empower students, we must recognize their strengths and create opportunities for them to leverage and increase their Community Cultural Wealth. The systems in place, that perpetuate feelings of Otherness and the deficit-based models which keep minoritized students from succeeding, must be dismantled if we want all students to participate in and benefit from study abroad without sacrificing who they are. Furthermore, by shifting our perspective to focus on the distinct forms of capital that students bring to their study abroad experience, we have the potential to reduce the incidences of Othering that they may be experiencing abroad. We see a shift to asset-based teaching, learning, and support structures as the foundation for study abroad programs that serve the new demographic reality.

In order to implement this pedagogy in our education abroad design, teaching, and support for minoritized students, new tools will be required. This article will provide an analysis of three tools: Empathy Mapping, a technique from the corporate world; Cultural Responsivity, an educational framework; and Brave Spaces, an inclusive co-curricular support tool from student affairs. These tools, frameworks for building assets-based education abroad, support a new purpose of study abroad which reflects the new American
mobility. The purpose of study abroad needs to reflect our students’ identities. One size will not fit all. In exploration of the former one-size-fits-all models based upon dominant ideologies and systemic inequities, we realize just how much work needs to be done to repurpose the role of international education in this new demographic reality.

Understanding the Current Framework of Our Education Systems

Recognizing how our social, political, and education systems systematically empower certain students and disadvantage others is critical to achieving equitable learning opportunities and outcomes for all students. All students need to feel safe, valued, and accepted in order to thrive (Rendón, Valenzuela, and Bartolomé, 2008). The history of systemic marginalization, embedded in the academic experiences of students, perpetuates the notion of invisibility and Otherness. The achievements of historically underrepresented students are not woven into the curriculum (Ladson-Billings, 1995). Their identities and lived realities are not equitably reflected in course content. Moreover, their unique voices are often stifled by classmates, faculty, and staff who fail to see the world through a similar lens.

The same challenges of systemic inequity that permeate the domestic learning spaces are reproduced abroad. For students who are from outside the borders of dominant culture, educational environments can expose them to unintentional slights, which devalue their backgrounds and diminish their ability to create a sense of belonging within educational environments (Chang, 2017; Talburt and Smith, 1999; Willis, 2015).

Straight, Christian, white, able-bodied, American, male, property-owning (or S.C.W.A.A.M.P.) can be defined as a framework by which our culture is affected by dominant ideologies (Grinner, 2013). As the future demographics of the US national and higher education population bump up against and challenge these ideologies, programs must follow suit. We seek to empower our students, reversing the deficit-based pedagogy which indicates that they need extra help to catch up to the majority of outbound students. When we create spaces to celebrate our students’ identities and empower diverse knowledge and lived experiences as assets, we are tapping the glass ceiling of the dominant ideology (Grinner, 2013). We encourage practitioners to create inclusive learning experiences that interrupt systems of privilege and disrupt systemic inequity.
The use of “minoritized” instead of “minority” throughout this article signifies the social construction of underrepresentation and subordination in US social institutions, including colleges and universities:

Persons are not born into a minority status nor are they minoritized in every social context (e.g., their families, racially homogeneous friendship groups, or places of worship). Instead, they are rendered minorities in particular situations and institutional environments that sustain an overrepresentation of Whiteness (Harper, 2012).

The notion of inferiority, or sub-standard student identities, requires a clear understanding of the fact that others are benefiting from an existing system where structures of power and privilege are perpetuated.

Minoritized students attending US colleges and universities are often compared to their peers emphasizing their deficits or performance gaps, masking minority group achievement, and homogenizing within group variations and distinctions. Stewart (2013) explains that the term “minoritized students” is informed by Benitez’s use of minoritized as an action rather than a noun referring to the process of “minoritizing” student groups. This reflects an understanding of “minority” status as that which is socially constructed in specific societal contexts (Stewart, 2013; Benitez, 2010).

Part Two: Program Redesign: Responding to Minoritized Student Needs

Empathy Mapping

Can education abroad professionals create culturally responsive programming for a community of which they are not a part? The answer to that question must be yes. Our first step in creating inclusive programming should be identifying the needs of all of our students including their diverse and intersecting identities. There is already a full menu of programs, courses, and services available to serve the current majority of study abroad students. We must invest the time and energy to create programming and support which addresses the unique identities and lived experiences of diverse student populations in order to re-engineer current programs. The need for emotional and physical safety, along with the need for social and cultural wellness, are paramount in creating an inclusive study abroad experience.

Some professionals may argue that one size does fit all, and that catering to these new demographics is not worth it. The historical record of
study abroad participation reflects a consistent audience of generally white women (Farrugia, 2016). International educators may suggest that revenue generated from the participation of traditional study abroad students is significant and should not be ignored. Marketing strategies primarily focused on images of white women collegians jumping in front of global landmarks has generated plenty of interest for their demographic (Caton and Santos, 2009).

Deviation from the proven marketing, pre-departure, curricular, and re-entry strategies means discarding antiquated or misinformed perspectives on how to engage emerging populations of students. Motivation to adopt new techniques or skills with hopes that diverse student profiles will be supported has been demonstrated. However, without intentionally redesigning the foundation of our programs, we have been missing the mark (Gathogo and Horton, 2018; Lueker and Bruce, 2018). The population growth and spending power of the new demographic reality is overwhelming the general population of students typically targeted for study abroad. We must discover the needs of these students beyond trying to re-market our existing programs to them. This programmatic restructuring will attract and benefit all students by preparing them for a globalized and highly diverse workforce (Whitehead, 2015).

A common question in diversity and inclusion work is “can we design an inclusive study abroad program without knowing the identity of the participants?” Our answer to this is empathy mapping. Empathy mapping and other student needs analyses are essential tools for study abroad practitioners committed to inclusive curriculum design. Although we must be able to design programming for students without knowing their identities, the greater responsibility is being able to refine our programs to honor unique lived experiences. Consideration of student identities in pre-departure, in-country, and re-entry all contribute to an inclusive global learning experience which will increase students’ sense of belonging rather than perpetuate feelings of Otherness (Lueker and Bruce, 2018). If we design a program before knowing the identity of our participants, are we ready to be flexible with that programming pending the outcome of our student-needs analysis?

Empathy mapping provides a solid foundation for understanding the next wave of students who will participate in education abroad. One size no longer fits all. Therefore, we must take time to deconstruct the unique
needs of this dynamic and diverse population of historically underserved students. In response to the new demographic reality, universities are ramping up the development of new pathways to help students thrive abroad. The empathy map provides a scaffolding for gaining greater insight into the needs and interests of these emerging student populations. Visualizing the attitudes, preferences, behaviors, and challenges of our rapidly growing markets gives global education professionals an important framework for designing inclusive courses and programs. The goal is to develop culturally responsive marketing, pre-departure materials, and support throughout the journey of historically underserved students, taking into consideration their unique lived experiences and identities. A study abroad empathy map generally breaks down the study abroad experience into four quadrants. What does the student say, think, do, and feel about study abroad? Far too often, faculty and partner providers create programs that are based on their own perspectives and lived experiences. A deeper dive into students’ fears, influencers, interests, and identities provides a map for heightened levels of engagement and richer teaching and learning opportunities.

Naturally, different students say different things about study abroad. How well do practitioners respond to student voices? Historically underrepresented students may not vocalize their discontent, fears, or hopes related to their experience abroad. Have we created brave spaces (Arao and Clemens, 2013) where students feel confident in sharing their perspectives? Team discussions around what historically underrepresented students think can often highlight areas for improvement in marketing, advising, destination, duration, and curriculum design. Our limited engagement with diverse student populations, coupled with the fact that no professional can ever share all of the intersecting identities and lived experiences of all of their students, often leaves us guessing about what they do domestically as well as abroad. For example, the purpose and structure of a program that attracts a cohort of men to study abroad may drastically contrast from women. A greater understanding of interesting discussion topics and activities is essential in designing the course, recruitment, and retention process.

Guiding students through the emotional aspects of studying abroad can be a daunting task for any educator. How do we support emotional, social, and cultural well-being prior, during, and after? What historically underrepresented students feel about study abroad goes well beyond what is often diagnosed as culture shock. Do we know what worries historically underrepresented students? What do they get excited about? How do we mediate
challenging conversations or potential conflicts among classmates? Moreover, how do EA professionals feel about diverse student populations? How does our implicit bias impact the inclusivity of our course?

**Cultural Responsivity**

Cultural responsiveness, also referred to as cultural mentorship, is a facilitator’s ability to honor a student’s culture and experiences in order to enhance their learning. This cultural responsiveness in turn provides all students with access to effective instructions and adequate resources for learning (Klinger et al., 2005). It requires individual as well as an organizational responsibility:

Cultural responsiveness is the ability to learn from and relate respectfully with people of your own culture as well as those from other cultures. It includes adjusting your own and your organization’s behaviors based on what you learn (Dean, 1996).

Research shows that there is a significant need for culturally responsive guides in study abroad (Bruce, 2012; Lueker and Bruce, 2018). These guides, also referred to as cultural development guides (Marx and Moss, 2011), are field practitioners shaping educational experiences through the lens of cultural mentoring. We are inclusion-oriented practitioners dedicated to learning about diverse cultures and thinking critically about which domestic and international experiences abroad may validate students’ identities, or might challenge them. Part of the role of a local country director is to understand what to look for in that unique context. In addition to the general course content, the success of the new American mobility will hinge on the ability of international educators to offer our students local guidance as it relates to their identities.

Students’ experiences abroad will vary based on their diverse and intersecting identities as well as their lived experiences. As an example of these experiential differences, Tasha Willis examines African-American female realities abroad and provides important insights in to these experiences in her article “‘And Still We Rise …’: Microaggressions and Intersectionality in the Study Abroad Experiences of Black Women” (2015). As exemplified in this article, and other research documenting the LGBTQ and other underserved student population experiences, these students experience different realities abroad (Chang, 2017; Seay, 2014; Willis, 2015; Bruce, 2012). Whether we share cultural similarities with our students or not, we must acknowledge that their lived experiences, leading up to and during their time abroad, will determine their reality.
The ability to see our programs through multiple lenses of identities is what makes exemplary guides. Culturally responsive guides are willing to invest the time to figure out how to make a student’s experience matter, and matter specifically to them. In their article, “Inclusion by Design: Creating a Sense of Belonging Abroad,” Bruce and Lueker expand on their three steps to being a culturally responsive guide: preparation, facilitation, and reflection (2018).

The University of Nebraska conducted a study on the frequency of cultural mentoring in faculty-led, short-term study abroad cases (Niehaus, Reading, Nelson, Wegener, and Arthur, 2018). Cultural mentorship is explained, in the short-term study abroad context, as a tool to maximize the potential of these experiences to facilitate students’ intercultural learning and the development of intercultural competence (Niehaus et al., 2018; Paige and Goode, 2009; Stier, 2003). The article reveals that the percentage of practitioners engaging in cultural mentorship is low, especially among practitioners who do not identify with minoritized student populations. However, we affirm that in order to be successful with our new demographic reality, the adoption of these culturally relevant and responsive facilitation models will be needed amongst all international education programs. This adoption will benefit the entire field as these programs have the potential to benefit minoritized students as well as our existing study abroad student majorities.

As an example, for the faculty-led course that Bruce led in the Dominican Republic (DR) through San Diego State University (SDSU), Lueker and Bruce designed pre-departure material to introduce the types of introspection and negotiation of identity, power, and privilege that maximized student experiences abroad. Identity and asset-based program design can improve every step of students’ journeys abroad. Even as early as their application and pre-departure, exploration of their own identities begins. Samples of these reflection and group discussion prompts include:

Why there, why now, what part of their identity will be validated by their experience, what part will be challenged? What do they consume at home …? What will they consume abroad? What does it mean to be American? Is this an identity they accept, reject? What lens do they see the world through at home? Are they prepared to borrow someone else’s? Are they prepared to be flexible with their identities? (Lueker and Bruce, 2018)
In addition to validating, honoring, and challenging students’ rich identities, the golden ticket to cultural mentorship is the ability to leverage these experiences to create teachable moments for the entire group. Wick leads a graduate level immersive learning course in France through the Middlebury Institute of International studies (MIIS) in which he uses similar identity-first tools to support his students and their learning. Additionally, Wick and Lueker serve on the California State Los Angeles First Generation Study Abroad Research team which analyzes diverse lived experiences abroad through an asset-based lens. The following are culturally responsive programming abroad examples, from these and additional programs:

**Cultural Responsivity Examples:**

A. In our SDSU DR program, we borrow diverse lived experiences and the resulting lenses to maximize the range of exposed perspectives. Showing students an all-inclusive resort seeks to create a counter-narrative to explore power and privilege compared to the Batey (settlements located around sugar cane mills) and impoverished communities visited shortly after. Many of our students have expressed a greater sense of belonging felt in the poorer of the sites. The exploration of these counter narratives and lens-borrowing experiences generates significant introspection and is always a prominent theme in student reflections. This example gives students from lower socioeconomic backgrounds the opportunity to explore their own agency, power, and privilege in comparison to their DR neighbors. Additionally, it offers the entire group an important opportunity to experience the DR through the lenses of those from familiar and unfamiliar backgrounds.

B. Moving beyond explaining the French laws forbidding religious apparel or symbols in French Schools, a study abroad provider in Paris aims to honor diverse student identities by providing narratives to all students which explain the French philosophy and legal regulations on nationality, race, and religion. As a Muslim student, this inclusive measure which educates their entire group creates the space for them to explore their relationship with their own religious identity and the host culture, without being singled out. While some programs ask students to opt-in to certain ethnic, racial, or other identity-focused program resources, this is an important example of a program that is educating all students instead. These education modules explore the nuances of racial, ethnic, religious, and sexual identity through a French lens. This is a valuable perspective for all.
C. A faculty member took students on a museum tour in the UK. While on the tour, they asked an African American student not to stray from the group. When the student pointed out that the tour was skipping the Africana Art section of the museum, the facilitator insisted the museum exhibit leader change course in order to include the exhibit. Not only was that student’s own identity honored as they found a sense of belonging in learning about local artists and his own connections to their culture, but the narratives exhibited opened the minds of the entire group. These untold stories offered a different perspective on the local community and culture. In this experience, students were able to develop empathy and compassion for the immigrant communities who settled in the area, a history and narrative that would not have been realized otherwise.

D. In designing a professional graduate study abroad program in France, Wick integrated components before, during, and after the program to leverage student strengths, build empathy, and enhance cultural responsiveness. Before graduate students at MIIS embarked on this faculty-led journey abroad, space was created for them to discover their multicultural identities as a group. The group chose themes for their pre-departure modules ranging from current events related to identity and social justice abroad, to creating a brave space code of conduct. In multiple pre-departure sessions, participants shared their own experiences being Othered or other uncomfortable experiences abroad, and the group created an action plan for group discussion and support. This pre-departure lesson helped all participants begin to see life through the lens of their group mates as well as to create their own risk management support system to address real time events whether from an external or internal source.

E. In emergent studies on Latinx student experiences abroad, a major theme has been students’ negotiations with linguistic capital. There are many instances where Mexican American students have shared that they felt their Spanish language abilities were considered insufficient, unimportant or, in some way, irrelevant to their academic and professional skills before studying abroad. While abroad, researchers observed recurring instances of students realizing and leveraging their linguistic capital in order to support their own learning, as well as the learning of their host families or larger cohort groups (Willis, Wick, Gutierrez, and Lueker, 2018). Creating the space for students to leverage their linguistic, familial, and social capital often had powerful effects on these students, as well on the overall study abroad experience.
In order to create spaces where culturally responsive design, teaching, and support will benefit all of our participants, we must also invest in the creation of brave space.

**Safe and Brave Spaces**

Once we grasp the new purpose of education abroad for the new demographic reality of our participants, and after discovering their needs through empathy mapping and other human-centered program design elements, how can we ensure that our educational spaces abroad facilitate the exploration of knowledge, skills, and attitudes which best serve their unique identities? We must understand and leverage the value of brave spaces abroad in order to respond to our students' needs.

Helping students to reflect on their identities and lived experiences is not a process that should take place exclusively in isolation. Although journaling is a common reflection activity for many students while abroad, the sharing of those reflections with a group, where their identities are respected and valued, can create powerful growth opportunities. Providing a space where historically silenced voices can be heard is empowering (Delpit, 1988). Moreover, the dialogue that emerges when spaces for civil discourse are created allow other students as well as educators to learn more about undiscovered topics. This process supports students by providing platforms for guided reflection and expression before, during, and after their experiences abroad.

The ideas behind safe and brave spaces are similar. Holly and Steiner (2005) describe safe space as an “environment in which students are willing and able to participate and honestly struggle with challenging issues.” Finding the balance between challenging students’ current views and supporting their exploration of new views is a common theme in higher education student affairs and student development theory (Sanford, 2017; Patton, Renn, Guido, and Quaye, 2016). However, the challenge associated with honest and open dialogue may not always create learning environments which students associate with “comfortable” or “safe” spaces. In recent years, social justice advocates and educators have begun questioning the appropriateness of the term “safe” when referring to these places of dialogue. In the wake of this uncertainty, the term Safe Space is being updated to Brave Space.
Arao and Clemens define a brave space within a classroom environment through five main elements:

1. Controversy with civility, where varying opinions are accepted; 2. Owning intentions and impacts, in which students acknowledge and discuss instances where a dialogue has affected the emotional well-being of another person; 3. Challenge by choice, where students have an option to step in and out of challenging conversations; 4. Respect, where students show respect for one another’s basic personhood; 5. No attacks, where students agree not to intentionally inflict harm on one another (2013)

A brave space is an important building block for a student’s ability to create a sense of belonging abroad. If we are consciously extracting minoritized students from their communities, how are we ensuring the facilitation of brave space for them internationally? Finding allies is essential in facilitating a sense of safety and belonging abroad. How can we utilize allies to create brave spaces for our students abroad? What resources at home do our students utilize as brave spaces, and can we employ these resources pre, during, and after their programs? Acknowledging the growing importance of brave spaces at higher education institutions is the first step in realizing the importance of replicating them for our students abroad. Just as institutions train their faculty and staff and display certifications or emblems signaling to students where there are brave spaces on campus, we should replicate these practices and spaces abroad. As noted in Wick’s French Immersive Learning example of pre-departure programming, using pre-departure orientations for your students mutually to agree on brave space ground rules and expectations of their facilitators, and especially of each other, is an important step in supporting minoritized student populations.

Part Three: Conclusion

The need and desire in the nation to address diversity in study abroad participants is not new. However, attempts to date have not been large enough to reflect the inequities and barriers to entry that exist in these systems. Multiple national initiatives have been passed mandating and advocating for the diversification of study abroad participants. The Abraham Lincoln Commission on Study Abroad 2005, The Senator Paul Simon Study Abroad Program act of 2017 (S. 601; H.R. 4379), and the Institute of International Education (IIE) Generation Study Abroad, are some
of the many efforts to mobilize resources and commitments to diversify participants in terms of gender, ethnicity, disabilities, income level, and field of study. Although we have made some strides, we must continue to challenge our assumptions about the purpose of mobility and migration. If we want to change who studies abroad, we have to change education abroad.

Given the new demographic reality and emerging concerns about the way the value of education abroad is portrayed, we believe that we must create a new form of American mobility that responds to, and connects with, the strengths of this new demographic population, while preparing all students for an equitable globalized future. We have to remove the border that is systemic inequity, a system of privilege and power, and rebuild study abroad to be a humanizing force. Minoritized student success will determine the new American mobility and the long-term wellbeing of our planet.
Success in Campus Internationalization at Spelman College: Lessons for Other Institutions

‘Dimeji Togunde and Rokhaya Fall, Spelman College

Introduction: Creating Mobility

Spelman College is a highly selective, historically black college that empowers women to change the world. Located in Atlanta, Georgia, USA, it was established in 1881 and currently enrolls approximately 2,100 women undergraduates. A global leader in the education of women of African descent, Spelman offers a holistic education founded on academic excellence in the liberal arts and sciences, and the intellectual, creative, ethical, and leadership development of its students.

Spelman has a long-standing commitment to expose students to the world around them through teaching, research, and service-learning as this is core to our mission to develop leaders who can effectively “engage the many cultures of the world.” In the current era of globalization, virtually every discipline and every profession operates in a world that has grown increasingly complex, competitive, and interdependent. That is why Spelman embraces the richness that comes from fluency in crossing boundaries, understanding cultural difference, and embracing knowledge that comes from encounters with disparate perspectives.

In 1888, Spelman student Nora Gordon studied in the Congo. In 1915, Flora Zeto came from the Congo to study at Spelman. The legacy of these two women shapes the Spelman mission to expand its reach of internationalization beyond international student exchange to a wide array of initiatives described in this article.

Leveraging Accreditation to Achieve Internationalization

In order to demonstrate Spelman’s commitment to internationalization, the College decided to leverage the Quality Enhancement Plan (QEP), an initiative mandated by our accreditation body, the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools Commission on Colleges (SACSCOC). This agency requires all institutions in the Southern Region of the United States to develop a Quality Enhancement Plan (QEP) that addresses a well-defined
topic related to enhancing student learning as part of the reaccreditation process and to submit an impact report at the end of the fifth year.

SACSCOC also requires that the development and selection of the QEP should be a broad-based process with participation from key stakeholders: the board of trustees, senior administration, faculty, staff, and students. By engaging these key constituencies, Spelman was able to obtain the buy-ins needed for a successful internationalization agenda. The planning process started in 2008. After several meetings of all stakeholders and a careful evaluation of three contending topical areas, in 2009 it was agreed that the next QEP should be titled *Spelman Going Global! Developing Intercultural Competence*.

A mission-driven and an outcome-based initiative—*Spelman Going Global!*—was designed to enhance student learning through global study-travel experiences connected to the College’s liberal arts curriculum: the Spelman MILE (*My Integrated Learning Experience*). It aimed to provide students with the skills they will need to navigate diverse global cultural landscapes and to be successful as global leaders. It fosters student interest in civic engagement and social responsibility within local and global communities.

This paper describes how each of the six elements of the American Council on Education (ACE, 2013) Model for comprehensive internationalization is fulfilled. These are: articulated institutional commitment; administrative leadership and structure; curriculum, co-curriculum, and learning; faculty policies and practices; student mobility; collaboration and partnerships.

**Institutional Commitment**

In order to demonstrate the importance of internationalization embodied in the QEP as a priority, the Spelman College Strategic Plan (2010-2017) was developed to carve out a road map for the implementation of the vision to internationalize the campus. The Plan argued “we must expand our campus to embrace the wider world, modelling for our students the importance of thinking globally and understanding the world through more international connections.” In order to demonstrate the importance of diversity and inclusion in the strategic plan, the goal was to ensure that every Spelman student had a global travel experience before completing her studies. Consequently, varieties of goals were set in both the QEP document and the Strategic Plan to foster and grow the breadth and depth of internationalization. Table 1 (p. 179) shows the goals and the achievements in seven years.
The implementation of Going Global! began in 2011 with the establishment of the Gordon-Zeto Center for Global Education as an infrastructure that provides coherence and centralization of all international initiatives. Established with a philanthropic investment of seventeen million US dollars endowment, the Center is led by the Associate Provost for Global Education who is charged with providing strategic leadership for international initiatives and assessment of students’ global learning outcomes. The Center includes eight staff members and several faculty who direct study abroad programs annually. With the support of the campus stakeholders, the Gordon-Zeto Center is widely recognized as a catalyst for new international initiatives that have brought national and international attention to the College.

While the College has been able to accomplish a great deal from the proceeds from the endowment, its laudable goals have pushed the institution to seek additional grants from the Mellon Foundation, Department of Education, and other international agencies.

At Spelman, students must take two years of foreign language and a course in international studies or comparative women’s studies as part of the General Education requirements. In addition, with the leadership provided by the Associate Provost for Global Education, Spelman has been infusing global topics/issues steadily into the curriculum in three ways. First, these are integrated through Area Studies, which offers courses that focus on different regions of the world: Africa and Middle East, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and Caribbean, etc. Second, this is achieved through a thematic approach that focuses on global topics such as health, food, poverty, migration, comparative race and ethnic relations, and terrorism, all of which promote faculty collaboration, team-teaching, and cross-fertilization of ideas among departments. This approach strengthens disciplinary and interdisciplinary endeavors. Third, the agenda fosters inquiry into the interconnectedness between local and global issues, sometimes called “glocal,” by supporting faculty to develop courses that will enable students to study global issues at the local level while tapping into the richness of multiple nationalities, myriad cultural activities, and the growing ethnic diversity of the Atlanta Metropolitan Area. This approach helps faculty develop curricular and co-curricular programming that enriches students’ experiences without travel abroad. The opportunity for students to connect local and global
issues adds luster to Spelman’s vantage location as an enriching learning laboratory nested within a vibrant cosmopolitan area.

The Associate Provost for Global Education works collaboratively with the Faculty Development Committee to review applications that would receive funding from the Gordon-Zeto Center for curriculum development. Faculty whose course proposals were selected for provisional funding are guided with constructive comments and are required to move forward to submit their course syllabi to the Curriculum Committee for final approval. Table 1 (p. 179) shows that twenty-eight global courses that have been added to the curriculum within seven years.

Spelman has defined Intercultural Competence (ICC) as acquisition of knowledge about global issues and other cultures and the development of skills to interact and engage with different cultures. To measure intercultural competence, we have then developed two learning outcomes (SLO) that are embedded into both curricular and co-curricular global travels:

- Identify differences and commonalities of two world societies based on political, economic, social, and/or cultural values during each international experience (Knowledge Component).

- Develop a personal definition of cultural engagement that reflects openness to cultural difference (Attitude Component).

These two learning outcomes were developed with theoretical guidance provided by the Deardorff Process Model of Intercultural Competence (Deardorff, 2006). For more information about the Intercultural Competence Model and how Spelman has assessed the two learning outcomes, and the results in five years, see Togunde and Fall (2017).

Feedback on the progress being made on internationalization is provided through periodic email reports, several meetings, and workshops led by the Associate Provost for Global Education, and sometimes at Faculty Institutes held at the beginning of every semester/year.

**Student Mobility (Inbound and Outbound)**

Through workshops for students and parents during campus visits, first-year student orientations, and testimonies of returnees, Spelman promotes the culture of study abroad as critical to students’ educational experience. Additionally, prospective students receive a letter from the Gordon-Zeto
Center about the importance of global learning and the various ways in which they can participate. According to Dr Mary Schmidt Campbell, President of Spelman College,

the College has made the culture of a global learning experience so integral to the teaching and learning environment that students view the study of their majors in a broad global context and come to Spelman assured that global travel is accessible and not dependent on certain socio-economic circumstances.

Spelman provides a variety of global travel opportunities that include semester abroad, international research, short-term summer faculty-led programs, internship and service-learning. Most faculty-led programs take place in the summer to address the curriculum barrier, so students do not see it as conflicting with semester courses needed toward their major. In addition to being relatively cheaper than semester study abroad programs, these programs also provide students with the opportunity to participate in internships, summer research, or paid work experience upon their return. Data on Spelman global engagement indicated that ninety-one percent of the students who studied abroad in 2017-2018 participated in short-term programs.

Noteworthy in Table 1 (p. 179) is the accelerated increase in the number of students’ study abroad participation: an increase of eighty-six percent within seven years. In general, Spelman College’s success in expanding study abroad in the last seven years can be attributed to the following: development of partnerships at the local and international levels; faculty-buy-ins through creation of faculty-led programs in summer, spring, and winter breaks; proceeds from the endowment fund as travel grants; availability of champions; increased positive perception of study abroad by parents; impetus to meet the goals articulated in the strategic plan; and increased student awareness of the importance of a global learning experience.

While the number of international students is modest, their impact is significant. They bring their cultural values and diversity of ideas to the classroom, broaden cross-cultural communication on campus, and serve as vessels for promoting intercultural competence.
Faculty Global Engagement

As purveyors and facilitators of knowledge, Spelman faculty are actively involved in ongoing internationalization. Faculty engage in teaching courses infused with international topics/issues; travel with students and serve as directors of faculty-led study abroad programs; participate in intercultural engagement programs along with students; and enrich intellectual discourse on global topics. Moreover, they attend international conferences, seminars, and workshops that bring innovative pedagogical approaches to teaching, and conduct international research and/or research collaborations on topics of global significance.

It is important to highlight that, unlike situations where STEM faculty are traditionally underrepresented in internationalization, Spelman STEM faculty are involved in enhancing international research for STEM students through our G-STEM Program in which they serve as research mentors and facilitators of international partnership agreements. Besides the proceeds from the endowment to support faculty global engagement, we have received a total of $220,000 from the Department of Education (2015-2019) to boost faculty internationalization. Faculty engagement in international activities, seminars, conferences, and workshops has increased by 170%. In addition, faculty’s role in campus intellectual global discourses through symposia, lectures, and book talks has increased significantly.

The role of faculty is highly valued by the College. Their contributions for developing internationally-focused courses and leading faculty-led study abroad programs are rewarded as adding value to the department’s mission and goals during third year review, tenure, and promotion.

Collaboration and Partnerships

The cultivation and nurturing of twenty new mutually beneficial relationships has become an effective strategy for Spelman within the last seven years. The Associate Provost for Global Education manages these partnerships in collaboration with the faculty, the Associate Director for Semester Study Abroad, and the Coordinator of Study Abroad; International Student Services and Data Analyst track the renewal dates. Partnership building is premised on a clear understanding that the proposed relationship initiated by a faculty or staff or an external institution would produce mutual benefits. Working with the initiator, the Associate Provost for Global Education performs an assessment and initial approval of a potential partnership to
determine its fit with the internationalization agenda of the College before seeking further higher-level approvals from the Provost and the President for tripartite signatures. Prominent among these partnerships is the Council on International Educational Exchange-Spelman Intercultural Engagement Program. Developed in 2013, this initiative has enabled Spelman to send a critical mass of students (106 in 2014, 162 in 2015, 178 in 2016, 179 in 2017 and 192 in 2018) to participate in two-week, three-credit courses on intercultural engagement in eight countries (twenty-five students per destination). Spelman has expanded this model to include partnership with CAPA: The Global Education Network, so that Spelman students can learn about key global issues impacting global cities of Florence (Italy) and Barcelona (Spain). In addition, through partnership with the Institute for the International Education of Students (IES), Spelman students are scheduled to take a cross-cultural leadership course in London (Summer 2019). Similarly, an intercultural communication program has been developed with DIS in Denmark and Sweden.

The uniqueness of the two-week summer program is that it has enabled Spelman to overcome the major barriers in study abroad: cost, curriculum, culture, and champions. Besides enabling the College to diversify the pool of student participants, it has been responsible for the increased number of faculty traveling with students. They, subsequently, enrich classroom discussions with their experiences, develop new courses, and research topics based on their travels to various destinations. Furthermore, these partnerships have enabled the College to provide international research opportunities for STEM students, in addition to enhancing student international exchange, student service learning, and faculty international research.

Summary: Overcoming Barriers to Student Mobility

Driven by its mission, Spelman College has approached global education with a high level of intentionality. It has supported comprehensive internationalization, an institutional goal, with a strategic plan (2010-2017) under the leadership of Emerita President Beverly Daniel Tatum and former Provost Johnnella E. Butler, and with investments in financial and human resources. The establishment of the Gordon-Zeto Center has produced coherence and centralization of international initiatives, thereby putting an end to the “random acts of internationalization” that once existed at the College. Tracking, monitoring, and evaluation of international programs have become more effective and rewarding. The College’s regard for inter-
nationalization is further demonstrated by its inclusion in the 2017-2022 Strategic Plan: Imagine/Invent/Ascend under the leadership of President Mary Schmidt Campbell and Provost Sharon Davies.

Internationalization pervades the broad spectrum of the institution’s teaching, research, and service. Faculty continue to show interest in developing courses that are embedded with trips abroad, thereby showing their roles as pivotal to the success of campus internationalization. Service learning has also gone global. Students are now able to demonstrate their responsibilities within local and global communities. It has produced positive transformative results for students and the institution. Student reflective essays submitted upon their return from study abroad reveal increased knowledge of other cultures, personal growth, self-discovery, openness to new cultures, and improved foreign language skills. Furthermore, the environment supporting student learning has been impacted through the creation of new academic programs such as Asian Studies minor, Portuguese Language, and Food Studies Program. Intellectual engagement has made the campus a hub for global thinking.

The international education profile of Spelman has been enhanced by bold internationalization efforts. For instance, in 2016, the Institute for International Education (IIE) Open Doors report showed that Spelman has, for the first time, made the Top Forty (ranked twenty-ninth) among the Baccalaureate Institutions producing the highest number of students studying abroad; the only distinguished HBCU on the list. In 2018, Spelman ranked eighteenth in the nation. Furthermore, our Accreditation body, in its response to the Fifth-Year QEP report, gave Spelman an accolade for clarity, thoroughness, and success. Although the QEP is over, internationalization is alive and well at Spelman; the College has been able to increase momentum. For instance, a year after its completion, a whopping 441 Spelman students studied abroad in thirty-three countries in 2017. Internationalization is integral to Spelman identity as it enjoys champions among students, faculty, board of trustees, senior administrators, and staff. It has had an infectious transformative impact that enriches the learning environment. Spelman has embraced internationalization with vigor, enthusiasm, and a hope for even greater accomplishments. Spelman’s commitment in fostering intercultural competence has enhanced its visibility and produced reputational gains for the College. For instance, the Association of International Educators (NAFSA) has selected and honored Spelman with the 2017 Senator Paul Simon Spotlight Award for Engagement in Internationalization. More recently, Spelman won the Diversity Abroad’s 2018 Excellence in Diversity and
Inclusion in International Education (Organizational level), and in 2019, the Institute for International Education (IIE) recognized Spelman with the Generation Study Abroad Seal of Excellence.

**Lessons for Other Institutions**

Based on Spelman’s success and the relevance of the ACE Model for Comprehensive Internationalization, institutions aspiring to succeed in their internationalization efforts may want to consider the following strategies:

- If possible, connect internationalization with Accreditation (e.g. QEP) to coalesce broad-based support from all stakeholders in the planning and growth of international initiatives. If there is upper-level support, funding would be provided. No institutional leadership wants accreditation processes to fail.

- Ensure there is a strategic plan that articulates the importance of internationalization and that can provide a road-map for implementation, monitoring, and assessment. It is imperative that you customize your international initiatives to align with the mission of your institution.

- Appoint a senior administrator with authority and expertise in global education to lead and centralize internationalization (if your institutional size would permit this), to correct “random acts of internationalization” or scattered efforts across the institution. If your institution is too big to have a central office, you could centralize within each divisional arm of the university.

- While new ideas or innovations may emerge, at the same time, there should be no need to reinvent your institution. Build on the strengths of your faculty, staff, and existing programs as there are many elements of a global campus already in place; however, what you need to do need is to ensure that those existing elements are intentionally connected to produce measurable learning outcomes.

- Develop formal partnerships and strategic memoranda of understandings.

- Transform the way international education is perceived by providing senior management with data and other supporting information/research. Data Collection is critical to documenting impact and for monitoring and assessment. Hard evidence is needed for successful grant applications.
• Create an “ethos that prizes internationalization as a positive good throughout the institution” (NAFSA) by rewarding faculty for their contributions through stipends for developing modules or new global courses, and in tenure and promotion processes.

• Partner with the Office of Communications to highlight faculty and students’ accomplishments and profile some outstanding students in their home newspapers.

• Build consortia with other schools to share or maximize resources and write collaborative grant proposals. For instance, Spelman students participate in some study abroad programs offered at Morehouse College and vice versa.

• Provide targeted funding to internationalize the curriculum. Curriculum internationalization is the nucleus of global education. It has proven to be the most effective way to get faculty involved. An investment in curriculum internationalization is also a catalyst for developing other international initiatives. For instance, our assessment data revealed that students who had previously taken courses with international topics/content are more likely to travel abroad and to demonstrate a higher level of intercultural competence. As a result, we decided to focus on systematic internationalization of the curriculum as a strategy to promote study abroad to enhance students’ understanding of other cultures.

• Start international initiatives on a small scale and increase gradually. You do not need to have a $17 million endowment before you can internationalize your campus. Yet, without money, you cannot achieve much!

• Go beyond institutional funding to seek external funding through grant proposals.

• Include language acquisition skills in General Education Requirements.
Table 1: General Goals Associated with the QEP/Internationalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Goals</th>
<th>Goal Attainment/Performance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Increase student study abroad overall by 100% (400 students in 4 years)</td>
<td>• In 7 years, total global student travel has increased by 86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 2011-2012: Global Travel is to increase to 108 (5% over fall 2010 enrollment of 2177)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 2012-2013: Global Travel is to increase to 218 (10% over fall 2010 enrollment of 2177)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 2013-2014: Global Travel is to increase to 327 (15% over fall 2010 enrollment of 2177)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 2014-2015: Global Travel is to increase to 435 (20% over fall 2010 enrollment of 2177)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 2015-2016: Global Travel is to increase to 544 (25% over fall 2010 enrollment of 2177)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Faculty Global Engagement</td>
<td>• Faculty Global Engagement has increased by 170% in 7 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Expand international partnerships by 5 in 4 years</td>
<td>• 20 partnerships were created in 7 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Goals</td>
<td>Goal Attainment/Performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Develop 25 globally-focused courses by 2017</td>
<td>• 28 global studies courses have been created by 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Increase faculty-led international programs by 5 in 4 years</td>
<td>• 44 new faculty-led international programs were created in 7 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• International Student Enrollment</td>
<td>• The number of international students has increased by 18.75%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These Strangers, in a foreign World,
Protection asked of me—
Befriend them, lest Yourself in Heaven
Be found a Refugee—
Emily Dickinson

Say this city has ten million souls,
Some are living in mansions, some are living in holes:
Yet there’s no place for us, my dear, yet there’s no place for us.
Once we had a country and we thought it fair,
Look in the atlas and you’ll find it there:
We cannot go there now, my dear, we cannot go there now
W. H. Auden, Refugee Blues

They had not found a home in America. So they looked across the sea to Africa where other black people were both the ruled and the rulers. Africa was to them a big free land which they could proudly call home, for there were buried the bones of their ancestors, there lay the roots of their families, and it was inhabited by the descendants of those same ancestors—which made them related by both blood and race. Everyone has to believe in something; and the white people of America had left them nothing to believe in
Chester Himes, Cotton Comes to Harlem

Geographical displacement brings to the fore the meanings and meaninglessness of modernity
Michelle Wright

All realms behold our driven seed,
Like wounded doves we fly their hate,
All nations hunt us and impede
And in the desert lie in wait …
Where is that kindness from above?
Solomon Ibn Gabirol (born 1020)
Liquid Borders, (In)visible Borders: The Case of Greece in the Management of Migration

Angeliki Dimitriadi, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy

Crossing borders is for most of us an intrinsic feature of our lives. Professionals, tourists, and all types of migrants cross borders around the world on a daily basis. Crossing borders is a “mode of being in the world” (Khosravi, 2011), an integral part of regulating human mobility. However, most people are caught between borders, in undefined (social, legal, and mental) spaces that exist within a state’s sovereignty, but often also outside it. The “in between” is fluid and often changes. Space, after all, is always under construction (Massey, 2011). A result of relations and material practices that have yet to be carried out, space is always in the making, never finished. It is in this space that borders exist. The spatial setting may appear firm, e.g. the external borders of states, however the reality is different. Cross-border conflict continues to exist as do claims over self-determination that could result in the formation of new states, and thus new borders.

Borders can be contested and change. In fact, from a historical perspective, they change rather often. The European Union is the most obvious example with its borders changing under every enlargement process (seven have taken place so far). Each enlargement pushes the external borders of the European Union to the Mediterranean and the East. In this vast border-land that emerges, internal borders for the most part have ceased to be, following the application of the Schengen Agreement and the Schengen Convention. The counter balance to the Schengen area of free movement has always been strong external border controls to determine right of entry but also “protect” the right of free movement of EU citizens. This balance between external border controls and internal open borders is also an acknowledgement that borders are needed in one form or another to compartmentalize and create order (Newman, 2009).

Beyond the traditional notion of what constitutes a border, the rise of globalization, of transnational citizenship, and the inevitable questions of identity

58 The Schengen Agreement led to the creation of Europe’s Schengen Area, in which internal border checks have largely been abolished.
and belonging have reconfigured the notion of borders; who can enter them and under what conditions. Migration, in this context, poses a continuous challenge; it affirms the power of the state to decide within its territory the right of entry and stay, but also contests territorial sovereignty through irregular border crossings. A symbiotic relationship exists between border and irregularity/illegality. Without borders, there would be no need to define the legality of a person’s mode of travel. So long as there are borders, their crossing will be categorized in relation to the right of entry (Donnan and Wilson, 1999). The arrival of the Other not only challenges but can lead to reconfiguration of borders, at times with multiple border-like spaces emerging amidst invisible lines. The fluidity of invisible border spaces is the focus of this discussion. Invisibility is crucial since borders are usually associated with demarcated lines, often visible. The way the border emerges depends on the demarcation process and the latter will impact how that border is perceived and managed. For Newman, “demarcation is the process through which the criteria of inclusion/exclusion are determined, be they citizenship in a country, membership of a specific social or economic group, or religious affiliation” (Newman, 2009: 149). In early 2016, due and in response to the refugee crisis, a new demarcation process took place within the Schengen area and within Greece creating a new, invisible border. Its purpose was the creation of a new spatial dislocation of arrivals. To understand the why and how one must first understand the way the refugee crisis unfolded and in what manner the policy response that ensued resulted in the emergence of new borders or border-like spaces within the EU (Greece) but situated on its outskirts (the islands of Northern Aegean).

A European “Refugee Crisis”

The refugee crisis of 2015 was a unique moment for Europe. In what has been termed the “long summer of migration” (Kasperek and Speer, 2015), thousands reached the islands of Northern Aegean in search of refuge. Most did not intend to stay in Greece; the latter has functioned for more than a decade as a transit stop on the way to northern Europe. Poor asylum capacity, lack of reception facilities, and no prospects of integration for those awarded protection transformed Greece early on into a stepping stone for other destinations (Dimitriadi, 2015; 2018a). In 2015, four islands bore the brunt of arrivals: Kos, Chios, Samos, and Lesvos (Lesbos). Situated across from the Turkish coasts, they have functioned for more than a decade as landing ground for irregular maritime migrants coming from the Middle East and Central Asia. In 2015, the island of Lesvos alone received
406,206 arrivals (January-November 2015) with November being the most critical month, recording 63,400 arrivals.

For Greece, the refugee crisis played out against a critical backdrop: Grexit. The number of migrants\textsuperscript{59} increased throughout the summer and autumn of 2015, during and after the referendum on the bailout from the \textit{Troika}.\textsuperscript{60} An unprecedented political and economic crisis peaked with the decision of the government to seek public support for rejection of the bailout proposal. Capital controls were imposed, a referendum was announced, and people took to the streets to protest for and against a potential exit from the Eurozone. The political discourse became deeply divisive and focused solely on the economic woes of Greece. The financial crisis that had slowly crippled the Greek economy since 2010 rippled to a political crisis and a growth in Euroskepticism, neither of which have ceased to this day.

Thus, the migrants arrived in a country already embroiled in turmoil and unprepared to address their needs. It could be argued that the Greek government’s response focused more on facilitating a swift movement from the islands (points of arrival) to Athens and then onwards by train to Thessaloniki. From there migrants made their own way through to the border area seeking to cross to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), the first stop on a long journey to western and northern Europe.

By early September 2015, an unspoken “agreement” seemed to have taken place throughout the transit corridor. From Greece to the Western Balkans, the borders were \textit{de facto} suspended, allowing migrants to continue their journey \textit{en route} to Hungary, Austria, Germany, or even Sweden. It is estimated that 507,745 crossed the border from Idomeni (Northern Greece) onwards to the Western Balkans. Since these are the figures recorded, the actual estimate of people is deemed to be much higher. The \textit{de facto} opening of the Western Balkan route allowed Greece a short respite from addressing the refugee crisis unfolding on the shores of the Aegean.

\textsuperscript{59} I use the term “migrant” as it denotes movement without classifying the individual and his/her purpose for undertaking the journey.

\textsuperscript{60} Editors’ Note: The term \textit{troika} is widely used in Greece (as well as Ireland, Portugal, and Spain) to refer to the three transnational institutions of the European Commission, European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund which collectively imposed stringent financial measures on their national economies after 2010.
What took place at the end of 2015 was unprecedented in many ways, from the number of arrivals, to the speed of movement of migrants, but most importantly the implications the crisis has had on the EU. As thousands made their way north, European policy makers acknowledged that the external borders were no longer performing as intended. Rather than screening, filtering, and effectively stopping entry to Greece and secondary movement from Greece through the Western Balkan route, migrants were assisted (by NGOs, border guards, and civil society) in crossing through. Hungary was the first member state to break ranks. The conservative government announced it would prevent cross border movement through the raising of fences and changes in law allowing for up to three years imprisonment of all those who crossed unauthorized its borders. The Hungarian decision exemplifies the challenge migration poses to borders. A “crisis of border controls is in fact a crisis of sovereignty” (De Genova, 2017:13). The Hungarian position paid no attention to the motives for irregular border crossing, for example the need for refuge. Instead it focused on the irregular mode of entry and ways of stopping it. Hungary’s decision was heavily criticized as violating European norms and values. It was nonetheless the first country to point out that the European border regime had collapsed and that, as a result, the “debordering” that had taken place abruptly ended the moment the first wire fence was put in place.

The crisis that played out from September 2015 to March 2016 was in the end a crisis of borders that eventually transformed into a deep political crisis for the EU. The terrorist attack in Paris on November 13, 2015, followed by events in Cologne, fueled an already brewing rhetoric that called for the preservation of European values and civilization, and the need for fortified external borders to protect European citizens not only from the migrants, but also from Muslim “extremists” and ISIS returnees who might be reaching Europe through the same routes. In other words, in the space of a month, the discourse shifted from hospitality and solidarity to securitization of migration once more. The eye of policy makers trained on the critical entry point at the time: the Greek-Turkish maritime border and the Aegean Sea.

The EU-Turkey Statement and the “Hotspots”

There is a certain paradox in the bordering practices in the Mediterranean Sea. Though the territorial border is fixed, the liquid essence of the Mediterranean poses a particular challenge. The legal architecture of maritime
The territoriality of states is complex, with delineated zones allowing for the exercise of sovereignty clearly agreed upon between states. Beyond them lie the high seas, and “patchy legal space constituted by overlapping and often conflicting fragments” of state sovereignty (Heller and Pezzani, 2017). If borders “define spatial relationships and, as such, provide an instrument to gain (or bar) access to geographically distributed resources” (Bermant, 2017), the liquid border poses an added challenge: access or prevention of entry depend also on the condition of one’s arrival.

While at sea, the migrant journey depends on variant conditions (weather, type of vessel, number on board) making it particularly risky. Often States are asked to deploy their resources to perform Search and Rescue (SAR) to save lives at sea. In the EU, search and rescue remains to this day (as the recent case of Italy highlights with the Aquarius incident) particularly problematic. In the liquid spaces of overlapping responsibility, who undertakes the SAR determines also where disembarkation takes place. In the EU’s case, due to the Dublin Regulation, SAR and disembarkation place the burden of responsibility for asylum processing, reception, and/or return, on the country of first arrival. Thus, Greece, before but also throughout the refugee crisis, was responsible for any and all that either reached its territorial borders or were rescued by Greek vessels in the Aegean and international waters and disembarked on Greek territory. The immediate implication is that any policy seeking to deter arrivals or prevent secondary movement had to focus on the sea border and construct spaces where management of irregular arrivals can take place. This was the purpose, to an extent, of the EU-Turkey Statement and the so-called “hotspots.”

On March 18, 2016, the European Commission announced that the EU had reached an agreement with Turkey over the management of irregular arrivals through the Greek-Turkish maritime border. The EU-Turkey Statement of 2016 (henceforth the Statement), commonly known as the “deal,” was presented in the form of a press statement. With unclear legal status, since it was not approved by Parliaments, the Statement proposed an unorthodox arrangement, though not an entirely unfamiliar one. Turkey would agree to patrol its maritime border better and deter departures from its territory.

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61 On June 10, 2018, 629 migrants were rescued in the Central Mediterranean in an operation carried out by NGOs and the Italian navy. They were taken on board the Aquarius, a rescue vessel operated by a German NGO (SOS Méditerranée). While the Aquarius was on its way to Italy for disembarkation, around thirty-five nautical miles off the southern coast of Italy, Italian authorities ordered the ship to stop. Italy refused the Aquarius access to its ports and prohibited the disembarkation of the rescued migrants onto Italian territory. The new Italian government argued that the days when disembarkation and asylum processing were linked had to come to an end.
Greece would ensure that new arrivals would remain on the five islands of northern Aegean in designated spaces (known as “hotspots”) where they would be screened, registered, and have their asylum applications submitted. Those whose applications were rejected would be returned to Turkey. The focus of the deal were the Syrians, since they constituted (and still do) the overwhelming number of arrivals. For every Syrian returned to Turkey from Greece, the EU would resettle another Syrian hosted in Turkey. The “1+1” as it was termed, sought to “reward” the refugees waiting in Turkey for an opportunity to be resettled to the EU, while punishing those who undertook an irregular border crossing to Greece by returning them and relegating them to the end of the queue. The arrangement strongly resembles the Pacific Solution introduced by Australia, another liquid border that securitizes migration. Coupled with the closure of the Western Balkan corridor, the aim was to ensure a significant and immediate reduction in the number of arrivals but also prevent secondary movement from Greece to other EU Member States.

Newly Demarcated Spaces of Dislocation

Greece, thus, was transformed overnight into a space where migrants were stranded. Unable to move forward or backward, this frontline state of the EU acquired the role of a buffer zone within the EU: a border within a border. Within this new demarcated space, immobility and mobility interchange between the islands and the mainland.

The demarcation is not visible, but it is ever-present and enables the management of the newly emergent border-like space. The five islands situated across from the Turkish coastline are designated as hotspots and it is in these islands alone where the screening, selection, immobilization, and return to Turkey of arrivals takes place. The spatial dislocation of arrivals to these islands serves multiple purposes. It allows for migrants to be held away from the mainland and the land border to Idomeni,62 thereby making secondary movement more difficult; on a daily basis, it reminds those who have undergone the journey that they are unwelcome and will likely be returned to Turkey; it ensures immobility since those in the hotspots cannot move to the mainland irrespective of the status of their asylum application; and finally, it serves as a warning to those wishing to make the journey of what they will face if they attempt to cross. The newly emergent border in this case serves as a buffer zone while sending a message to migrants.

62 Editors’ Note: Idomeni is a small village in Greece, near the borders with the Republic of Macedonia.
as well as EU citizens. It designates the space where the management of migration takes place in times of crisis and distinguishes newcomers from those who have entered prior to the implementation of the Statement.

According to Dimitris Avramopoulos, the Commissioner for the EU Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs,

A “Hotspot” is characterized by specific and disproportionate migratory pressure .... An external border section should be considered to be a “Hotspot” for the limited period of time during which the emergency or crisis situation exists and during which the support of the “Hotspot” approach is necessary.

Spatial dislocation is, thus, justified; a result of a “crisis.” It is not uncommon to have islands functioning as border-like spaces. Traditionally islands have served as spaces of exclusion and detention. Alison Mountz has argued that island detention is one of the ways through which nation-states attempt to manage entry, and it is their geographical location that enables them to function as sites of exclusion (Mountz, 2011). The Greek Islands go a step beyond, not only excluding but also functioning as the designated space in which the State responds to newcomers. Nationality screening, fingerprinting, asylum applications, and immobilization are processes that take place in these islands for all arrivals who cross the Greek-Turkish maritime border.

Everyone, irrespective of the irregular manner of entry, has rights under EU and national laws, including the right to asylum. The Common European Asylum System details the services first arrivals can and should receive and expands further the rights of asylum seekers. However, the spatial dislocation of refugees on the Greek islands has had significant implications on the asylum system implemented in Greece; a different asylum process is followed on the mainland and in the hotspots. A regular procedure is applied on the mainland and an expedited procedure applies in the hotspots, one largely based on one’s nationality (in clear contravention to the 1951 Convention). Whereas in the mainland, one’s application is examined on merit, on the islands an (in)admissibility assessment takes place first, which looks at whether the applicant can be returned to Turkey based on the “safe third country” and “first country of asylum” rules. Those whose

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64 For a discussion on the procedure in the “hotspots,” see Dimitriadi (2017).
claims are found inadmissible are (in theory) returnable to Turkey. However, from April 2016 to October 31, 2018, only 1,755 people were returned to Turkey,65 of which 337 were Syrians. In fact, the latest data shows that the majority of those returned are Pakistani nationals, most having opted out of the asylum process or having had their claim rejected.

The usage of different asylum processes further facilitates the emergence of unseen barriers for migrants. Depending on the point of entry (land or sea border), the migrant will face different administrative procedures, different treatment and reception conditions, and likely different freedom of movement. Perhaps most importantly, those on the islands are deterred from the asylum process, not physically but mentally. They can apply but they are aware they will have to remain in limbo for a lengthy and unknown period. Trapped in a border zone with few options, some opt out entirely of the asylum process. Tazzioli, in her discussion of the new border zones emerging across Europe, argues that they function as spaces where both alliances and solidarity grow between migrants and citizens and where migrants struggle to claim their right to stay in Europe (Tazzioli, 2018). The five Greek islands can be examined under this prism and one could argue that their determination to see the asylum process through is an act of resistance. In the face of multiple hardships, they persevere and claim their right to stay in the EU. However, the islands are also spaces where migrants may choose to abandon the struggle for their right to stay in Europe. By opting out of the asylum process, they are freed from the legal, mental, and physical limbo imposed on them.

Different asylum procedures not only further divide the islands from the mainland, but also serve as one more reminder that those on the islands are in fact different “migrants” from those on the mainland. Everyone can leave the reception and identification facilities after twenty-five days, but only those deemed extremely vulnerable can leave the islands. Everyone else remains trapped awaiting either for positive recognition of their asylum application or return to Turkey (voluntary or forced). As the process can take as long as two years to complete, the islands acquire a dual role: they are prison-like entities, where freedom of movement exists, but not the freedom to leave the islands. Thus, even though the migrants have arrived in Europe, their journey has not been completed. They are geographically within the

EU and yet simultaneously “outside” it, and, like a border, the islands and the facilities on them function as a barrier to migrants’ mobility.

The Value of the Greek Case

The intricacies of the EU-Turkey Statement of 2016 and the hotspots are far too numerous to discuss in the present article. Nonetheless both offer a valuable opportunity for academic study and research. The refugee crisis of 2015 was in fact a crisis of borders. It allowed for old questions to resurface amongst the member states: Whose borders are the external borders? Who is responsible for their protection? What happens to those who “violate” them? De Genova notes that regardless of the types of bordering, migrants have been “mercilessly sacrificed—usually with callous disregard, occasionally with sanctimonious hypocrisy—in the interests of instituting a ‘new’ Europe encircled by ever-increasingly militarized and securitized borders” (Genova, 2017: 24). The border(s) no longer seek to filter entry or exit, but to control migration as much as possible; a tall order that, in the end, is relegated to policing practices.

As obstacles are raised and borders emerge, from fences and walls to restriction of movement and spatial dislocation from urban centers to peripheral islands, the border crisis of Europe has spilled over into the region’s social fabric and raised normative questions over Europe’s values, responsibilities, and identity. These are questions that also increasingly dominate public discourse beyond Europe, as evident in the case of the United States. There, the focus on the US-Mexico border frames the issue around sovereignty and identity and the political discourse around walls versus responsibility in ways very similar to the European debate.

At the same time, the EU-Turkey Statement, the hotspots, and the policy responses in relation to events, are likely a harbinger of the future of border management and asylum practices in Europe. The Statement was not only about reducing migrant numbers. It was also a way of addressing the discontent of various Member States that suddenly found themselves having to deal with an increase in asylum applicants, a way of appeasing political division, and of piloting new approaches to migration management (Dimitriadi, 2018b). The Statement sought to combine asylum processing in a third country, resettlement, financial assistance for border controls and at
the same time ensure protection against refoulement and individualized processing of asylum claims.

Instead, what emerged as a lesson from the refugee crisis was not only the importance of the border, but also a willingness to return to a more traditional approach to borders, visible through barriers and fences, manned by border guards and new technologies, and one experienced by migrants through the restriction of movement, difficulty in accessing asylum, and the threat of return. In that sense, the Greek case offers a unique opportunity for researchers and students of border and/or migration studies to understand how the external border can transform, be visible or invisible, and be experienced and managed for the purpose of regulating migration.

The EU-Turkey Statement can be used as a model for the future and is indeed being used at present in the discussions between the EU, Morocco, Italy, and Libya. The consensus increasingly seems to be that Europe can meet its moral and legal obligations to asylum seekers by ensuring that the vast majority settle in third countries, and away from the EU. Alongside deals and partnerships, the focus has shifted to the creation of stronger borders and buffer zones that will allow for management of irregular arrivals in third countries deemed safe by policy makers.

The EU and its Member States have become more creative in externalizing responsibility for reception, asylum processing, and returns and more restrictive with the rights and services afforded to those already in the EU. The challenge was, and always will be, how to ensure the protection of external borders without failing those people who need to access them the most. It is a normative, political, and societal challenge, and one that is currently dividing and transforming Europe.

66 Editors’ Note: refoulement is a legal term referring to the forcible return of refugees or asylum seekers to a country where they are liable to be subjected to persecution.
Gianfranco Rosi’s *Fuocoammare (Fire at Sea)*: The (Un)Translatability of Death

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This essay is a work in progress, prompted by several questions stemming from our postcolonial condition and from the ongoing tragedy playing out on Europe’s borders. As a work in progress, it is characterized by interrogations and detours, and urged forward by questions that problematize our being here. Political, cultural, and social questions inform our systems of belonging, our agency, and that of others, within the framework of what Jacques Rancière calls “consensus democracy.”

In *Dis-Agreement Politics and Philosophy*, the French intellectual reflects on the dialectic of politics and democracy and on their interplay right at that historical junction where they are being challenged by the emergence of violent conflicts and disturbances. Globalization of the markets and free movement of goods, externalization and militarization of borders, economic and social instability are all elements of a system that is consistently being threatened by the claims of a specific “uncounted” part whose very appearance produces the destabilization of the well-ordered system of consensus. Rancière contests the idea that the system as a “whole” is just a sum of all its parties, the principle on which consensus democracy rests, preferring to demarcate democracy as a space of interlocution and dissent: “the place where the people appear … the place where a dispute is conducted” (Rancière, 1999: 100-1). The nature of this dispute is not to be intended as a “conflict of interests” but rather as a “conflict over the very count of those parties” (Rancière, 1999: 101).

The very essence of democracy is, then, its ability to set up “communities of a specific kind, polemical communities that undermine the very opposi-

67 For Rancière, “consensus democracy” is constituted by a reasonable agreement between individuals and social groups who have understood that knowing what is possible and negotiating between partners is a way for each party to obtain the optimal share that the objective givens of the situation allow them to hope for and which is preferable to conflict. But for parties to opt for discussion rather than a fight, they must first exist as parties who then have to choose between two ways of obtaining their share. Before becoming a preference for peace over war, consensus is a certain regime of the perceptible: the regime in which the parties are presupposed as already given, their community established and the count of their speech identical to their linguistic performance (Rancière, 1999: 102)
tion of the two logics; the police logic of the distribution of places and the political logic of the egalitarian act” (Rancière, 1999: 100-1).

The dialectic logic of policing and egalitarian claims, whereby the whole is equal to the sum of all its parts, is discarded by Rancière in favor of a ternary mechanism that allows democracy to function in as much as in it “specific political performers who are neither agents of the state apparatus (policing), nor parts of society” (institutions) conduct, as non-identitary subjects, a “dispute on the stage where people emerge” (1999: 101):

The forms of democracy are the forms taken by the emergence of this appearance, of such nonidentary subjectification and conducting of the dispute. These forms of emergence have an effect on the institutional mechanisms of politics and use whatever mechanisms they choose. They produce inscriptions of equality and they argue about existing inscriptions. And so they are in no way oblivious to the existence of elected assemblies, institutional guarantees of freedom of speech and expression, state control mechanisms. They see in these the conditions for being exercised and in turn modify them. But they do not identify with them. And still less can they be identified with individuals’ ways of being (Rancière, 1999: 100-1)

My work on the phenomenon of migration in the Mediterranean has been guided by a stay in Lampedusa in 2013 during the hunger-strike of a group of Ethiopians and Eritreans protesting against fingerprinting; the knowledge of protests by collectives and activists working on and around Lampedusa; and the study of docu-films that have attempted to represent the migrants’ condition. I juxtapose the theoretical dimension of politics and democracy, as illustrated by Rancière, with the struggle of particular parties to dissent and to dispute, in a polemical way, the “very situation of interlocution” in a consensus system which actively pursues the unwanted’s exclusion.

My attention, in my larger study, is directed towards those practices of narration, representation, and memorialization belonging to non-identitary groups who dispute the binary dialectic of “consensus democracy,” introducing with their “appearance” a splintering of reality. The artistic output presents itself as a “contentious object” which is “not homogeneous with the ordinary mode of existence of the objects thereby identified.” Its appearance, which expresses itself primarily in a political dimension, defies the “identification of the real with its reproduction and simulation,” as
exemplified by Guy Debord: “spectacle presents itself as society, as a part of society, and as unifying instrument” (Debord, 1967: 3).

Against the fabricated “unification” and reassuring conciliation proposed by the society of spectacle, the appearance of these artistic and political pronouncements denounce the spectacularization of the heterogeneity aimed at producing the “dismissal of the case for the political constitution of non-identitary subjects that upsets the homogeneity of the perceptible by showing separate worlds together, by organizing worlds of litigious community.” Aware that “the ‘loss of the real’ is in fact a loss of appearance,” a loss of political reality and agency, Gianfranco Rosi’s docu-film challenges the law of consensus in which “a population [is] exactly identical to the counting of its parts” (Rancière, 1999: 104).68

My exploration of Rosi’s docu-film finds fertile ground also in Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of a minor literature. In their (1983) essay on Franz Kafka, the French philosopher and psychiatrist identify a minor literature as a decidedly deterritorialized space, where the language of a minority, situated within a larger, historically and linguistically authoritative context, emerges as a privileged utterance in its raw and even brutal directness.

Let us consider then the notion of a deterritorialized language. Is it simply a language without territory or should we view it rather as a mode of communication that challenges the very notion of space and its relationship with power? Situating itself outside of the dimension of territoriality, this “language” exceeds the teleological limits of space, conceived today as imperium, dominance, and terror (Agamben, 2015). Politically, it would imply a system of signification that challenges the claims for sovereignty, power, and authority, problematizing the Hobbesian principle of control over a territory, achieved today through the destabilizing power of terror within territorial boundaries for the purpose of reaffirming and preserving that very same control and in that very same space. A language that situates itself outside territorial claims, like the language of art, is by nature dynamic, mutable, unstable; its very appearance exposes the deception of the state of exception which allows a supernatinal governance to perform increasingly militaristic control over a territory.

68 Rancière argues that

Simulated reality is in no way the simulacrum’s power to destroy the ‘real world’ and its political avatars … [it] … is much more the final turning on its head of the truth proper to metapolitics. It is the organization of a specular relationship of opinion with itself, identical to the effectiveness of the sovereign people and to scientific knowledge of the behaviors of a population reduced to its statistical sample (Rancière, 1999: 104).
In line with Rancière’s notion of non-identititary subjectification, a minor literature stresses the political dimension of its oppositional interlocution, which exceeds memory, history, or individual biography. The minimal space a minor literature occupies turns every experience, action, and expression into a collective enunciation; there is no presence of, or need for, individual authority; the voice of the agent does not claim subjectivity but rather produces a shared utterance.

In a minor literature, Deleuze and Guattari see the foreclosure of authorial individuality, seeking an impersonal singularity that coalesces in the expression of a collective that challenges the simulacrum of a “truly overthrown world,” where “the real is a moment of simulation” (translation from Debord, 1967: 9). Converting what was rendered evanescent into the highest degree of reality, a minor literature utilizes a visual, pre-textual, cinematic language, much akin to the one Pasolini described in his well-known heretical essay *Cinema of poetry*, where the “im-signs,” the “world of memory and of dreams” (Pasolini, 2005: 168), appear articulated in the “sacred” expressiveness of repetition. In later essays, Deleuze favors the language of cinema, for its flow of images is literally the doubling of corporeality, an immanence that stems from “reality’s natural language” (Pasolini, 2005: 168). Significantly for my thesis, the language of cinema challenges the perception of the “loss of the real,” which validates the system of consensus of our “postdemocracy,” in which social energies are marginalized or shut off in favor of an “identifying mode, among institutional mechanisms” that allocate “society’s appropriate parts and shares … making the subject and democracy’s own specific action disappear” (Rancière, 1999: 102).

It is also useful to implicate in this theoretical framework the notion of “multitude,” as proposed by Hardt and Negri in *Empire* (Hardt and Negri, 2000), as it describes vividly the condition of the “illegal immigrants” stationed at the borders of Europe. This “multitude,” extending from Greece, to Macedonia, to Turkey, urges us to reflect on a common, shared belonging: the suffering body, the body in pain (Scarry, 1985), which materializes at the border of civil society producing violently inhuman reactions. The foreclosed body brings to the fore notions of inclusion, exclusion, violence, racism, exploitation, colonialism, and globalization. It invites us to rethink the idea of citizenship and its binary practices of liberation/subjugation, or its claims of subjectivization. In the notion of citizenship, I locate the point of intersection between the body and politics, contending, with Mezzadra

69 “Monde réellement renversé … le vrai est un moment du faux.”
and Nielson, that its very corporeality constitutes the “moment of excess that can never be fully expropriated” (Mezzadra and Nielson, 2013: 252).

“Your body is a battleground”

History is the stage where the re-presentation of the political is achieved through geographic and cultural dis-locations that challenge our gaze, destabilizing its needs for discursive coherence and linear understanding. In his latest work, *Fuocoammare*, director Gianfranco Rosi has spotted the inconsistency, the delusion which has so convinced western thought that it could “move beyond the body,” that we could be reassured, even consoled, as in Plato’s cave, by the seductiveness of the shadows, metaphors, ideas, forms, and theories that disengage and disconnect the mind from its corporeal reality. The body is not a metaphor, it is an actuality, and its common “naked suffering” (Camus, 1957: 240) the only certainty left. Paraphrasing Camus, if we lose the body we lose everything (Camus, 1957: 246).70

That the body must be protected, in life as in death, is a fact that immigrants in Lampedusa, or at the border with France, Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Turkey (Dickinson, 2015), have somberly grasped. It is the black body, recovered, reconstructed, documented, mourned, which takes center stage. The body has become, to borrow from Barbara Kruger’s famous poster, the Other’s political “battleground,” inviting further reflections, primarily that of “re-presentation.”71

In the eleventh of his *Prison Notebooks* (Gramsci, 1995: 306),72 Gramsci observed that the problem of every truth, in political struggle, is its translatability into a language that is effective, situation specific, and material (versus academically abstract) (Gramsci, 1971: 201). Expounding on Gramsci, Mezzadra and Neilson add that “[t]ranslation, in its political transposition, is not an organizational technique dictated by leaders, but a material practice forged from below within struggles … It is a grounding principle that links struggle with concrete situations” (2013: 271).

70 See Albert Camus, “The Wager of Our Generation”: “We have nothing to lose except everything. So let’s go ahead. This is the wager of our generation. If we are to fail, it is better, in any case, to have stood on the side of those who choose life than on the side of those who are destroying” (Camus, 1957: 248).

71 In 1989, Barbara Kruger created “Untitled (Your Body is a Battleground)” as a political poster to be used during the Women’s March on Washington in support of women’s reproductive rights. See, for further information: http://www.thecrimson.com/column/the-art-of-protest/article/2014/4/9/art-of-protest-your-body-is-a-battleground/.

72 I am indebted to Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson for their elaboration of Gramsci’s notion of translatability, which I develop in aesthetic as well as political terms in the exploration of artistic and cinematic expressions in the present study (Mezzadra and Neilson, 2013).
Gramsci’s notion of translation and translatability and Mezzadra and Neilson’s observations appear of import for the present study as it analyzes how the “black” body, in its political and socio-economic dimension, is “translated” onto the screen in *Fuocoammare*. Assuming as location Bourdieu’s “positional suffering” (Bourdieu, 1999: 4), the juxtaposition of the “translation” aims at interrogating the gaze that entraps the “uncounted” body either in the state of exception (which urges repression) or in a discourse of victimization (which calls for humanitarian intervention within a deeply concealed discourse of subalternity). The “black” body is framed exclusively within the phenomenon of migration, which media have appropriated and spectacularized. Following Debord, we can see that “all that was lived directly has been distanced into a representation.”73 What is produced is the sense that the body’s reality is non-living, separated from the viewer both by image and language, the latter appropriately turned into a self-proclaimed “official language of generalized separation” (author translations from Debord, 1971: 1-3).74

Borders, liquid in the Mediterranean and solid in Ventimiglia, Calais, and the Balkans, have had a tragically materializing effect on the refugees’ and migrants’ bodies, retranslating them into inescapable physicality for a desensitized Western consciousness used to confuse mathematical calculations with reality, scientific modeling with bodies, numbers with opinion. As they become enmeshed, literally and metaphorically, with the border, bodies become the intersection of a “transfer of meaning” (*traslatio*) that sees “bodily gestures, affective exchanges, rhythmic expressions, and the sharing of pain, suffering, and joy … generate a political subject” (Mezzadra and Neilson, 2013: 276) whose presence/absence/loss problematizes any disavowal or foreclosure of the economic realities that sustain the exploitation and dispossession inherent in the globalized economy.

**Bodies without Reality: The Case of *Fuocoammare***

Following Iain Chambers’ notion that “[c]ritical montage of words and images can carry us through the poetical to a further understanding of the political” (Chambers, 2016: 118), I will now analyze the almost two-hour-long award winning docu-film, *Fuocoammare*. Gianfranco Rosi’s film received much praise and was awarded the Golden Bear at the 2016 Berlin Film

73 “Tout ce qui était directement vécu s’est éloigné dans une représentation.”

74 “Langage officiel de la séparation généralisée.”
Festival. It was described by critics as an “impressionistic portrait” of Lampedusa and its inhabitants, an “oblique, poetic alternative” to the canonized narrative about migration. Rosi’s work appears articulated and multidimensional in its attempt at negotiating different levels, the symbolic, the poetic, and the representational, to translate the reality of Lampedusa into a discourse of disagreement which makes possible the re-presentation of the “part with no part.”

Rosi landed on Lampedusa a few weeks after the tragedy of October 3, 2013. This was the largest recorded migration tragedy ever to occur in the Mediterranean: over 360 migrants drowned a few miles off the coast of the island. The event and its impact on the people of Lampedusa are however absent from Rosi’s narrative, in what appears at first as a decontextualizing technique. The unfolding of the story, which develops after a brief introductory text, is not accompanied or followed by captions, a voice over, or other texts that suture the assemblage of the various episodes. The absence of textual or verbal support points to the refusal of a universalistic narrative, a normative voice, which, under the guise of neutrality, would indicate the presence of an absolute, hegemonic intentionality.

“Naked” images privilege a non-verbal grammar that points to a different way of telling. Following Barthes’ observations on image, connotation, and meaning contained in his essay The Photographic Message (1982), Rosi has elaborated his polemical, political message of dis-agreement by employing the Barthesian notions on photography, struggling to maintain the literal reality of the visual images, their analogon, and formulating them as a message “without a code,” a syntax of connotations that would imply the “naturalization of the cultural” (Barthes, 1982: 26) to produce the normalization of the image’s iconographic “innocence.” Any text or voice over would come at a cost to the image, that of “elucidating or ‘realizing’ the text itself, to sublimate, patheticize or rationalize the image” (Barthes, 1982: 25).

In Fuocoammare, Rosi is committed to the operation of subtraction, reduction, and contraction of connotative elements. He operates at the level of

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76 This was a tragedy that impacted greatly on both the island’s inhabitants, who came together on one side to protest the spectacle of politicians grieving publicly for the benefit of the media, and on the other to mourn as a community the untimely loss of lives and to support those who had taken part in the rescue. See, for example, “Naufragio dei migranti: il racconto della tragedia,” Corriere TV (October 10, 2013), http://video.corriere.it/naufragio-migranti-racconto-tragedia/852a8e42-3191-11e3-ab72-585440a4731e.
both the natural and human landscape, mixing Lampedusa’s wild nature with its inhabited spaces. Subtraction produces absence, void, ambiguity, and, in terms of message and meaning, the reality in its untranslatability. In the space of the film, objects are treated as veritable symbols, like the meager catch on the boat that turns into Samuele’s simple family meal, a subtle reminder of the end of the fishing industry on an island completely transformed by the economy of border patrol and militarization.

Through subtraction, the director has done away with as many cultural manifestations and historical connotations as possible: the tourists, the humdrum of summer, even, arguably, the Lampedusans and the migrants as cultural agents, as dis-agreeing community. Absence has its objective correlative in the silence that envelops the scenery. The cloudiness and cold of a wintry season devoid of sun speaks as much of an afflicted and dispossessed island as of the director’s attempt to liberate Lampedusa from the burden of the mediatic discourses that held it captive in the circularity of emergency, calamity, and distress. In Fuocoammare, scenes work more as photographs whose assemblage and ostensibly loose order indicate a decision to remain moored to the level of the analogon, of continuous denotation, where each image is a message that “totally exhausts in itself its mode of existence” (Barthes, 1982: 18). Rosi’s operation may prove difficult, precisely because of the complexity of the historiographical context. The issue is the subtraction of perceptive or connotative elements, of any predetermined syntactical order of meaning, to allow the viewers to approach what is seen without the support of any preestablished “culture, moral, [or] imagination” (Barthes, 1982: 26).

John Berger, in “Another way of telling” (Berger and Mohr, 1995), argues (by the way of Edward Said’s “Bursts of Meaning,” 1982-2000) that a photograph is a “quotation” of reality rather than its re-presentation or interpretation, and for this reason it remains untranslatable, ambiguous: “Its ambiguity, precisely as ambiguity, sustains truth, not necessarily as an identifiable semantic unit, but rather as an experiential opening towards something that escapes the closure of any singular telling of time and place” (Chambers, 2016: 119-20).

Like photographs, Rosi’s images form a series of micronarratives. Imbricated within a concurrence of episodes flowing without the support of a linear storyline, they are rather existential “quotations” from life on an island. In defying institutional temporality, the images question the historical construction of perspective. Narrative junctions remain suspended as Rosi
privileges a spatially and temporally fragmented, anecdotal framework that poses a deliberate challenge to any pretense of meaning, closure, or method. The lack of structural subordination continuously disrupts discursive linearity, challenging the logic of any historiographical operation that rests on a beginning, a development, and an end. Thus, the question is, what are we seeing? Rosi asks us to ask ourselves about the process of seeing as knowing, of seeing as understanding, of telling as universal monopoly exercised on the historical process. *Fuocoammare* aims to question our perception of reality starting from the narration of migration within the splintered realities of Lampedusa.

“Quoting” reality has a further repercussion on our understanding, it may bring us as close as possible to a level of “neutrality”: not as the sense of distance and detachment dictated by the use of technology, of instruments that reassure us of their surgical, neutral perception of the world; neutrality as in not becoming prey to pre-established discursive practices, prefabricated for easy and comfortable consumption; neutrality as a source of instability, dislocation, and disagreement; neutrality as an unstable, skeptical, and distrustful positionality. Rosi’s technical operations support instability, disturbance, and disorientation. Lampedusans are for the most part presented individually, in enclosed, isolated spaces, desolate landscapes, empty boats, windblown piers. A woman in her kitchen, as she cooks or serves dinner listening to the radio, a DJ working in his studio, a scubadiver exploring the sea depths, Samuele’s cousin and father, at sea or at home, and finally Samuele, the twelve-year-old boy whose expeditions in the interior of the island are visually filled with the mix of beauty and wilderness which is Lampedusa’s striking natural trait.

The only narrator in *Fuocoammare*, foreboding the deadly final scenario, is the doctor, who recollects what he witnessed time and again as the island’s coroner. Talking about the bodies of the dead, he describes the mortal burns caused by fuel leakages, the countless children, the newborn attached to their mothers’ umbilical cord. Acknowledging the necessity of the surgical removal of ears and other body parts for identification purposes, he communicates the agony of the repressed in recurrent nightmares that foreshadow the condition of the viewers after they leave the movie theater. Stylistically, the doctor’s presence at the center of the film acts as thematic connection between Samuele’s and the other Lampedusans’ temporalities. Rescue and retrieval operations mirror the persistence of different rhythms and existential tempos on an island that has become the metaphor of our planetary condition, where extreme realities and urgent
proximities accumulate and call for a renegotiation of our understanding of the present.

The intentional disconnect between the episodes calls into question the isolation, separation, and political marginality that has characterized Lampedusa and the Mediterranean in recent years. A geopolitical space that remains heavily patrolled by national and supernational assemblages, the Mediterranean is conflated in the film with the migrant’s body, which is presented in life and re-presented in death as the return of the repressed, exposing, in its clandestine status, the juridical illegality of communities, like those housed in Lampedusa, that confuse cultural and geographic boundaries, that exceed, in their heterogenous mix, constructed paradigms of national identity. The migrants’ disquieting presence in the film is always underlined by instability, the rough sea of their arrival, or darkness, as in the prayer scene, or commotion, as during the soccer game, or by rhythms and lyrics that persist as the only extraterritorial space in which migrants are allowed to speak and narrate the reasons behind their exodus and the hardships experienced during the journey. Divisions of Europe and Italy, of Africa and of the South-North are inscribed in their bodies, which remain physically confined and representationally enclosed within the discourse of emergency, chaos, and death.

However, Rosi’s discourse places the migrants at the center of the story in an unusual way. His gaze mixes contemplation with empathy, idyll with distress, deriving them from the flow of natural and human landscapes, the scattered “quotations” that charm at first but ultimately destabilize the viewers, moving them to a critical understanding that could be defined as asymmetric. Appearing to indulge over the domesticity of the quotidian, Rosi deliberately disturbs it, as in the scene where a matriarch is intent on preparing dinner. There, the linearity of the intimate and familiar is interrupted as death percolates through the radio, where the daily news of the numbers of those who die at sea are followed by the reports of the collapsing island infrastructure. Woven together in a narrative that is purposefully exclusionary, the episodes leave the Lampedusans as a community out of the picture, avoiding the stereotypical, the folkloric, the consolation of the familiar and ordinary. Are we to continue to consider Lampedusa and the Mediterranean a u-topos, an alterity, a space outside of modernity, a symbolic space of eternal circularity, ensnared in a mythological dimension to and from which to escape?
Not so fast! If, on one side, *Fuocoammare* constructs Lampedusa’s reality as a conflation of heterogeneous presents, suspended spatially between the North and the South of the planet, it also simultaneously depicts its space as deeply enmeshed in a geopolitical context of hegemonies, national borders, disciplinary protocols, and unauthorized spaces of belonging. Encrypted in the very beginning are scenes from an island that has become the posterboy for Italy’s ultramodern surveillance capabilities. The overarching presence of the Italian military complex is intermittent but constant, the *longa mano* of a national government which seems singlehandedly to oversee each rescue operation with sophisticated instrumentation and state of the art equipment. What Rosi places at the forefront of this “quotation” is the contradiction existing between the military force and the peace operations they conduct, an incongruity that is rendered more manifest by the contrast between the technological apparatus and the desperate status of the rescued migrants. The glaring difference acts once again as a destabilizing mechanism within a practice, rescue and retrieval, which the viewers intuit does not ordinarily fall under military jurisdiction.

Rosi does not shy away from displaying this inconsistency. On the contrary, he insists on incongruities throughout the film, interpellating the viewers by challenging them to find relationships between the episodes featuring the Lampedusans and what is happening around their island. Incongruous presences surround the Mediterranean space, making them veritable *deus ex machina*, which will lead the film to its gruesome end scenes. It is in the final rescue and retrieval operations that subtraction, absence, and dislocation culminate in the message that the director asks us to extract from his work, that there is a war around Lampedusa, like the one Samuele’s grandmother mentions in her den. This is a war whose aftermath is horrifying, inconceivable, and simply untranslatable. The dehydrated bodies, the bloody tears, the mental anguish and physical agony, the corpses and body bags are a total *analogon*, a space outside of logos, an absence. No verbal categorization or signification is conceivable, we are facing, again, the absolute chaos Levi saw in the concentration camps. As Barthes notes, “The trauma is a suspension of language, a blocking of meaning” (Barthes, 1982: 30). Rosi insists on this trauma, the certainty of its reality confirmed by the absence of distance, sublimation, or interpretation. The fact is that that there is nothing left to say.

Rosi’s *Fuocoammare* leaves us with an unsolvable paradox, that of a dead migrant standing squarely at the center of our historical reality, simultaneously present and absent. Her body cannot be dismissed; it is the trauma,
the return of the repressed in the doctor’s episode, which challenges lan-
guage inasmuch as language is invested with syntax and meaning. The
silent gaze that accompanies the retrieval of the corpses on the abandoned
vessel points to the fear mentioned by Samuele’s grandmother in her den,
as she reminisces about WWII. It is the sense of oppression Samuele
cannot explain to his doctor; it is the Lampedusans’ condition, which Rosi’s
images signal as an impossibility, that of a way out through language. Its
collapse is a failure of logic, of rationality, and of sense. The corpses are
the absolute “quotation.” Placing them at the center of our gaze serves to
focus on the human repercussions of our globalized order. The root of the
problem, in Fuocoammare, is the way we perceive, understand, and repre-
sent reality. Like Samuele, forcing our “occhio pigro,” our lazy eye, to work,
means to sharpen our vision, to make a more effective use of our ethical
judgment. As with the biblical sling that Samuele cuts at the beginning of
Fuocoammare, our good judgment needs to come from a resistant tree, and
it takes, as Samuele reminds his friend, passion. Pathos is, in Aristotelian
terms, one of the modes of persuasion: the audience’s emotion awakens
“to induce them to make the judgment desired … to change their opinion
in regard to their judgment” (Aristotle, Book 2.1: 2–3). Aristotle posits also
that, alongside pathos, good ethos is necessary to establish credibility
(Aristotle, Book 2.1: 5–9).

Fuocoammare’s “quotations”/images are uncomfortable, disruptive, desta-
bilizing to our desire for the familiar, the comforting, and the normative. But
they are much more. If, as Iain Chambers notes, “the world is drawn ever
tighter into being rendered accountable only to its language and logic, to its
unilateral power” (Chambers, 2016: 121), Rosi’s work questions that very
same language, that very same authority. The Mediterranean archive, its re-
pository of accumulated proximities, refuses to be left out, to be re-written
within the rules of “there is no alternative,” which has justified modernity’s
interpretations of events, and hegemony over historical narrations. The
alternative is the unspeakable “quotation”: dead bodies that force our lazy
eye to focus and to see again.

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